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In early modem England the word "measure" had a number ofdifferent but
related meanings, with clear connections between physical measurements and the
measurement of the self (ethics), of poetry (prosody), ofliterary form (genre), and of
capital (economics). In this dissertation I analyze forms of measure in early modem
literary texts and argue that measure-making and measure-breaking are always fraught
with anxiety because they entail ideological consequences for emerging national, ethical,
and economic realities.
Chapter I is an analysis of the fourth circle of Dante's Inferno. In this hell Dante
portrays a nightmare of mis-measurement in which failure to value wealth properly not
only threatens to infect one's ethical well-being but also contaminates language, poetry,
and eventually the universe itself. These anxieties, I argue, are associated with a massive
shift in conceptions of measurement in Europe in the late medieval period. Chapter II is
van analysis of the lyric poems of Thomas Wyatt, who regularly describes his
psychological position as "out ofmeasure," by which he means intemperate or subject to
excessive feeling. I investigate this self-indictment in terms of the long-standing critical
contention that Wyatt's prosody is "out ofmeasure," and I argue that formal and
psychological expressions of measure are ultimately inseparable. In Chapter III I argue
that in Book II of the Faerie Queene Edmund Spenser figures ethical progress as a course
between vicious extremes, and anxieties about measure are thus expressed formally as a
struggle between generic forms, in which measured control of the self and measured
poetic composition are finally the same challenge. Finally, in my reading of Troilus and
Cressida I argue that Shakespeare portrays persons as commodities who are constantly
aware of their own values and anxious about their "price." Measurement in this play thus
constitutes a system of valuation in which persons attempt to manipulate their own value
through mechanisms of comparison and through praise or dispraise, and the failure to
measure properly evinces the same anxieties endemic to Dante's fourth circle, where it
threatens to infect the whole world.
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1CHAPTER I
DANTE AND THE IDEA OF MEASURE
AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE RENAISSANCE
It hath been ordained that one measure and one weight should be throughout all this
realm of England...
Magna Carta
As Virgil and Dante enter the fourth circle of hell in the seventh canto of The
Inferno, they are accosted by Plutus, the ancient god of wealth, who clucks at them in a
simulacrum of speech: Pape Satan, pape Satan, aleppe! These words-approximating
real language, but resisting translation-introduce the pilgrims and the reader into the
region of hell reserved for the avaricious and the prodigal, those who mismeasured
wealth in their former lives, either by hoarding or by squandering, and are consequently
condemned to spend eternity colliding with one another in an indiscriminate, swirling
mass. By opening this canto with nonsense words, Dante immediately establishes a
connection between measure and language, or, more accurately, between mismeasure and
mangled language.
This connection-between one's ability to measure wealth and one's ability to
speak-is the canto's dominant recurring theme; it is derived in part from an ancient and
venerable connection established by Boethius in his commentary on Aristotle's De
2
Interpretatione. All forms of measure in this hell are debased, beginning with economic
measure, for money is the ultimate marker ofvalue. 1 In Virgil's words,
Tutti quantifuor guerci
si de la mente in la vita primaia,
che non misura nullo spendio ferci. (40-2)
[Every one of them was so cross-eyed of mind in the first life, that no measure
governed their spending.2]
No misura-measure-governed the spending of these souls while they were alive, and
in the afterlife their mismeasure is transformed into a world where they must suffer an
existence of extremities, eternally denied the ethical mean that they themselves disdained
during their mortal lives. Dante repeatedly relies on the imagery of extremity to describe
their suffering. The sinners swirl between extreme points in the expanse they inhabit,
"d'una parte e d'altra" (26), "on one side and the other." From these opposing sides they
move da ogne mana a l'opposito punto, "on either hand to the point opposite" (32).
Instead of occupying the spatial middle ground, the sinners continually return to the
extreme ends of their hell. They move toward the middle only to encounter violence,
smashing into one another with their meaningless burdens.
But as much as it is a hell of extremes, Dante's fourth circle is also a hell of
broken language, a region that continually reenacts the moment after the fall of the Tower
of Babel. For Plutus' speech is not the only failed language in the seventh canto. As they
1 R.A. Shoaf establishes this connection, noting that "Aristotle [... ] insists that 'all goods
to be exchanged... should be measurable by some standard coin or measure.' From this
need, universally recognized, for a common measure, arises what [I] call the reductive
power ofmoney-the power of money to reduce anything and everything to itself" (11).
2 All translations of Dante in this dissertation are from Robert M. Durling's edition.
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run in their furious circle, holding great weights, the sinners speak only in
interrogatories, "crying 'Why do you hold?' and 'Why do you toss?'" (30). Although
their voices clearly ring out, there are no answers here; their questions are purely
rhetorical, and this speech approximates a cry of agony more than a communicative
attempt. In the final part of the canto, when Virgil and Dante encounter those condemned
for wrath, another sin of ethical excess,3 they find that the sinners "gurgle in their throats,
for they cannot fully form the words" (125-6).
These three forms of language-the guttural clucking ofPlutus, the rhetorical
questions ofthe avaricious and prodigal, and the throat-gurgling ofthe wrathful-
constitute the only forms oflanguage endemic to the mismeasurers. There is no dialogue
in any meaningful sense, just as there is no true dialectic, merely thesis and antithesis
eternally alternating while the possibility of synthesis disappears into an infinitely
regressing horizon. Dante cannot talk with the sinners as he does elsewhere in hell. The
souls cannot even insult one another. They merely talk (or gurgle) at one another.
Language exists in this hell purely as utterance and its communicative function is aborted
even at the outset; this is a place of infinite questions and no answers. Only Virgil and
Dante, walking through this circle, practice a viable form of language when they speak to
one another, and in noting the cause ofthese sinners' punishment, Virgil is overtly
conscious of his ownparole:
Mal dare e mal tener 10 mondo pulcro
ha tolto loro, e posti a questa zuffa:
qual ella sia, parole non ci appulcro. (58-60)
3 Aristotle follows his discussion of extremes and deficiencies of wealth in Nicomachean
Ethics 2.6 with a discussion of anger, which itself "admits of an excess, deficiency and
mean" (2.7)--the wrathful are those who are excessive in anger.
4[Bad giving and bad keeping has deprived them of the lovely world and set
them to this scuffling: whatever it is, I prettify no words for it.]
Virgil's statement, constructed as it is in elegant, interwoven terza rima lines,
self-consciously points to an inescapable irony: Dante does prettify words. The
Commedia, with its strictly defined temporal and geographical parameters, its
hypersensitivity to the passage of time and to spatial relations, and above all its precisely
measured language-its poetry--offers itself as a perfectly ordered countermeasure to the
swirling disorder of the mismeasurers. Dante is conscious of the way his terza rima, his
misura, counters the disorder of these sinners. Their abortive attempts at language, the
unanswered questions they shout at one another, constitute a kind of anti-poetry:
Cosi tornavan per 10 cerchio tetro
da ogne mana a 1'opposito punto,
gridandosi ancheloro ontoso metro; (31-3)
[Thus they would return around the dark circle on either hand to the point
opposite, again shouting at each other their shameful meter.]
Here the correlation between language and measure becomes clear: there is an
inextricable connection between shameful measure and shameful meter. Metro is misura;
meter is measure.4
4 The relationship is etymological. "Meter" (and metro) and "measure" (misura) probably
derive from the same Indo-European root, and throughout their histories these words
have meant both poetic meter and the measure of physical objects (Oxford English
Dictionary, "mete" nl). In ancient Greek, for example, "metron" could mean both poetic
meter and quantitative measure (See OED "meter/metre," where the etymology lists
meanings of Greek metron as "poetic metre, measure, rule, length, [or] size."). Similarly,
the classical Latin cognate metrum meant either "poetic metre," or "a vessel or other
object used for measuring," while mensura [misura, measure] could refer to either a
"system ofmeasurement" or "metrical or rhythmical value" (see OED, "measure" n:
S
This connection points to a deep measure-anxiety present in the late medieval
period. By figuring this circle ofhell as a measureless chaos, Dante dedicates the canto to
these anxieties, the apprehensions of a culture in the throes ofa massive shift in the way
it conceived of measure. In this circle the avaricious and prodigal produce in a pure form
the consequences ofmismeasure, or, more accurately, they produce the cultural fantasies
of anxiety that accompany perceptions of mismeasure. Dante does not merely reinscribe
the sins of the intemperate in an ironic contrapasso punishment; instead he gives the
sinners over to themselves, to the extremity of their own mistaken view ofthe world.
Their punishment does not mirror or reverse their sin; they create their own hell by
enacting the essence ofmismeasure. Lack ofmeasure is given free reign and pushed to its
logical and (ironically) extreme end.
This is why, in the fourth circle, there are no persons. It is the ability to order the
world that allows us to distinguish one person from another, just as it allows us to
distinguish between hours on the clock, between boundary lines on maps, between
worlds, and between words. The logical end of mismeasure is the loss of individuality
itself. The pilgrim Dante thinks he will be able to recognize and speak to some of the
sinners, as he does throughout hell. But the damned here have lost more than their ability
to speak. They have lost the markers by which they are distinguished as individual
personalities: the failure properly to distinguish economic value manifests in hell as the
"action or process of measuring, system of measurement, instrument of measurement,
[or] metrical or rhythmical value." In English the meanings of the cognates of these
words carryall the same interrelationships. "Measure" and "meter" can both refer to
poetic structures and to physical quantification, and "measure" and "met" both point to a
behavioral dimension as well. They conjoin in the proverbial phrase "met and measure,"
as in the proverb "met and measure make men wise" (OED "met" Sa).
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inability to distinguish among people.5 Virgil delineates this connection by taking up
and playing on Dante's use of "conoscere," the Italian word for knowledge or
recognition. When Dante says he will surely be able to recognize (riconoscere) some of
the avaricious, Virgil disagrees:
la sconoscente vita che iIe sozzi
ad ogne conoscenza or lila bruni. (52-4)
[The undiscerning [sconoscente] life that befouled them makes them dark now
to all recognition [conoscenza].]
In Aristotle's discussion of structural techniques in the Poetics, he frames
recognition (anagnorisis)6 as an epistemological event, a "change from ignorance to
knowledge" (2.4). Terrence Cave has analyzed the implications of recognition at length;
he notes that the etymology Aristotle uses to define anagnorisis survives in the English
(and Italian) cognate: '"Ana-gnorisis', like 're-cognition', in fact implies a recovery of
something once known rather than merely a shift from ignorance to knowledge" (33).
There are recognitions, and mis-recognitions, in the Commedia: in nearly every circle
Dante recognizes a friend or enemy, from whom he gains some understanding, yet this
"something once known" is, in the fourth circle, irrecoverable. Mismeasure has
foreclosed the possibility of riconoscenza; whereas other denizens of hell can recognize
and speak to one another, can learn from Dante or tell him of their forms of existence,
here there is only darkness. Dante's failure to recognize these souls, Virgil explains, is
deeply connected to their particular sin, to their failure to measure wealth. It is the result
5 This measure-anxiety is analyzed in the context of an English literary text in Chapter
IV.
6 The Italian cognate is riconoscenza (Cave 5).
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of an epistemological short circuit initiated by the sinners themselves: mismeasure in
life has annihilated the possibility of recognition in the afterlife, and with it the discovery
that would (potentially) lead to peripeteia, to some change in circumstance.
Virgil's connection between the sin and its punishment depends on the slippage
he exploits between various forms of conoscere, between forms of knowing. What is in
life a failure of the intellect properly to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate
attitudes toward money-a failure of reason or cognition-becomes, in the afterlife, a
failure to distinguish between persons-a failure ofre-cognition. Virgil's wordplay
allows him to draw a causal connection between mismeasure and failed recognition, that
is, to explain why miserliness and wastefulness should lead logically to an inability to
recognize persons. Yet the connection relies primarily on what may be called
etymological accidents, connections between words more than connections between
agents situated in a compelling relationship of cause and effect. If so, Virgil's explanation
points toward a salient feature ofmismeasure, a fact ofmeasure anxieties in the late
medieval and early modem periods: the sense that mismeasure causes widespread effects
(seemingly) unrelated to measure itself.
The cross-categorical threat of mismeasure implied by the failed recognitions of
Dante's seventh canto is not a special case, but an early example of how anxieties of
measure would manifest throughout the early modem period.7 This dissertation tracks
7 In using the term "early modem" instead of the term "Renaissance"-here and
elsewhere in this dissertation-I emphasize how the onset of the new measures
(beginning roughly with Dante) constitutes a worldview that is essentially "modem" and
that has not been displaced. Both terms imply fundamental discontinuities between the
medieval and subsequent periods, though "Renaissance" clearly suggests a return to the
idealized classical age. Because I am interested in both "looking forward" and "looking
8
those anxieties and the effects they have on literary-cultural productions in the sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries in England. Dante presents a world where the sins of
prodigality and avarice are imagined as a nightmare ofmismeasure, one that ties together
diverse meanings of misura and suggests that failures ofmeasure cannot be partitioned.
But the nightmare of failed misura is, for writers of the centuries that follow, undeniably
real. For these writers, mismeasure is a kind of contagion in which failure to measure
properly in one category threatens the ability to measure in all categories.
The sense of connections between categories ofmeasure, the feeling that one
failure ofmeasure leads to another, is the context of Ulysses' famous speech in the first
act of Shakespeare's Troilus and Cressida. Ulysses' premise-that the failure to keep
"degree" destroys the world-is described in terms of contagious disease: when "degree
is shaked [...] the enterprise is sick" (101,3). The inability of the Greek troops to order
themselves is figured as an infectious fever, an epidemic:
The general's disdained
By him one step below; he, by the next;
That next, by him beneath. So every step,
Ensampled by the first pace that is sick
Ofhis superior, grows to an envious fever
Of pale and bloodless emulation. (1.3.129-134)
This paranoid worldview depends on the premise that the universe is divinely ordered,
and that disorder at any level threatens the entire universe, the entire created order. The
order ofthe universe is mirrored at the level of human cultural relationships. Ulysses'
catalogue ofthe institutions that depend on estabiishing order comprises a significant
backward," both terms are helpful in conceiving the historical period theorized in this
dissertation, and both are used. My decision to refer primarily to the period as "early
modem" is dictated by current institutional usage.
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range of the period's social intercourse. Military ranks, residential communities,
academic positions, guilds, international commerce, primogeniture, inheritance, systems
of government, and-importantly for a play treading in ancient literary waters-laurels,
all depend on keeping proper degree, or as Ulysses describes it, "degree, priority, and
place,lInfixture, course, proportion, season, form,lOffice and custom, in all line of order"
(86-88). This assertion of the relationship between the (dis)order of human institutions
and the (dis)order of creation is an early modern commonplace. Benedetto de Cortrugli, a
fifteenth-century merchant, argues that the example of God's creation is the proper
pattern for human systems of order: "Inasmuch as all things in the world have been made
with a certain order, in like manner they must be managed" (Crosby 199). Because
disorder is contagious, disorder in the heavens disrupts the order established in human
institutions, as when an astronomical occurrence threatens war and disaster.8 But the
converse is equally true: the disease of disorder among men threatens to infect all the
world.
That creation is ordered was obvious to observers of heavenly bodies from ancient
times and was taken as a sign of the divine order of the universe. The Book of Wisdom
provides the key text for early modern understanding of God's role as a creator and as a
measurer: ""thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight" (11 :20).
This text is one of the most frequently quoted Bible verses of the middle ages; indeed,
E.R. Curtius notes that "the ordo-idea of the medieval world-picture developed from this
one Bible verse" (504):
8 For examples see Shakespeare's Hamlet 1.1.129-42 and Julius Caesar 1.3.424-34.
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Through this verse, number was sanctified as a form-bestowing factor in the
divine work ofcreation. It acquired a metaphysical dignity. This is the imposing
background of numerical composition in literature [... ]. "Numero disposuisti."
God's disposition was arithmetical! (504-5)
This key verse thus unites God's creation and the writer's creation under the rubric of
measured disposition; it emphasizes the relationship between ordering and creating
inherent in the opening lines of Genesis, in which creation consists of a three-part model:
God speaks things into existence, divides them by category and name, and then
announces that they are good.9 This linguistic, metric, normative creative process occurs
again and again until the creation of the universe is complete. Before this, the earth is
"without form"; the pre-created state is literally chaos. God creates the world via
language, which comes a priori, and the act of measurement is simultaneous to the act of
creation. Virgil points to the creation in the same canto, emphasizing God's attention to
9 Genesis 1:14-5:
And God said, Let there bee lights in the firmament ofthe heaven, to divide the
day from the night: and let them be for signes and for seasons, and for dayes and yeeres.
And let them be for lights in the firmament of the heaven, to give light upon the
earth: and it was so.
The nascent connection between governing and measuring is captured by the double
meaning of the English word "rule," where the lights both reign over their respective
divisions and simultaneously measure them out:
And God made two great lights: the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser
light to rule the night: he made the starres also.
And God set them in the firmament of the heaven, to give light upon the earth:
And to rule over the day, and over the night, and to divide the light from the
darkenesse: and God saw that it was good. (Genesis 1:16-8, Authorized Version)
11
distributive measure. He tells Dante that God delegated the rule of the heavens to
governors whose job it is to ensure that light is meted out equally:
Colui li cui saver tutto trascende
fece li cieli, e die lor chi conduce
sl ch 'ogne parte ad ogne parte splende,
distribuendo igualmente la luce. (73-6)
[He whose wisdom transcends all things fashioned the heavens, and he gave
them governors who see that every part shines to every other part, distributing
light equally. 10]
The inhabitants of the fourth circle, in their mismeasure, deconstruct the first
creative act. Their mangled version of order, their eternal commitment to disorder,
reverses the creative, ordered language-the poetry---of God's created order. Virgil's
strategy for defeating Plutus at the opening of the canto is to refer to God's mandate for
Dante and Virgil'sjoumey: "Silence, cursed wolf1 Consume yourself with your rage
within. Not without cause is our descent to the depths: it is willed on high, where Michael
avenged the proud onslaught" (l0-2).11 Virgil reminds Plutus that the primeval disorder,
10 Virgil's reference to the genesis of the world analogizes and contrasts the way Fortuna
works; in the same way God intends that his governors distribute light, he intends that
Fortuna distribute wealth and favor, though her rationales must remain inscrutable to men
caught in the movements of history. When he discusses Fortune, Virgil relies on a
medieval commonplace articulated by Boethius, who is much more negative about
Fortune's role. Dante's notion that Fortune facilitates the cosmic distribution of measure
according to God's plan is more complicated than Aristotle's belief that the greatest
ethical good (happiness) can be achieved irrespective of fortune, though Aristotle agrees
that fortune can be a factor in the loss of happiness (Nicomachean Ethics 1.8). The
medieval English poets considered Fortuna "the force that threatens not only king and
state, but all human civilization and order" (Ebin 44).
11 Virgil's invocation ofPlutus-the god ofwealth-as a "cursed wolf' implicitly
connects him with the medieval allegorical referent: avarice (The wolf also recalls the
wolf of Canto I, which is usually recognized as a symbol of avarice.).
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the rebellion of Satan, was destroyed by the countenneasures taken by God's ministers,
the angels who enforce law and order. Virgil vanquishes Plutus by referring to the
ancient triumph of an objective system of order over disorder, the measure by which God
"rules" (that is, governs and measures) the cosmosP
The association of disorder with rebellion points to a key anxiety for the period.
As Shakespeare's Ulysses argues, order at the personal level has a direct effect on social
order. Rebellions-including Satan's-are mismeasure writ large; they are an epidemic
resulting from the contagion indicated at fIrst by the symptoms ofpersonal disorder. 13
The ability to govern a people depends on the ability of individuals to govern themselves.
Thus moderation in one's actions becomes an ideologically important standard, and
temperance becomes a critical virtue for any society interested in order, for it constitutes
a model of self-conduct the state has an interest in promoting among its populace, a
political analogue of the state's interest in confIning disease, in preventing the spread of
sicknesses that threaten to become disastrous epidemics.14 Indeed, the ability ofpoets to
create intemperance in their readers was one of the primary reasons Plato argued for the
12 The pun is operative in Old English: metan (to measure) and metod (Creator).
13 The changing fortunes of the factions in Florence, suggests Virgil, are the result of how
Fortuna, another of God's ministers, distributes prosperity in ways inscrutable to men.
14 Thus Michel Foucault, in The Use ofPleasure, fInds that sexual relations in ancient
Greece were not censured by the moralists according to categories of desire (such as
same-sex desire) but according to whether the desire was temperate: "What distinguished
a moderate, self-possessed man from one given to pleasures was, from the viewpoint of
ethics, much more important than what differentiated, among themselves, the categories
ofpleasures that invited the greatest devotion" (187).
13
banishment of the poets from the republic. 15 Furthermore, failing to order one's writing
(one's language) also threatens to infect the social order. I6 In The Art ofEnglish Poesie,
George Puttenham relies on the epidemic nature of disorder when he points to examples
of folk poetry in which the (dis)order of words leads to or encourages rebellion, including
the Peasant's Revolt of 1381 (345-6).
Montaigne, in his essay "Of Moderation," also appeals to metaphors of contagion
to describe mismeasure: "As if our touch were infectious, we by our handling corrupt
things that of themselves are beautiful and good. We can grasp virtue in such a way that it
will become vicious, ifwe embrace it with too sharp and violent a desire" (146).
Mismeasure is so infectious that it risks turning inward and contaminating even virtue
itself. I7 The danger for Europe, the humanists realized, was not lack of religion, but
overzealousness in religion. Thus when Montaigne claims he has "known a man of high
rank to injure his reputation for religion by making a display ofreligion beyond all
15 "And as to temperance, isn't the most important thing for the common people that they
be subject to the rulers, and that the rulers themselves exercise temperance in drink, love,
and feasting? [... ] I think it does not make for temperance if the young men hear [certain
verses in Homer]" (33). Furthermore, Plato argues that temperate men are not interesting
dramatic subjects, so poetry makes intemperate leaders its heroes and encourages us to
sympathize with them (52-3).
16 This was a special concern for Lydgate, who frequently noted the capacity of the
maker-poet to order the realm. As Lois Ebin argues, the Hundred Years War made the
connection between poetry and political rule particularly relevant in fifteenth-century
England: "Lydgate underscores the role of the poet in reinforcing the office of the prince,
both by providing models of the good ruler and subject and in moving humanity to
embrace these ideals" (41).
17 In the case of intellectual pursuits, not overreaching was important enough for
Montaigne that he had a verse from the epistle to the Romans (12:3) inscribed on the
rafters of his library: Nolite esse prudentes apud vos metipsos (do not think too highly of
oneself, but soberly).
14
example ofmen of his sort" (146),18 one editor suggests that the historical person
referred to is Henry III of France.19 If so, the analogy is particularly apt, for early in his
career Henry III seemed to occupy a middle position in the War of the Three Henries,
attempting to hold the throne against the Hugenot Henry ofNavarre while Henry of
Guise rallied staunch Catholics against any concessions toward the Protestants.
Henry III failed to navigate the landscape of extremism successfully, instead
presiding, while Duke, over the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre and later, while king,
engineering the assassination of Henry of Guise. Of the three Henries, it was in fact
Henry ofNavarre who represented the moderate middle position, which proved to be a
much more effective strategy for governing a religiously divided country. Montaigne's
allusion to Henry III points to the pressing historical consequences of his topic-
moderation-in a typically offhand way, but hints at the barbarity lurking in the
potentials of immoderation. The contagion ofmismeasure, even if applied to otherwise
holy pursuits like religion, leads to the massacre of thousands and threatens to bring
down nation states. The answer to this threat, as to all threats ofmismeasure, is
temperance, the ability to control oneself, which if practiced carefully by all will prevent
the disease of disorder from destroying the person, the community, the state, and the
world.
In Dante's conception failures ofmisura evince the same ability to jump
categories, to infect other measureable classes. He relies on the lexical complexity of
18 See also Olivia's claim about Malvolio's Puritanism, in Twelfth Night: "0, you are sick
of selflove, Malvolio, and taste with a distempered appetite" (1.5.86-7).
19 Donald Frame, 146 n. 2.
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misura to investigate the interconnectedness of measure and the consequences of its
failures. For Dante and for the early modem writers who would investigate measure-
making and measure-breaking, measure can be partitioned into three separate but related
spheres modeled by the creative activity of God: it is quantitative, normative, and
linguistic. It refers, first of all, to the measure of physical properties (such as height,
weight, volume, and time), which I shall refer to as quantification. Secondly, measure
constitutes an ethical category, specifically the Aristotelian conception of virtuous
behavior as proper habits subject to the laws oftemperance. Finally, measure has an
inextricable relation to language, which depends on a shared system ofmeasure in order
to function. In literary investigations into measure, language becomes a special area of
concern, for mismeasure always threatens language. For instance, in poetics, where
formulations of language are most self-consciously structured, "measure" is synonymous
(in Western languages) with poetry itself.
It is perhaps obvious to say that Dante's use of misura refers to measure as
quantification. This is the first and oldest sense of "measure," in both Dante's Italian and
modem English, the meaning that refers to the application of numbers to dimensions of
space and time. Around the time of Dante's birth the technologies that made the
standardization and precision of these forms ofmeasure underwent profound changes.
Dante's generation was the first to live in the world of the mechanical clock, a measuring
device one historian calls "perhaps the greatest single human invention since that of the
wheel" (Cardwe1139), and the early modem period is in many ways an age marked by the
changes in worldview that accompany a monumental shift in conceptions of
measurement.
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The new technologies of measure were swiftly and widely disseminated, so that
by 1560 Pieter Bruegel the Elder was able to dedicate an engraving to their collective
success. This work, entitled "Temperance," celebrates the achievements of measuring
technologies (Fig 1). At the center of the print the allegorical figure "Temperentia"
presides, moderating, as it were, the various figures surrounding her. These figures
represent the new sciences ofmeasure that had proliferated from the thirteenth century to
Bruegel's own historical moment: accountants, musicians reading musical notation,
astronomers measuring the sky, cartographers measuring the earth, children learning
standardized letters, compasses, and numerous devices, including squares, a plumb bob,
and-balancing on top of Temperance's head-a mechanical clock measuring the hours
of the day. These forms ofmeasurement were, for the period, new technologies, new
ways of seeing the world. Together they constitute a kind of omnibus of the technological
achievements ofmeasure from the thirteenth through the middle of the sixteenth
centuries. Almost all of the instruments in the print had been invented in the relatively
recent past; they are manifestations of a view of the world that began to disseminate in
Europe a generation before Dante and that still holds sway. In this sense, the images in
the print may be thought of as early modern technologies, for they represent the advent of
a way ofthinking of the world and about quantification that has persisted and become a
cornerstone ofmodem conceptions of reality.
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Figure 1: "Temperance"
The quantifying technologies presented by Breugel together constitute one of the
primary reasons for the period's anxiety about measure and mismeasure. The problem of
how to organize the world-how to categorize thought, systematize knowledge, measure
things, and order words-is a problem that presents itselfto every culture and every
historical epoch. But some historical periods are special cases. Europeans living in late
medieval and early modern Western Europe witnessed a massive upheaval in thinking
about measure, what Alfred Crosby calls "a new model of reality": a shift from
qualitative to quantitative categories of thought (xi). It was this "swing away from
metaphorical models to mathematical ones" that created the foundation for the
development of modern sciences, for "[i]n form, at least, Kepler's was a mathematical
universe rather than a qualitative one" (Finkelstein 2). An epistemology that had held
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sway since antiquity and that privileged qualitative analysis of the world began to give
way to a new understanding of how the world might be conceptualized, a craze for
quantifying the world, for enumerating all aspects of reality itself.2o
Dante writes in the early throes of that change, for the period between 1275 and
1325 witnessed "Europe's first mechanical clock and cannon" (Crosby 18), both of which
helped Europeans to think of time and space, respectively, as quanta. At the same time, or
shortly thereafter, advances in marine charts facilitated advances in navigation,
perspective painting revolutionized the visual arts, and double-entry bookkeeping nudged
the West toward the rise of early capitalism (19). For Europe, it was an era of new
measures. These measures both caused and were the effects of enormous shifts in how
the average European thought about the world.
It is almost impossible to overstate, for instance, the effects wrought by changes
in how Europeans thought about time in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Before
mechanical clocks, sun-based systems ofmeasurement dictated that the day had twelve
hours and the night had twelve hours, no matter what time of year it was. In the summer,
daylight hours were simply longer than nighttime hours, and in the winter the reverse was
true (Leach 113). Furthermore, most people kept track oftime not according to hours of
the day, but according to the local church's ringing of the bells at the seven canonical
"hours" (Crosby 33). These monastic divisions are the usual measures of time in Dante's
Commedia, but a more precise, mechanical way ofmeasuring time was even then
appearing in Western Europe, and Dante refers to these new measures alongside the old:
20 It was in the fourteenth century that scholars at Oxford began to think about measuring
"motion, light, heat, and color" with abstract quanta, and if these, why not "certitude,
virtue, grace?" (Crosby 14).
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the mechanical clock was invented in the l270s (Lloyd 648), and a few decades later,
in the Paradiso, Dante employs the gearwork of such a clock as a metaphor for the
spinning movement of ecstatic souls (Crosby 79).
The first mechanical clocks were, like the bells announcing the hours ofchurch
prayer, communal, usually located on towers in urban centers. These clocks changed not
only the common belief that hours could vary in length by season, but also the very
conception of time itself, a conception that lasted from the ancient world into the
fourteenth century. E.R. Leach points out that "[i]n the Greco-Roman world the only
mechanical time-recorders were water devices, which conveyed a notion of constant flow
rather than of consecutive equal intervals" (113). Other conceptions of time prior to the
mechanical clock also depended on the metaphor of flowing substance, and thus time
itself was conceived ofas flowing until the thirteenth century. But Crosby argues that,
because measuring devices based on this view--eandles, water, sand-were not reliable,
the shift in worldview toward quantification was necessary for the invention ofthe
mechanical clock: "Solving the problem becomes possible when one stops thinking of
time as a smooth continuum and starts thinking of it as a succession of quanta" (80).21
The result is what Leach calls "scientific time," a new way of thinking about being itself,
in which time is not cyclical or magical, but "a simple dimension, analogous to length,
21 Adas describes the transition to the mechanical clock as a shift from the religious to the
secular, and hints at the relationship of quantified time to the rise of capitalism: "By the
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries considerable numbers ofEuropeans, particularly
those living in urban areas and engaged in textile production or commerce, had
undergone the profound reorientation of time perception that the spread of public and,
later, private clocks had effected. Personal and social activities, especially those related to
work and market exchanges, were increasingly regulated by manufactured, secularly
oriented machines rather than natural rhythms or religious and ritual cycles" (61).
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and capable of being measured in equal intervals according to any convenient scale"
(114).
The ability to think of time as "a simple dimension," or "a succession of quanta"
is directly related to the rise of the cash economy. The misvalue of money is Dante's
target for measure anxiety in the Inferno because money is the ultimate quantifier; the
move to a cash economy in the late Middle Ages dramatically increased the possibilities
of the quantifiable worldview, to the extent that a scholar in the fourteenth century was
able to proclaim that "(e]very saleable item is at the same time a measured item" (Crosby
70). This view hints at the pervasive nature ofmeasuring, for early capitalism suggested
that everything could potentially be a "saleable" and therefore a "measured item," and
every measured item is potentially a mismeasured item.
The rise of the cash economy tied time and money together as measurable
categories, for it allowed time to be quantified by means of the measure of interest on
debt (Crosby 71) and the burghers, the merchant class not included in the three medieval
estates, dedicated themselves to the quantification of wealth as much as they did to the
mechanical clock (77). For the first time labor became measurable by abstract quanta,
rather than by generational relationships of feudal allegiance and protection, and the
quanta of exchange were made visible in the columns of the ledger sheet, added and
balanced by means of another new invention of the fourteenth century: double-entry
bookkeeping.22
22 See Crosby, 199-223 for a discussion of the advent of bookkeeping in Europe. Future
economic advances were aided by developments in mathematics, for it was not until the
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries that hindu-arabic numerals finally replaced Roman
numerals, and the use of basic arithmetic signs like + and - followed later (Crosby 113).
21
Measured time also revolutionized the art of music, as the Gregorian chants of
medieval churches began to give way to ordered, written polyphonic composition. Music
in the Medieval period already took advantage of harmony, of the proportion of pitch
between various notes, and harmony had provided the basis of metaphors of music as
order since ancient times; the music of the spheres, a concept at least as old as
Pythagoras, associates musical harmonies with astronomical proportions and places both
in the context of God's creative measures. When Johannes Kepler calculated the orbits of
the planets on the Copernican model at the end of the sixteenth century he relied on this
quasi-mystical metaphor to explain the proportions of celestial movement. Music ordered
space, and, with the development of polyphony, time began to order music, for
polyphony added a temporal order to what had been timeless chants. Several singers
voicing different parts require a consistent time signature to avoid absolute chaos. In the
thirteenth century musicians systematized the relationship of notes in proportion to one
another, so that the duration of one note might equal the duration of two notes half as
long. Music had become quantified in terms of both pitch and time.23 It remained a
commonplace metaphor for God's creative order: Ulysses, in Troilus and Cressida,
follows his planetary metaphor with a musical one: "Take but degree away, untune that
string,lAnd hark what discord follows" (1.3.9-10).
The visual arts, too, became subject to the tyranny of numbers as painters turned
to mathematical principles to aid their pursuit of representing perspective. In 1425 the
Florentine artist Filippo Brunelleschi exhibited a series or demonstrations revealing his
"discovery" of the vanishing point, and, for the first time since the classical age, pictures
23 See Crosby 139-163.
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were made according to the principle of geometric linear perspective (Edgerton 4-5). It
is perhaps not coincidental that Brunelleschi was trained in architecture, where the
application of numbers to spatial objects developed ahead of other arts and sciences in the
Middle Ages. A decade later the Florentine artist Alberti elaborated these rules in a
treatise on perspective, creating "the first document ever-anywhere in the world-to
relate the optical laws of vision to the aims and aspirations of artists" (6). These
innovations entail the application of the laws of geometry to painting, and later in the
same century Leonardo da Vinci classed painting among the sciences that depend on
mathematics (Adas 62). In Breugel's print a painter thus crouches in the lower left comer
near other arithmeticians: the merchants and money counters.
The science of cartography, interested as it is in the application of numbers to the
real world, benefited from the developments of linear perspective. Additionally, the
discovery ofPtolemy's world atlas by a group of Florentine humanists in 1400
revolutionized the study of mapmaking; Ptolemy's methods included solutions to a
number of problems of translating the spherical features of the world to two dimensions,
notably by taking the viewer's point of view into account. Ptolemy provided three
cartographic methods, one of which provided a way forward for Florentine cartographers
by reducing "the traditional heterogeneity of the world's surface to complete geometrical
uniformity" (Edgerton 113). As Samuel Edgerton makes clear, the revolution in
cartography was the same as, and in some ways dependent on, the revolution in art. It
entailed the application of geometry to two-dimensional space in the representation of the
three-dimensional world. By the sixteenth century, cartography had advanced from the
metaphorical "T-0" maps of the middle ages-based on an allegorical worldview that
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placed Jerusalem at the center of the world and relied on medieval Christian number
theory-to maps that accurately portrayed the world on mathematically-based models.
This numeration of the world itself represents a kind ofparable of the late medieval, early
modem transition from a metaphorical "worldview" that represented symbolic truths
about God's creation to a quantifiable, scientific depiction of the world.
Bruegel's print is a useful compendium of these new forms of measure, but it also
suggests a crucial point about the way measure functioned in the early modem period. In
his analysis of the technologies Bruegel depicts, Alfred Crosby does not mention the
most obvious fact of the print, its raison d'etre, and it might seem that I too have
neglected the person at the center of the engraving: this figure, as the writing on the hem
of her garment reveals, is Temperance, and she stands (appropriately) at the center of the
engraving. In her hand she holds a bridle connected to a bit in her own mouth, modeling
self-restraint. To view the print as merely a historical index ofmeasurements would be to
miss the key point: all quantitative measures are tied together by the allegorical figure of
ethical measure. Ifit does not strike viewers as peculiar that this anthology of technical
achievements is surrounding a personification ofvirtue, it may be a testament to the
pervasiveness of the ancient relationship between the measure of objects and ethical
measure. While the technologies Bruegel depicted were, for him, relatively new, the
relationship between measuring objects and measuring the selfwas not. Thus
Temperance stands at the center of Breugel's print, while the new technologies of
measure circle her like constellations; Temperance for Breugel, as for Dante, is itself the
metonymical index by which all forms of measure may be presented and connected. By
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the ethical category of temperance the order of the universe is tied, measure for
measure, to the order of the self.
Dante's view of the vices of avarice and prodigality borrows heavily from
Aristotle,24 who spells out the how temperance applies to the spending and keeping of
money:
In giving and taking money the mean is generosity, the excess wastefulness and
the deficiency ungenerosity. Here the vicious people have contrary excesses and
defects; for the wasteful person spends to excess and is deficient in taking,
whereas the ungenerous person takes to excess and is deficient in spending. (2.31)
In the case of avarice and prodigality, both vices represent a failure properly to value
wealth, either by investing it with too much value (avarice) or too little (prodigality).25
The resident of this circle has mistaken the proper measure of wealth because desire has
infected the will, causing him or her to miss the mean state. Excess and deficiency in the
keeping of money are versions of the same sin insofar as they both fail to keep the proper
mean, but oppose one another insofar as they stand on opposite sides of the virtue of
generosity. Thus Aristotle refers to them as "contrary excesses and defects," and Dante's
24 For Dante's knowledge ofNicomachean Ethics, see Minio-Paluello, 67. In dialogue
with Dante, Virgil calls this work "fa tua Etica" (Canto XI). Dante's knowledge of both
Aristotle and the medieval redactors and commentators of Aristotle was extensive, and in
the Commedia Dante quotes or refers to the Ethics "not less than forty times."
25 The kinship of this meaning can be traced etymologically as well: in post-classical
Latin mensura came to signify "moderation." (Oxford English Dictionary, "measure" n.)
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Virgil says that the sinners cry out "when they come to the two points of the circle
where their opposing faults (colpa contraria) disjoin them" (43-45).
It is not a coincidence, then, that Dante alludes to Charybdis in a simile early in
the canto. He describes the swirling mass of sinners as a monstrous whirlpool:
Come fa Z'onda Zasovra Cariddi,
Che si frange con quella in cui s'introppa:
Cosi convien che qui Za gente riddi. (22-4)
[As the waves do there above Charybdis, breaking over each other as they
collide: so the people here must dance their round.]
The reference to Charybdis invokes the classical type of excess and deficiency, a parable
alluded to by Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics. 26 The passage through the strait of
Messina, traversed by Jason and Odysseus (and later, in a different but appropriate
setting, Guyon), provides an ideal analogy for the ethical task of achieving the mean. On
one side crouches the monstrous Scylla and on the other swirls the whirlpool Charybdis,
and the challenge of passing safely between these dangers corresponds to the analogous
ethical task of seeking the "golden mean."
How is missing the golden mean an emblem of temperance? For Aristotle and for
the scholars who disseminated his work, temperance had a double sense. On the one
26 Whereas Aeneas is told by the prophet Helenus to avoid the passage entirely, Odysseus
decides to travel closer to Scylla to avoid the more dangerous extreme, Charybdis.
Aristotle interprets this as an analogue to ethical decision-making. Often one extreme is
worse than another; a lack is more dangerous than an excess or vice versa: "we must first
of all steer clear of the more contrary extreme, following the advice that Calypso also
gives-'Hold the ship outside the spray and surge.' For since one extreme is more in
error, the other less, and since it is hard to hit the intermediate extremely accurately, the
second-best tack, as they say, is to take the lesser of the evils" (2.33). It is actually Circe
who gives Odysseus this advice (Book XII).
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hand, it refers specifically to vices associated with missing the proper mark for eating
and drinking, or for sexual activity. Aristotle and Aquinas both locate its sphere as that of
the senses. But it also has a more general meaning, one that can apply to almost all forms
of virtue. Dante's consideration of measure as failures of temperance in relation to the
keeping and spending of money would have been familiar to late medieval readers; the
classical, Aristotelian model of ethics presents most virtues as states achieved by
avoiding extremes, that is, as schemata subject to the general rule oftemperance.27 Thus
in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines "virtue" (conceived broadly) as "a mean
between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency" (2.23). Accordingly, almost all
vices can be thought of as failures to keep the ethical mean?8 On this model, courage is
not the opposite of cowardice, but the middle ground achieved by behaving properly-in
the right way at the right time according to the circumstances with which one is
presented. One can be deficient in the virtue (cowardice) or excessive (foolhardiness), but
deficiencies and excesses are both related, in opposite ways, to the virtue they have
missed. Cowardice and foolhardiness are in one sense opposites, but in another sense
they are very much the same, for they are versions of the same ethical deficiency: they
27 The rich tradition of scholastic Aristotelianism was a relatively late feature of the
medieval period; commentaries began to appear only in the thirteenth century, and they
were usually based on poor Latin translations. Humanist interest in moral philosophy and
the return to translations based on Aristotle's Greek texts made the Nichomachean Ethics
increasingly important to early modem thinking in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. See Charles Schmitt 3-5 and 15-25.
28 Some vices do not fit the tertiary system, but are simply wrong in and ofthemselves,
such as theft and adultery: "Hence in doing these things we can never be correct, but
must invariably be in error. We cannot do them well or not well---e.g. by committing
adultery with the right woman at the right time in the right way." (2.23).
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both represent failures to achieve proper courage. This sense of excesses as both equal
and opposite is a commonplace in both ancient and early modem conceptions of the
temperate virtues. Montaigne's comparison of immoderacy to marksmanship is a typical
metaphor: "The archer who overshoots the target misses as much as the one who does not
reach it" (146).
The ethical dimension of misura thus provides a convenient field for the
exploration of measure more generally, for a venerable tradition of virtue theory
originating in the Nichomachean Ethics-and extending through the church fathers and
Aquinas to Dante-viewed temperance as a virtue that could itself govern or apply to
other virtues. Thus Aquinas, in his analysis of Aristotle's treatment of temperance, turns
to Augustine to emphasize this point: "For when Augustine writes, [']It belongs to
temperance to keep oneself sound and unspoilt for God,['] he is indicating the function of
every virtue. On these grounds temperance is a general condition ofall virtue" (2a2re.
141,2 my emphasis).29 Thus while temperance is a virtue that has a special meaning in
relation to governing the appetites of the senses--especially taste-it also governs other
appetites, including spiritual ones (Aquinas 2a2re. 141,4-5). Just as "taste" has a
metonymic relationship to desire more generally, so temperance (Aquinas argues) refers
to all virtues insofar as they represent the governing of desire: "Desire implies a certain
impulse of appetite for what is pleasurable, and the checking of this calls for the work of
29 Aquinas points to the metonymic function of temperance when he argues that it is both
a special virtue, as set down by Aristotle, that refers to temptations related to the physical
senses, and a general virtue that can apply to all virtues that deal with desire: "temperance
can be spoken of either broadly or more pointedly [... ]. Desire implies a certain impulse
of appetite for what is pleasurable, and the checking this calls for is the work of
temperance." (9, 15).
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temperance [... ]. Temperance is directly about desires" (2a2re. 141,3). And Thomas
Elyot, citing Plotinus, defines temperance as "the propretie or office therof is to covaite
nothynge whiche maye be repented, also nat to excede the boundes of medyocritye, and
to kepe desyre under the yocke of reason" (257).
Like Dante's canto, this chapter began with an assertion of the connection
between broken measure and broken language. The relationship between language and
misura is perhaps less obvious than the connection between quantitative forms of
measure, but it too may be traced to technological innovation. Letters themselves became
standardized and measureable by means of the appearance, in Germany in the fifteenth
century, of a number of innovations that collectively constituted the invention of
moveable type. The effects of print on the development of early modem culture have
been discussed at great length, and it is a commonplace that the standardization of letters
by size facilitated the dissemination of ideas-many of them ideas of quantification-that
provided the impetus of the humanist conceptions of a "Renaissance." But printing had
another effect, for it began to change the very way that Europeans thought of language
itself. The organization of words into printable quantities begins to fix language, which in
its various dialects, spellings, scripts, puns, and overall slippery relation to real-world
referents represents a maddeningly difficult category to measure.
Dante's historical position before these technologies began to fix language marks
him as a thoroughly medieval figure. The obvious fact of language in the fourteenth
century is its brokenness, and Dante's concern is with what Thomas Greene calls "the
scandal of the mutability, the ungrounded contingency oflanguage" (5), the sense that the
vernacular languages of Europe were separated not only from one another (by country, by
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region, and sometimes even within a single city), but also diachronically from
themselves, so that the language of one's neighbors might be as unintelligible as the
dialects of the ancients. In De Vulgari Eloquentia Dante traces the descent from the
unified, eternal language of God, spoken by all humans before Babel, to the variable and
various languages marked by the sin ofmen. This discussion is marked by nostalgia for
the lost language that tied words to their referents in the real world:
I say that a certain form of language was created by God along with the first soul;
I say "form" with reference both to the words used for things, and to the
construction ofwords, and to the arrangement of the construction; and this form
of language would have continued to be used by all speakers, had it not been
shattered through the fault ofhuman presumption [... ] (13).
Greene notes that the impulse to tie language to some kind of universal measure, a
"natural language" or "universal authority" extends from Plato to Chomsky. For Dante
and for early modem writers this impulse is motivated by a deep unease about the
possibility that one's language will pass from existence, that one's writing will ultimately
become unintelligible. Noting examples from Samuel Daniel, Castiglione, and
Montaigne, Greene identifies this linguistic obsession with an abiding uneasiness: "for
most medieval and Renaissance writers, the recognition of linguistic mutability was a
source of authentic anxiety" (6).
The measure of language-and the accompanying "authentic anxiety" of failed
language-is Dante's final major investigation into misura. As I have argued, the broken
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language ofthe seventh canto points to the interconnectedness of measurable
categories and to the contagion ofmismeasure. The failure of the intemperate to measure
themselves threatens the efficacy of language: without a shared measure for words,
language cannot exist. But language is more than just another measurable category, for its
relation to the world in the fourteenth century makes it a particularly acute locus of
measure anxiety. The philosophers of the ancient world had struggled with both the
epistemology and the metaphysics of language, recognizing that speech not only
organizes the world, but in a real sense might constitute it. Thus Gorgias argues that "We
communicate not about things which exist, but only speech," a mysterious and disputed
claim that suggests that there may not be a reality independent of human linguistic
construction (qtd. in Cooper 3). Metaphors that equate word and world are commonplace
in early modem literary texts, and the metaphor cuts both ways: language is a world unto
itself, with its own organization, relationships, and histories, just as the world is a version
of text, open to interpretation and commentary. God, both the Creator and the logos ofthe
world, ties text and reality together.
In The Order ojThings, Michel Foucault's investigation into the epistemological
bases of Western civilization-the historical shifts in perception of the world that enable
the existence of science and criticism-Foucault argues that the prevailing European
epistemology in force from the ancient period until the dawn of the seventeenth century is
"resemblance." It is the resemblance between things that indicates their relationship to
one another, and this resemblance is revealed by "signatures.;; The fact that a walnut is
good medicine for head ailments is revealed by a visible signature: walnuts look like
brains (27). Language is the ultimate system of signatures, for it constitutes the group of
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signs that both organizes the world and that represents the original order of things, the
divine knowledge of God that he has made evident to all: "There is no difference between
the visible marks that God has stamped upon the surface of the earth, so that we may
know its inner secrets, and the legible words that the Scriptures, or the sages of Antiquity,
have set down in the books preserved for us by tradition" (33). The ancients have already
done most of the work of gathering together visible signs and marking the resemblance
between things, and thus the primary task of knowledge in the Medieval and early
modem periods is one of uncovering. Nature and text must be interpreted: "The process
is everywhere the same: that of the sign and its likeness, and this is why nature and the
word can intertwine with one another to infinity, forming, for those who can read it, one
vast single text" (34).
Language is like the world not merely because it refers to the world, but because
like reality itself language consists of a measured system of affinities that together reflect
resemblances between things. Just as resemblances in nature require special knowledge in
order to be deciphered, the affinities that constitute language are esoteric, mysterious:
"Words group syllables together, and syllables letters, because there are virtues placed in
individual letters that draw them towards each other or keep them apart exactly as the
marks found in nature also repel or attract one another" (35). The secret resemblances of
language merely imitate, of course, the original language, the ancient speech before
Babel that truly resembled the divine order of the cosmos (36), but these resemblances
retain the secrets of God's creation for those wining to decipher them. This property of
language, its relationship with the world, lasts until the Classical period, when words
come to be viewed in terms of what they represent, rather than as a mystical system of
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signs that together reveal God's transcendent, incarnate will. At the end ofthe
Renaissance, Foucault argues, "[t]he profound kinship oflanguage with the world was
thus dissolved" (43). The word and the world become separated.3o
The position of language in the medieval and early modern periods is thus fraught
with anxiety, for language both hints at the secret, whole, and divine order of created
nature and inevitably points to the inability to know that order, to something that has been
lost. By "anxiety," the term I have been using for the pressures that produce Dante's
remarkable canto on measure, I refer to the cultural forces ofpsychological unease
created in part by technological and epistemological changes and revealed, consciously or
unconsciously, in the thinly veiled tropes of period literature and the preoccupations of
criticism. Language is always a locus ofmeasure anxiety because of its role in
categorizing the world and because of its relationship with the nature of god, the logos by
which he reveals himself to us.
In a hell ofmismeasure the anxieties ofbroken language are even more acute.
Dante's fourth circle ofhell constitutes what Foucault calls a "heterotopia," an "other
space." Heterotopias are places "outside" of society, like prisons, asylums, gardens, or
cemeteries, which create their own hierarchies of order. Often they are "heterotopias of
deviation," spaces reserved for those "whose behavior is deviant in relation to the
required mean or norm" (3). Foucault does not specifically mention literary hells as
heterotopias, but they surely fit his criteria. For instance, he points out that heterotopias
30 The humanists challenged the notion that language revealed the mysteries of God, but
their view still contextualized language as an anxiety-laden enterprise that entails the
measuring of the world: "an instrument both of self-expression and the practical ordering
of things" (Cooper 43).
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are "not freely accessible": "Either the entry is compulsory, as in the case ofentering a
barracks or a prison, or else the individual has to submit to rites and purifications. To get
in one must have a certain permission and make certain gestures" (5). The correlation
between the compulsory inhabitants ofthe prison and the inhabitants of hell is obvious,
as is the ancient commonplace of the rites that must be undertaken by those sti11living
who wish to enter hell, such as the requirement that Aeneas retrieve the golden bough and
offer it to Proserpina.31
One of the primary markers of a heterotopia, says Foucault, is its treatment of
language. Unlike utopias, which describe ideal regions, heterotopias are fraught with
anxiety:
Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language,
because they make it impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or
tangle common names, because they destroy 'syntax' in advance, and not only the
syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which
causes words and things (next to and also opposite one another) to 'hold together'.
(xviii)
31 See the Aeneid, Book 6, lines 194-6: "Only he may pass beneath earth's secret places
who / first plucks the golden-leaved fruit of that tree." Another criterion of heterotopias is
that they constitute heterochronies, spaces where there is an absolute break with
"traditional time" (4). While Dante and Virgil maintain a strict sense of the passage of
time outside hell, the residents are more like the inhabitants of a cemetery or the
collections of a museum, "in which time never stops building up and topping its own
summit" (4-5).
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This is why, unlike utopias, which "permit fables and discourse," heterotopias
"desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the very possibility of grammar at
its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences" (xviii).
The inability to order properly is a condition of failed language: language depends
on order, but, as Foucault suggests, order depends equally on language. Thus Foucault
describes "certain aphasiacs" who, presented with the challenge of organizing colored
skeins of wool into patterns cannot construct a coherent order. Because these individuals
do not have linguistic categories for the objects they attempt to classify, they have no
capacity to create a unified system of organization. Their decisions are based on
resemblances between the objects, but these decisions cannot constitute a unified system
of organization, which would depend on language.
Within this simple space in which things are normally arranged and given names,
the aphasiac will create a multiplicity of tiny, fragmented regions in which
nameless resemblances agglutinate things into unconnected islets; in one comer,
they will place the lightest-coloured skeins, in another the red ones, somewhere
else those that are softest in texture, in yet another place the longest, or those that
have a tinge of purple or those that have been wound up into a ball. (xviii)
But things fall apart: "no sooner have they been adumbrated than all these groupings
dissolve again, for the field of identity that sustains them, however limited it may be, is
still too wide not to be unstable" (xviii), and so the aphasiac continually and infmitely
reconstructs the order of the world in a Sisyphean effort,
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Creating groups then dispersing them again, heaping up diverse similarities,
destroying those that seem clearest, splitting up things that are identical,
superimposing different criteria, frenziedly beginning all over again, becoming
more and more disturbed, and teetering finally on the brink of anxiety. (xviii)
Anxiety, persistently and consistently, is the condition of disorder, of failed measure.
When language becomes separated from its ability to organize and reveal the world,
when it exists (for instance) only in the mutilated forms of Dante's fourth circle, it creates
a literally unspeakable anxiety, for mangled language is the most devastating symptom of
the sickness of mismeasure that potentially infects all measurable categories and destroys
them. Thus the aphasiacs of Dante's seventh canto move in their circles, revealing and
simultaneously suffering the cultural anxiety of an epoch wrought by an upheaval in the
measure of the world itself.
II
On July 9th, 1486, Hemy Tudor issued a decree that one pound be paid from his
treasury to William Nele, "gonnefounder and brasier, of London, upone making of
diverse measures and weightes, according to the old standard of England, to be sent unto
severalle shires and cities of England" (Materials 493). As an element of the Tudor
bureaucratic apparatus, this order is fairly inconsequential. As a symbol of a series of
standardizations-both practical and ideological-however, it literalizes a set of
metaphoric re-measurings that together constitute a monumental shift in how the English
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conceived ofthemselves, their language, and their goods in the 16th and early 1i h
centuries. This dissertation investigates that shift, and the ways that the measure-anxieties
adumbrated by Dante at the beginning of the fourteenth century play out in the English
literary Renaissance during sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
The Renaissance, of course, came late to England. A cultural lacuna of English
court-inspired achievement extended from the reign ofEdward III, when Gower,
Chaucer, and Langland wrote their poems, to the establishment of the Tudor dynasty in
1485. Without a stable and powerful central court, there was neither a patronage system
available to support poets, artists, and musicians, nor a political advantage for the nobility
to use such endeavors to maneuver at court. The end of the Wars of the Roses initiated a
period of relative stability, but much of Henry Tudor's reign consisted of putting down
rebellions and was thus a continuation ofthe years in which the monarchs' primary goals
were military, their holds on the throne tenuous, and their investment in cultural
achievement minimal.
The national system of weights and measures, too, remained in a state of relative
chaos. English measures of quantity consisted of a hodgepodge of systems reflecting the
various cultural influences of the island's history. The currency, for instance, was at the
time of the Conquest coined locally by licensed moneyers who collected old coin and
recoined pence, which were then the only coin current (Johnson xix). Over the next three
centuries numerous new coins were introduced, usually modeled on continental
currencies like the florin. Gradually coinage became standardized and centralized in
London, though the state's attempts to control and regulate currency continued to face
challenges, such as the common practice of "clipping" coins to remove a portion of their
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metal. In England the attempt to standardize currency anticipated later attempts to
standardize other measures; obviously increased anxiety centered on unequal coinage,
and penalties for altering coins or for minting "light" coins were severe. In fact, every
attempt to standardize currency in the medieval period in England met with failure. It
would take more advanced manufacturing technologies and economic infrastructure to
establish the more sophisticated economic structures of the early modem period.
Pressure to standardize measures is created by the expansion from local to
regional, or from regional to national economies. Under the Tudors England transitioned
from a largely local, feudal economy to a burgeoning early capitalist center of
international trade, and this transition was accompanied by a corresponding regulation of
standards of measurement. Local standards for the area, dimensions, weight, and volume
of goods could be wildly different during the middle ages, and as Henry focused on
unifying England's social and political entities, he also attempted to accomplish the
monumental task of standardizing national measures. Henry's order thus represents, less
than a year after the Battle of Bosworth, an attempt to standardize and nationalize
England's disparate system of measures.
Henry had already given attention to the country's weights. A focus on
international trade required a unified measure for commodities exiting and entering the
nation, and in February of 1486, only six months after taking the throne, Henry provided
for the "[e]stablishment of a weighing machine (upon representations from divers of the
king's lieges that great losses have been sustained for want of one) or pesage beam
commonly called 'Ie Kinge's Berne,' in the ports of Exeter, Dertmouth, Plymmouth, and
Topesham, co. Devon and in all ports and places adjoining thereto" (Materials 302).
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These were to supplement the pesage (duty) beam at Southampton and provide a
standard for weighing imports and exports.
The money Henry paid to William Nele in July of the same year, however, is
more significant as an example of national standardizations, for it represents not only an
attempt to increase the national capacity for measure, as the pesage beams did, but goes
further: it suggests a mechanism for unifying regional differences. The idea that Nele
would fashion standard weights and measures, presumably from brass, and send them to
"severalle shires and cities ofEngland" represents a strategy for abolishing regional
difference.
This was not the first and would not be the last attempt to standardize England's
system of measures. The drafters of the Magna Carta had attempted to unify the national
system of quantification, but they had no practical means for implementing standards.32
The language of the charter insists on "one measure,"- "It hath been ordained that one
measure and one weight should be throughout all this realm ofEngland ..."-but the
national economies of trade and infrastructure were not yet sophisticated enough to create
the requisite pressure to invest in the actual standardization of the various weights and
measures. Differences in measure were not only regional, but were also artificially
created and enforced by the merchant class to create trade advantages, and the Magna
Carta, an anti-guild document, insists on the regulation of trade on behalf ofthe barons'
"interests as buyers, and against the interests of the trade guilds as sellers" (McKechnie
32 Rulers had periodically attempted to standardize England's weights and measures since
before the Norman Invasion. In 960 King Edward attempted to fix the bushel to the
London and Winchester standards (Whitelaw 16). Only a few years before the Magna
Carta Richard the Lionheart issued the "Assize of Measures," dictating that "[t]hroughout
the realm there shall be the same yard of the same size and it should be of iron" (16).
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358). The charter attempts to quash practices of manipulating measures for economic
advantage at the expense of the landed class:
Let there be one measure ofwine throughout our whole realm; and one measure
of ale; and one measure of corn, to wit, "the London quarter"; and one width of
cloth (whether dyed, or russet, or "halberget"), to wit, two ells within the
selvedges; of weights also let it be as of measures.
In 1215 unstandardized measure was enough of a problem to be diagnosed, but a remedy
would have to wait another two and a half centuries.
The Magna Carta's expression (in spite of its optimistic grammar) and Henry's
executive order both point to a perceived need. They suggest that regional differences in
the calculation of quantities and distances created real problems. But only Henry's decree
provides a plan for the unification of the systems of measure, a plan that privileges the
London measurements as standards by insisting on the conformity of regional variants to
the standards adhered to in London. Henry made another payment to Nele in September
of 1486, to continue his work of creating national standards. Yet these changes were not
immediately successful.
In 1491 Parliament took up the issue of measures, pushing the king to make
known the "true standard" of the nation's weights and measures:
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[C]onsidering that in divers partes of this your seid realm ther be used measures
and weightes some more large than the seid standard and som lesse because that
the very true mesure ofthe seid standard is not to all your true lieges verily
knowen, at your owne propre cost and charge have do lette make bothe weightes
and measures of brasse according to the very true standard" (Pollard 245).
Parliament explicitly identifies the problem of regional difference in weights and
measures and prescribes a solution, in great detail and in the language of bureaucracy,
establishing that
[... ] the seid measures and weightes of brasse be deyvered to the citezeine or
burgeises of the chief cites or shire townes or burghes ofevery shire in this realm
in this parliament nowe being. [... ] And the seid citizens burgeises or other chief
officers aforseid so theym receyvying, saufly to be conveyed to that cite towne or
borough that they be of, at the cost and charge of the seid cite towne or borough,
[... ] to thentent that as well all measures and weightes within the seid cite towne
or borough as the measures and weightes within the seid shire may be correct
reformed amended and made according and after the mesure of the seid standard
before the feste of Seynt Mighell tharcangell next comying.
A.F. Pollard contextualizes this and other Parliamentary legislation under Henry
Tudor in terms of the Tudor project of the nationalization of government, currency, and
measurement. Historical changes in trade necessitated legislative involvement:
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Internal trade was becoming national rather than local, and such [Parliamentary]
legislation as is devoted to this subject represents somewhat crude experiments to
substitute national for local regulation. Matters such as the fixing of wages and
hours of labour, and standards for commerce and manufacture, which had been
determined by guilds and municipal corporations, were now brought within the
expanding scope ofParliamentary interference. Effective steps were at length
taken to secure a national uniformity of weights and measures, licence was
occasionally granted by Hemy VII for the introduction of foreign clothworkers,
and the currency was improved, notably by the first coinage ofEnglish
sovereigns. (xlv-xlvi)
The key phrase here is the reference to trade "becoming national." The old allegiances
and regional bases ofpower were beginning to be reshaped into an ideology of a unified
English state, a state based on the power of the merchant classes that were then
establishing London as one of the centers ofEuropean commerce.
These attempts to standardize measure literalize other attempts to create
ideologies of England as a discrete nation state. There are thus two historical tendencies
governing the establishment ofEnglish measure under the Tudors. The first is the
quantification revolution-and attendant anxieties-discussed earlier in this chapter, a
shift in thinking about the world that affected every European between the years of 1300
and 1600. The second is the emergence ofan ideology of "England," a sense of the
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national language, dress, conduct, and culture that Tudor bureaucracy explicitly and
self-consciously promulgated.
These historical shifts provide the background for this dissertation's investigation
into early modem measures. The literal standardization of England's weights and
measures corresponds to the creation of a national, standard poetic measure, for just as
England's weights and measures varied by region, so the poetries ofthe fifteenth century
represented a jumble of influences and of forms. The transition from the alliterative
accentual poetry of the medieval period to the accentual-syllabic strictures of the high
English Renaissance have been widely discussed, although its causes, mechanisms, and
significance remain substantially unresolved, if not irresolvable. In Chapter II, I explore
the move from these various folk forms to a single, measured poetic line, a monumental
change in the conception ofpoetry and its rhythms in English that I refer to as the early
modem prosodic shift.
This shift can be contextualized in terms of England's determination to "measure
up" to its international cultural competition. This desire became manifest during the reign
of Henry VIII, when the Tudor court first consciously sought to establish a cultural
rivalry to correspond with its various national political rivalries. This included following
those countries' strategy of creating cultural ideological myths in which ancient
achievements were equaled and surpassed. This nationalistic, ideological movement
entailed the creation of a recognizable national-linguistic form, a measure that could
replicate the meters of the ancients and of continental forms and couid itself be
replicated. The breakdown of the medieval Anglo-Saxon poetic structural devices left
England without such a uniform poetic structural mechanism, without what would come
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to be called "numbers" by early modem poets. Chapter II thus analyzes the
establishment of numbers (particularly the preeminence of iambic pentameter), the
relative rapidity of the acceptance ofthat standard, and the critical (disciplinary)
measures taken against those in violation of the normalized meter.
The compelling aspect of critical prosodic debates lies in the intractability of the
debates themselves. I look at these debates both during the establishment of iambic
pentameter and in subsequent periods and argue that English poetic meter is built on a
pattern that is both precise and immeasurable. One of the fundamental acts of
measurement is criticism itself, in its processes ofjudgment, quantification, and
canonization, and I analyze Richard Tottel's Songs and Sonnets, an early and influential
anthology that establishes and creates metrical norms, and George Puttenham's The Arte
ofEnglish Poesy, which similarly judges and establishes measure in the service of
English cultural ideology. I focus on the work of Thomas Wyatt, whose metrics remain a
source of critical debate. Through close readings of Wyatt poems I analyze both how he
measures the poems and how they are remeasured by critics like Tottel and Puttenham.
The common property of metrical regularity and irregularity, I argue, is the
prevalence of anxiety, the measure anxiety ofthe aphasiac discussed earlier in this
chapter. Literary texts that confront measure are fraught with the anxieties of the
aphasiac, and because they are themselves constructed of words they become subject to
the anxieties of others, in an infinite regress of critical pressures on perceived instances of
mismeasure. Tnus criticism itself measures and becomes subject to measures. Critical
anxiety persists in current approaches to prosody and can be traced to other developments
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in the early modem period, which are discussed in subsequent chapters and include
shifts in the ethical and economic registers.
Chapter III analyses Book II ofEdmund Spenser's the Faerie Queene in the
context of ethical measure. This book, often seen as the most "epic" section of The
Faerie Queene, self-consciously responds to the central generic divide of the Aeneid
(between romance and epic), as well as one of its most significant themes: an extended
meditation on limits and empire. Unlike the Aeneid, the Faerie Queene posits a second
world with indeterminate edges, an open space in which measure is achieved through
personal ethics on the Aristotelian model. Furthermore, in Book II, which constitutes an
extended exploration of the virtue of temperance-the ethical analogue of the measure
and limits of the self-Spenser argues for a generic analogue for personal measure, one
in which the form of the work itself participates in what is advocated ethically: balance.
I argue that Book II of the Faerie Queen plays the romance and epic forms
against one another, identifying each with ethical categories of transgression (the
concupiscent and irascible passions) in an exploration and critique of Virgil. The book is
thus a kind of experiment, an investigation into classical ethics that identifies moral
temptation with the temptations of literary genre. Romance, which is gendered female, is
constructed as a form of temptation, ofmismeasure. Conversely, epic, which is gendered
male, constitutes an equal but opposite temptation, another form of mismeasure. Just as
Dido represents narrative deferral in Virgil's epic, so Phaedria, for Spenser, threatens to
prevent the hero from completing the narrative quest
In claiming that these narrative deferrals are loci of the cultural connotations
associated with romance, my argument is not that these values define romance, but that
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Spenser uses the divisionary model to set systems of value apart from each other and
investigate their effects on narrative action. The values associated with romance are
consistently those that, when considered in relation to those associated with epic, are
denigrated. This is not surprising, given the regular devaluation of romance in respect to
epic. What is surprising is the way that Spenser locates these values in terms of character
and space and reveals their negative potential not as instances of narrative failure, but as a
form of temptation-a form of temptation that also threatens the poem itself: as Gordon
Teskey argues, "there is a sense in [... ] Renaissance epic poets generally, that because the
heroic poem has its origin in the romance it is almost constantly in danger of an ethical
and aesthetic relapse" (4-5).
Earlier in Book II, the constellation of values associated with epic (masculinity,
violence, martial prowess) receives a much briefer treatment than those associated with
romance. This set of values is also a form of temptation, but wields comparatively little
power compared to that of romance and female sexuality, as Spenser claims in the first
stanza of Canto vi: "A Harder lesson, to learne Continencelln ioyous Pleasure, then in
grievous paine" (1.1-2). In this chapter I argue that Spenser, as Wyatt had done before
him, incorporates anxieties of measure into the form of the work itself, in this case in
terms of the poem's continual movement between romance and epic "temptations."
Finally, in Chapter IV, I examine the recurring expressions of value that circulate
through Shakespeare's Troilus and Cressida and the implications of those tropes on
language. I focus on the play's persistent attempts to fix value on literally everything,
including the play itself, attempts that ultimately remain groundless because of the lack of
an objective, intrinsic measure of value. The play both creates and undermines a world
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without objective measure and depicts that world as a hell in which language and
individual distinction fail.
In this play Shakespeare portrays emerging economic realities; specifically, he
literalizes exchange value. He rewrites Christopher Marlowe's famous lines on Helen of
Troy: Troilus substitutes "price" for Marlowe's word "face":
Is she worth keeping? Why she is a pearl
Whose price hath launched above a thousand ships
And turned crowned kings to merchants (2.2.80-2).
The word "price" represents the play's general tendency to figure all worth in economic
terms. As a result, Troilus and Cressida becomes a debate about value and measure in the
context of the rise of early capitalism, particularly in terms of what we would now call
"opportunity cost."
In Troilus and Cressida straining for individual distinction paradoxically results
in repeated failures to distinguish one individual from another. Again and again
characters' identities are confused. It is the lack of a standard of measure that damns both
Shakespeare's characters and Dante's indistinguishable souls. Furthermore, I argue that
without objective measure, individual worth depends on and is contextualized by the
value of one's peers, that is, it is a market value. As I have suggested, this recognition has
a thoroughly economic effect: individuals devalue the worth of others to improve their
own relative "price."
The economic quantification ofeverything creates a pervasive measure-anxiety.
In fact, Troilus and Cressida manifests many of the anxieties ofDante's fourth circle:
language is debased, people are indistinguishable from one another, and every aspect of
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mismeasure threatens to destroy the entire cosmos of measurable reality. The dominant
metaphors are thus those of contagion, for mismeasure is a sickness that runs rampant, for
the characters of the play, like Dante's sinners, are given over to their own failures of
measure. For Shakespeare, as for Dante, the world of appetite without measure is a kind
of hell. The anxiety of the early modem period is that-without proper measures-this
hell will spread like a disease and infect the whole world.
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CHAPTER II
"SO FAR OUT OF MEASURE": THOMAS WYATT'S LYRIC METER
Meter and measure is all one, for what the Greeks call Jlc'tpov, the Latins call mensura,
and is but the quantity of verse, either long or short.
George Puttenham, The Art ofEnglish Poesy (157).
Thomas Wyatt is a poet out of measure. To say this is to appropriate one of
Wyatt's own favorite expressions: he repeatedly describes his pain-and his beloved's
cruelty-as "out ofmeasure" or "without measure.,,33 To say that Wyatt is out of measure
is also to make a claim, in sixteenth-century usage, about his inability to achieve
moderation or temperance. To be out ofmeasure is to stand in excess of some normative
standard of being, to experience desire or fear beyond the usual bounds, to be in extreme
pain. Excess, in this sense, constitutes an ethical transgression, and can stand as a
metonymy for sin of all kinds; thus when Wyatt translates the sixth Psalm, he turns to
Aretino's version for a characterization of the sin that requires penitence as a sin of
intemperance: "Tempre, a lord, the harme of my excesse" (Wyatt 90). The experience of
excess creates, for whomever is out ofmeasure, a complex and contradictory emotional
state, the consequence of which Wyatt usually calls "restlessness," but which might be
33 See, for example, "Lo what it is to love!," To wisshe and want and not obtain," "Yf
with complaint the paine might be exprest," and "Psalm 6. Domine ne infurore."
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referred to as "anxiety.,,34 Thus one of Wyatt's poems on the cruelty of his beloved
begins, in the Egerton manuscript, "What rage is this, what furor of excess?" As that
poem and others reveal, the consequence of immoderate dependence on the beloved is
immoderate pain, and the resulting inability to rest became for Wyatt something of a
calling card. Thus Surrey, in one of his epitaphs for Wyatt, begins with a line-"Wyatt
resteth here, that quick could never rest" (Nott 45)-that echoes one of Wyatt's
frequently anthologized poems, "Of Carthage he that worthy warrior": "At Mountzon
thus I restles rest in Spayne."
Wyatt's anxiety-his restlessness-is one symptom of the tension inherent in the
concept of temperance in the sixteenth century. On the one hand, early modern ethical
theory designated temperance as a primary virtue, a mode that represents and epitomizes
all forms of desired ethical states, for to be virtuous, on the Aristotelian model, is usually
to be moderate. On the other hand, for the poet-speaker who appropriates the conventions
of a Petrarchan lover, the language oflove is the language of excess. For the medieval
courtly love tradition, for Chaucer, and for Petrarch-all important influences for
Wyatt-love is a kind of violence, and falling in love is always excessive. When Wyatt
says he is "out of measure," he is capitalizing on a centuries-long poetic tradition of
describing love as a form of excess, one familiar to any reader ofLe Roman de fa Rose or
Chaucer. One of Wyatt's earliest anthologized poems, "So unwarily was never no man
34 See, for example, "Alas poor man, what hap have I," "Of Carthage, he, that worthv
~. .... - .&' - ~ ~ '"
warrior," "There was never nothing more me pained," and "So unwarily was never no
man caught." In "Go, burning sighs unto the frozen heart," and "Once, as methought,
Fortune me kissed" Wyatt begs to be left "in rest." In "Mine old dear en'my, my froward
master," the speaker complains that Love "took me from rest and set me in error" (28).
Rest and amorous desire, for Wyatt's speaker, are usually mutually exclusive.
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caught," replicates perfectly the late Medieval conception of falling in love as a form
of violent excess.35 Wyatt's speaker wants his beloved, and he wants to be at rest, and his
primary complaint against the beloved is that she perpetuates these mutually exclusive
goals in an oscillating cycle of desire and repudiation, to which the speaker usually says
he would prefer the ultimate rest of death.
The tension inherent in Wyatt's poetry of excess is found in Petrarch as well, but
Wyatt is capable ofless poetic variety than Petrarch; he knows only a few tunes, and
together they constitute the music of resentment and frustrated desire.36 Thus, while
Wyatt argues repeatedly that his excessive feelings leave him in a state of unbearable
restlessness, this restlessness is also often the raison d'etre ofthe poems; without the
anxiety accorded by measureless desire many of the poems would not exist at all. Given
sixteenth-century England's cultural investment in the normative value oftemperance
and decorum, contemporaries would recognize the restlessness that gives rise to these
poems as an untenable emotional condition, deserving of sympathy. The tradition of
excess thus simultaneously and contradictorily functions in Wyatt's poetry as a recurrent
and conservative trope he may safely invoke against the forces and personalities that
serve as enemies in his poems, a trope that might even be called "comfortable," for it
allows Wyatt to position himself as unfairly victimized. Wyatt regularly returns to
gestures ofexcessive suffering both to create his poems and to make them count for
35Muir and Thompson note the Chaucerian influence on two ofthe poem's metaphors,
and Nott discovers several antecedents in Petrarch, which Muir and Thompson call
"commonplaces" (419).
36 C.f. Reed Way Dasenbrock: "Wyatt's range as a poet is much more restricted than
Petrarch's, but within that more restricted register, these poems of Wyatt have great
intensity and power" (30).
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something politically, to elicit the kinds of responses that might be advantageous for
his diplomatic career.37
I do not mean to suggest that every time Wyatt refers to mismeasure or to
restlessness he is consciously using his poetry to maneuver at court. To do so would be to
divest them of all aesthetic, psychological, and emotional content merely to salvage
political or economic motivations that Wyatt, had he been aware of them, would have
considered secondary at best. Wyatt's poems are obsessed with pointing out the injustice
of incommensurate relationships; surely he wants to elicit sympathy, to write himself into
a role of unfair victimization, but here I want to argue that the poems are doing much
more than that. In this chapter I do not attempt to manufacture for Wyatt manifest
motivations for his accusations and confessions of mismeasure, but rather to assume that
his motivations are complex, contradictory, and often hidden even from himself. I hope to
show rather that he regularly returns to the trope ofmismeasure because it both reveals
his own anxiety and simultaneously provides grounds for a grievance against his beloved,
an accusation of the worst kind of bad faith. In these contexts, mismeasure can,
paradoxically, produce both comfort and anxiety.
This chapter is interested in two key questions. First, how does Thomas Wyatt
(mis)measure himself? Wyatt's recurrent rhetoric ofvictimization works to establish that
he has lost measure of himself as a result of a corresponding lack of measure inherent in
37 As Jonathan Crewe and Stephen Greenblatt have shown, Wyatt's portrayal of himself
in both the lyrics and the letters cannot be taken at face value. Wyatt has a personal stake,
in the lyrics, in portraying himself as a man out of measure, as a victim, subject to the
whims of his beloved's measureless cruelty, just as he has an interest, in the letters, in
portraying himself as a chastened veteran of court intrigue who has learned that
withdrawal from that world is the best remedy for its evils.
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the behavior of his beloved. Here I argue that this mismeasure is a rhetorical position,
not so much a carefully contrived political stance as a poetic tic, a device Wyatt relies on
to express an untenable condition. It is sometimes difficult to place exactly the line
between an artificial, postured excess and real, uncontrolled emotion. I will argue that,
whether or not the poems represent actual emotional responses by Wyatt to the conditions
of his intemperate life, excess is for him a poetic device that reflects a real cultural
obsession over measure and mismeasure.
Secondly, how do critics (mis)measure Wyatt? Just as measure provides a
standard by which Wyatt may carve out a rhetorical position and score rhetorical points at
court, Wyatt's critics have also applied an arbitrary concept ofmeasure-a concept that I
will argue is highly artificial and necessarily subjective-in order to carve out their own
rhetorical positions and score their own rhetorical points. In the poetry of Wyatt excess is
an ethical category; his poems are confessions of an ethical imbalance. In Wyatt criticism
the category shifts to the aesthetic and his poems become signifiers of a formal
imbalance. Thus the same anxieties that shape Wyatt's measure and mismeasure of
himself are reproduced in the criticism ofhis work.
As I have argued in Chapter I, the period's obsession with measure and with lack
ofmeasure points both to a culturally pervasive neo-Platonic matrix of ethical concerns,
the correct balance of which is represented in the period by the term temperance, and to a
more subtle but equally pervasive social nonning of behaviors and personal comport, a
particular and ordered construction of the self, of which the appropriate balance is
denoted by the term decorum. These qualities-temperance and decorum--constitute key
aspects of the courtier personality, particularly for a courtier-ambassador like Wyatt.
53
Critics have always been fascinated by the facts of Wyatt's biography, even before
Stephen Greenblatt included a chapter on Wyatt in Renaissance Self-Fashioning (1980)
and consequently cemented Wyatt's place as a key subject ofNew Historicist study.38
The facts of Wyatt's life provide a background for the poetry's obsession with
mismeasure.39 Wyatt was certainly an intemperate man, given to passionate love affairs,
angry outbursts, long grudges, and violence. 40 His marriage was unstable and he
ultimately repudiated his wife and publicly accused her of adultery. While separated from
her, Wyatt fell in love with the woman who would become the most dangerous object of
desire in England, Anne Boleyn.41 This love affair nearly cost him his life twice-first
38 For biographical sketches before Greenblatt's, see Chambers, Southworth, and
Tillyard. For more recent New Historical analyses, see Brigden and Woolfsen's essay on
Wyatt in Italy; Gleckman discusses humanist anxieties about flattery, as manifested in
Wyatt's satires; Greene looks for the ways that the poems represent themes that resonate
with the conquest of the Americas; Powell contextualizes the poems in terms of Wyatt's
diplomatic mission, in an approach that might be called "historicist" as opposed to "new
historicist"; Jonathan Gil analyzes how Wyatt's treatment of sexuality in the lyrics
creates distinction in a system of power relations. The best historical treatment of Wyatt
is Stephen Merrit Foley's Thomas Wyatt (1990).
39 The biography can be misleading. It is tempting, for instance, to read a number of the
poems as though they were about Anne Boleyn, and to an extent the biography makes
such a reading possible. Yet connections between the biography and the poems are
tenuous, and too much significance can be placed on assigning persons and situations
from Wyatt's life to the poems (Greenblatt 146). At the same time, Wyatt's poetry is
about nothing except his tendencies, obsessions, and anxieties.
40 We know a good deal about Wyatt's life because he was one of Henry VIII's key
diplomats; his father had been a trusted servant of Henry Tudor, and Thomas became
involved in the court ofHenry VIII at a young age. His role as diplomat, his involvement
in political intrigue surrounding his diplomatic duties and his patron Thomas Cromwell,
and his romantic interest in Anne Boleyn make Wyatt an ideal subject for New Historical
research.
41 For the evidence on which this relationship is based see Thomson, 21-30, 176.
Although a love affair cannot be proved, Thomson notes that the "gossiping chroniclers
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when the King became infatuated with Anne in 1528 and again when she fell from
favor in 1536.42
Wyatt's immoderate nature was not limited to amorous pursuits and upheavals. In
May of 1534, "there was a great affray between Mr. Wyatte and the serjeants of London,
in which one of the serjeants was slain" (Brewer, qtd. in Thomson 32). For this Wyatt
was thrown in the Fleet briefly and then probably sent to his family's home in Allington
to "cool off' (Foley 16).43 Stephen Foley suggests that Wyatt, in his ambassadorial
duties, was "thought by many to be a hothead" (25), and his tendency to speak rashly got
him into trouble. Edward Bonner, Wyatt's fellow ambassador and lifelong enemy,
brought to Thomas Cromwell in 1538 a series of charges against Wyatt, including an
accusation that he had courted the favor of Charles V "above all mesure" (qtd. in Foley
25). Bonner also charged that Wyatt repeatedly complained of the time he spent in the
and tract-writers all concur on one point: that Wyatt courted Anne before the King
stepped in" (25), and most critics assume an intimate relationship: "There is plenty of
evidence to suggest that some of [Wyatt's] poems were written to Anne" (Muir Life, 15).
Muir notes that several sixteenth-century accounts claim that Wyatt personally warned
Hemy that Anne was unfit to be queen, as she had been Wyatt's mistress (19-20).
Wyatt's relationship to Anne Boleyn is discussed by Nott, Foxwell, Simonds, Chambers,
and Harrier, as well as every other biographer of Wyatt.
42 Wyatt's affair with Anne Boleyn was public enough that Hemy sent Wyatt on a
diplomatic mission to Calais during Hemy's courtship with her.
43 This incident offers some insight into Wyatt's temper, for a high-ranking diplomat to
be involved in a "great affray"-a brawl-suggests an inclination to give in to the
irascible passions (anger and violence). In early modem England having killed a man was
not particularly unusual, but one might think a diplomat would be better able to keep a
cool head and, more importantly, a controlled tongue, and certainly not be brawling with
sergeants in the streets of London. By killing a man in a brawl, Wyatt also participated in
a particularly brazen threat to social order. For unlike the duel, which reiterates social
order by means ofprecise attention to rank and protocol, and which calls for witnesses
and ritualizes (and thereby controls) violence, a brawl represents a complete capitulation
to the irascible passions and enacts a version of rebellion.
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Tower of London in 1536---during the fall of the Boleyns-and that he insulted the
King's person.44
Bonner's narrative of Wyatt's treason depended on Wyatt's own misspeaking:
first, Wyatt's supposedly treasonous claim that the king deserved to be "cast out at the
cart's tail"-a reference to death by hanging; and, second, Wyatt's complaints about his
imprisonment in 1536, which Bonner argued were evidence of Wyatt's motive for
committing treason with Cardinal Pole (Foley 26). Although Wyatt was ultimately
released, his tendency to speak impulsively was clearly an impediment to his personal
ambitions, and, indeed, Wyatt's own defense against the charge that he insulted the King
depended on this fact. As Muir puts it, Wyatt "admitted that he sometimes used this
proverb, but as Bonner had already taken exception to his outspokenness or coarseness he
would not have used it in front ofhim" (186).
Wyatt's "outspokenness or coarseness"-together with his brashness, violence,
and romantic entanglements-suggest a biographical basis for his tendency to accuse
himself in his lyrics of being "out ofmeasure." Michael Schmidt summarizes Wyatt's
personality in such terms: "He was a man of flesh and fiery blood, and his best poems are
decidedly un-Platonic, arising out of carnal passion" (124). This is not to suggest that
Wyatt is a cultural outlier; to live out ofmeasure was not extraordinary for a man of the
44 Cromwell investigated the charges and found them without merit (Foley 27), but when
Cromwell's policies failed and Henry executed him in 1541, Wyatt-as a member of
Cromwell's faction at court-was again imprisoned in the Tower, and Bonner's old
charges were again trotted out against him.
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rank and experience of Thomas Wyatt.45 The biography, rather than highlighting
Wyatt's unusual intemperance, instead points to a cultural fact oflife under Remy VIII:
court life encouraged daring, brashness, outspokenness, and wit, while intermittent
periods of state terror (fueled in part by a pervasive spy culture) threatened anyone
exhibiting these same qualities with execution.46 Yet Wyatt's tendency toward
intemperance is the personality trait perhaps most noted by biographers, and one of
Surrey's poems to Wyatt is a catalogue of commonplace sayings warning Wyatt not to
give in to extreme passions. The poem is included in Tottel's anthology, where it is titled
"Ofthe golden mean, and the danger and the inconvenience ofa too abject, or a too
elevated station."
Wyatt's restlessness is a function both of his own excessive temperament and of
his relationships. In his poems, he usually depicts his beloved as immoderately cruel,
which increases the speaker's anxiety and causes him immeasurable pain. A typical
expression of this pain is "Yfwith complaint the paine might be exprest," a madrigal
from the Devonshire manuscript:
Yfwith complaint the paine might be exprest
That inwardelye dothe cause me sigh and grone,
Your harde herte and your cruell brest
Shulde sighe and playne for my umeste;
And tho yt ware of stone
Yet shulde Remorse cause yt relent and mone.
45 David Starkey notes that Wyatt's life, "though dramatic, was in no way unusual. Every
aspect of it could be paralleled in the biographies of a dozen or more ofhis
contemporaries at the court of Remy VIII" (qtd. in Foley 29).
46 Greenblatt thus dismisses C.S. Lewis's depiction of Wyatt providing "a little music
after supper" by noting that "conversation with the king himself must have been like
small talk with Stalin" (136-7).
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But sins yt ys so farre out ofmesure
That with my wordes I can yt not contayne,
My overlye truste, my hertes treasure,
Alas whye doo I still indure
This resteles smerte and payne,
Sins yfye list ye maye my woo restraine?47
This is not a translation, yet in many ways it is a standard Petrarchan conceit. If it
were possible, the speaker argues, for the enormous pain caused by the beloved to be put
into words, she would be forced to speak out on his behalf---or rather, her own heart and
breast would testify against her, as though these body parts would stand apart and act as
impartial judges of her sins. The speaker's pain, however, is not capable of expression,
because it is excessive. There are two consequences to the excessive pain of the speaker:
the first is that the very existence ofthe boundless pain is utterly compelling. If the
beloved became aware of the magnitude of the pain, she would be forced to recognize
and alleviate it. The allusion to the gospel of Luke reinforces this point. In that gospel,
Jesus, during the Triumphal Entry into Jerusalem, is praised by the crowd as "the king
who comes in the name of the Lord." The Pharisees who witness this possibly
blasphemous and certainly treasonous clamor try to get Jesus to quiet the crowd, but
Jesus replies that "if these should hold their peace, the stones would immediately cry out"
(19:40). The message ofthe crowd is so universally true, so pressing, that it demands
expression. Likewise, the pain of the speaker in Wyatt's poem demands expression, if not
47 I have reproduced here, as elsewhere in this chapter, the original orthography ofthe
manuscript, as it appears in the Muir and Thomson edition of the collected poems. The
textual and editorial history of Wyatt is, to say the least, problematic (see Caldwell 241-
43). Despite the shortcomings of Muir and Thomson's edition, it remains the
authoritative complete poems in original orthography, and reproducing the spelling of the
original is important for a number of places in this argument, as I hope shall be clear.
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from a human voice then even from stones-or, in this case, the stony heart of the
beloved.
The second consequence of excessive pain, as the speaker makes clear, is that it
ironically resists expression. This is the paradox at the heart of the poem: neither the
beloved nor her stony heart will speak out on behalf of the poet, because even he cannot
speak on his own behalf. The excessive pain of the speaker both compels and resists
expression. The poem is thus a meditation on a paradox: it is an expression of its own
failure, for its subject matter is a pain so great that its expression is urgently required, but
precisely because of its magnitude that very expression is impossible. It retreats into the
trope of ineffability, but not of a mystical or scholastic kind; this is a paradoxical and
anxiety-ridden ineffability: the pain is literally unspeakable.
The incapacity to verbalize pain becomes the only reason for the poem's
existence, and the hypothetical first line-"if with complaint the pain might be
expressed"-posits a world in which this poem would not exist, for if complaint could
alleviate this pain, the poem would have no function. The poet could have written a poem
describing the pain, and the poet's woe presumably would have been lessened by the
contrite beloved. But in this poem the speaker's pain is out of bounds. At the moment the
speaker reveals the reason for his inability to describe the pain ("But sins yt ys so farre
out of mesure / That with my wordes I can yt not contayne"), the poem's syntax seems to
break down. Because the speaker's inability to describe his pain will, according to the
poem's logic, prevent his beloved from acknowledging and restraining that pain, the
madrigal should end as it began: as an expression ofa paradox ofpain. But the poem
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does something else. As the poet announces his immoderate feeling he leaves off mid-
thought and instead appeals to his beloved in spite olhis inability to explain his pain:
My overlye truste, my hertes treasure,
Alas whye doo I still indure
This resteles smerte and payne,
Sins yf ye list ye maye my woo restraine?
The tone of the first stanza treats the beloved as pitiless and cold, remorseless and
literally stony-hearted. But the second stanza changes tack, leaving behind the initial
meditation on the paradox of ineffability and instead entreating the beloved to end the
speaker's restless pain. Once the speaker has established the ineffectuality of attempted
expression, the only thing left for him to do is beg.
This is a poetics of excess. The speaker's immoderate stake in the beloved's
response creeps into the poem at every level. The eighth line of the poem invokes the
lover as "my overlye trust, my hertes treasure." "Overly" ("ouerly" in manuscript) is
always amended to "only" in modernized editions, and surely it should be, as this is the
only way to make sense of the line. But the manuscript orthography suggests the extent to
which excessive feeling controls the poem even at the lexical level: it is precisely Wyatt's
overly invested trust in his beloved that creates his boundless pain in the first place. He
has placed himself at the mercy of his beloved, a dubious strategy if her heart is as hard
as the poem suggests; he indeed "overly" trusts her, and suffers accordingly.
If the cruelty of the beloved in "Yfwith complaint the paine might be exprest"
leads to boundless pain, in "Lo, what it is to love!" love is treated as a snare, leading to an
"endless woe" irreconcilable with true wisdom: it is impossible, the speaker says flatly,
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"to love and to be wise" (24). Here the consequence of love is not only boundless
("endless") sadness, but also boundless repentance:
Love is a fervent fire,
Kendeld by hote desire,
For a short pleasure
Long displeasure;
Repentaunce is the hire;
A poure tresoure
Withoute mesure, (33_9).48
The cause of Wyatt's measureless pain is here, as elsewhere, the measureless cruelty of
his beloved. Wyatt's theme is usually the same: he has behaved in good faith, and has
placed his very life in the hands of a woman, and she has repaid him with boundless
cruelty and measureless ingratitude. Wyatt usually complains to the woman, alternating
between accusations of cruelty to pleas for consideration, sometimes within a single
poem, as in "If with complaint the pain might be expressed."
In one of Wyatt's better known poems, "Behold, love, thy power how she
dispiseth!" he appeals to a third party-the god of Love-for vengeance against his cruel
beloved:
Behold, love, thy power how she dispiseth!
My great payne how litle she regardeth!
The holy oth, wherof she taketh no cure
Broken she hath: and yet she bideth sure,
Right at her ease: and litle she dredeth.
Wepened thou art: and she unarmed sitteth:
To the disdaynfull, her liff she ledeth:
To me spitefull, withoute cause, or mesure.
Behold, love!
48 This is a three-part poem consisting of this first complaint against love, followed by a
defense of love, and culminating with the faintly dubious claim that "love is a pleasant
fire."
61
I ame in hold: ifpitie the meveth,
Goo bend thy bowe: that stony hertes breketh:
And, with some stroke, revenge the displeasure
Of thee and him, that sorrowe doeth endure,
And, as his lorde, the lowly entreath.
Behold, love!
The poem is a translation of a madrigal by Petrarch, and the source poem also
frames its argument as a formal petition or grievance.49 Petrarch's original emphasizes
the physical appearance of the beloved, and his tone is playful:
Or vedi, Amor, che giovenetta donna
tuo regno sprezza et del mio mal non cura,
et tra duo ta' nemici e S1 secura.
Tu se' armato, et ella in treccie e 'n gonna
si siede et scalza in mezzo i fiori et l' erba,
ver me spietata e 'ncontr' ate superba.
l' son pregion, rna se pietaancor serba
l'arco tuo saldo et qualcuna saetta,
fa di te et di me, signor, vendetta.
The speaker in Petrarch's poem protests that he is a prisoner, but much of the wit of this
lyric lies in a contradiction between the rhetorical model-a formal petition to a judge, an
appeal for advocacy against unjust treatment-and the substance of that appeal, which
instead of an expected earnestness, relies on what might be described as a kind of
49 Wyatt's treatment of his source material is here typical. Wyatt expands the poem from
a nine line madrigal to a fifteen line rondeau (see Muir 263), excises references to the
physical appearance of the beloved, and transforms Petrarch's "giovenetta donna"-a
young woman-into a mere "she." For accounts of Wyatt's overall treatment ofPetrarch,
see Dasenbrock (23-31), Chambers (129), and Holahan.
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fraternal needling, an appeal to the masculine sensibility of the god oflove that, as
Robert Durling's translation reveals, simultaneously pokes fun at the speaker himself:
You are in armor, and she in a mere robe with loose hair is sitting barefoot
amid the flowers and the grass,
Wyatt's tone, on the other hand, is acerbic and concise: "Weaponed thou art: and
she unarmed sitteth" (6). This is not to say that Wyatt's version lacks wit; his reference to
Love as "weaponed" alludes to the god's genitalia and picks up on the gendered appeal of
Petrarch's poem. But Wyatt's version rejects Petrarch's overall playful tone in favor of an
insistent earnestness. Petrarch's speaker complains that he is a prisoner of the giovenetta
donna, but Wyatt cannot prevent the literal cruelty of his beloved from seeping into his
translation; his beloved is an oath-breaker, disdainful oflove and spiteful toward the
speaker: "To the disdaynfull, her liff she ledeth: / To me spitefull, withoute cause, or
mesure" (7-8). Again, it is the measurelessness of the beloved that creates the anxiety that
generates and sustains the poem.
For Petrarch, love is likewise often out ofmeasure, and the beloved's part in the
rhetoric of excess includes blame; but Petrarch's is mostly the poetry of praise. Because
the relationship is always distant, always unconsummated, desire for the beloved is
described in terms of pain and frustration, but because the project ofloving Laura is at its
heart noble-and is so precisely because the relationship is unconsummated-these
feelings are always subject to the rules of decorum. The longer desire remains
unachieved, the more difficult and the more noble it becomes.
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Consider, for example, Rime 224, a poem in which, as Reed Dasenbrock points
out, Petrarch "uncharacteristically upbraids and attacks his lady" (29):
S' una fede amorosa, un cor non fmto,
un languir dolce, un desiar cortese,
s' oneste voglie in gentil foco accese,
un lungo error in cieco laberinto,
se ne la fronte ogni penser depinto,
od in voci interrorte a pena intese
or da paura or da vergogno offese,
s' un pallor di viola et d'amor tinto,
s' aver altrui pili caro che se stesso,
se sospirare et lagrimar mai sempre
pascendosi di duol d'ira et d'affanno,
s' arder da lunge et agghiacciar da presso,
son Ie cagion ch' amando i' mi distempre:
vostro, Donna, '1 peccato et mio fia '1 danno.
Even here, the yearning and desire associated with love are always modified by
ennobling adjectives, as Robert Durling's translation ofline two (un languir dolce, un
desiar cortese) indicates: the symptoms of love are "a sweet yearning, a courteous
desire.,,50 The poem catalogues the symptoms ofthe lover in terms of excessive bodily
reaction, capitalizing on a tradition that extends at least as far as Sapph051 : the lover's
pallor is too red, "like the violet's, tinted with love"; he is "always sighing and weeping";
his temperature fluctuates from too cold to too hot; and in one ofthe period's
commonplace signifiers of excess, his ability to speak is impaired (his thoughts are
"written" on his brow, but when spoken are "barely understood in broken words"). Yet
50 The English translations ofPetrarch's poems throughout are by Robert Durling.
51 See, for instance, "He seems to me equal to the gods that man" (Carson 63).
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the love itself is noble, and, even if Petrarch suggests that love here is destructive and
that the fault is on the part of the Donna, the experience is nonetheless salvaged by the
sweetness of the destruction.
What Wyatt makes of this sonnet reveals his preoccupation with the bad faith of
his beloved:
Yf amours faith, an hert unfayned,
A swete languor, a great lovely desire,
Yf honest will kyndelled in gentill fiere,
Yflong errour in a blynde maze chayned,
Yf in my visage eche thought depaynted,
Or else in my sperklyng voyse lower or higher,
Which nowe fere, nowe shame, wofully doth tyer,
Yf a pale colour which love hath stayned,
Yfto have an othre then my selfe more dere,
Yfwailing or sighting continually
With sorrowful anger feding bissely,
Yfburning a farre of and fresing nere
Ar cause that by love my self I distroye,
Yours is the fault and myn the great annoye.
Here, as elsewhere, Wyatt generates the poem from the restlessness created by both
resisting and giving in to excess. He begins, with Petrarch, by describing the sweetness of
desire, but quickly diverges. Where Petrarch characterizes his amorous experience as ''un
lungo error in cieco laberinto (4)"~"a long wandering in a blind labyrinth"~Wyatt says
that his love has been "long error in a blind maze chained" (4). Wyatt's decision to
translate the Italian word error into its English cognate gets at the difference between his
tone and Petrarch's: for Petrarch love is ambiguous, for errore can mean "to error" or ''to
wander"; for Wyatt the pun does not translate: his love has been a mistake. But Wyatt
goes even further here, for love is "a long error in a blind maze chained"; the addition of
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"chained" draws on the myth of Theseus and Ariadne, which Petrarch has merely
gestured toward, and reverses the way the allusion works. IfPetrarch's lover is
wandering the labyrinth in search of the Minotaur and inspired by love for Ariadne,
Wyatt's experience oflove is the same as that of the Minotaur, chained to the center ofa
vast labyrinth, bestial and monstrous.
Wyatt may have been attracted to this poem because of its obsession with love as
an instrument of immoderation.52 When Petrarch's speaker says "ch' amando i' mi
distempre"-in Durling's translation "I untune myself with love"-the reflexive verb
summarizes the effects of the "cagion," the intemperate symptoms of love. The speaker's
catalogue of bodily excesses reveals that the lady has caused him to "distemper"
(distempre) himself. Wyatt preserves the catalogue of excess, but changes the
summarizing verb. For Wyatt, to live in excess is a form of living death, and he translates
the line accordingly: "by love 1myself destroy" (13).
Both Petrarch's original poem and Wyatt's translation capitalize on a traditional
trope of immoderation: the fluctuation of extreme temperatures. The period's humoral
theory ofhealth privileged the idea of balance as the primary indicator of good health.
Thus "temperature" in the sixteenth century meant "[d]ue measure and proportion in
action, speech, thought, etc.; freedom from excess or violence; moderation" (OED 3a), or
"[t]he character or nature of a substance as supposed to be determined by the proportions
of the four qualities (hot or cold, and dry or moist); = TEMPERAMENT" (OED 4). The
52 This is one ofDasenbrock's examples of a poem Wyatt chooses to translate faithfully
"because Petrarch is writing a poem more like one of Wyatt's" (29). However,
Dasenbrock misses the significance of the allusion, suggesting that the only significant
change in Wyatt's translation is in the increased attack ofthe final tercet.
66
etymological connection between "temperature" and "temperance" suggests why
temperature, for Wyatt, is an indication of intemperance. To bum or to freeze-and
especially to bum and to freeze-indicates that something is out of balance, that the
speaker is out ofmeasure. Petrarch's poems discussing the "contraries oflove," often
including the trope of extreme temperatures, were favorite targets of translation for
Wyatt, as in "I fynde no peace and all my war is done," where Wyatt's speaker
complains: "I fere and hope I bume and freise like yse." This translation ofPetrarch's
Rime 134 is entirely a catalogue of contrary emotions, ending with the paradoxical
expression of the cause: "my delite is causer of this stryff."
In another expression of rnismeasure, Wyatt, via Petrarch, invokes the Classical
and early modem trope of the nautical passage between Scylla and Charybdis, a metaphor
for the attempt to achieve the ethical mean:
My galy charged with forgetfulnes
Thorrough sharpe sees in wynter nyghtes doeth pas
Twene Rock and Rock; and eke myn ennemy, Alas,
That is my lorde, sterith with cruelnes;
And every owre a thought in redines,
As tho that deth were light in suche a case;
An endless wynd doeth tere the sayll a pase
Of forced sightes and trusty ferefulnes.
A rayn of teris, a clowde of derk disdain
Hath done the wered cordes great hinderaunce,
Wrethed with errour and eke with ignoraunce.
The stares be hid that led me to this pain;
Drowned is reason that should me confort,
And I remain dispering of the port.
Wyatt changes Petrarch's "Scilla et Caribdi" to "Rock and Rock," but the metaphor still
invokes the challenge of temperance in its Classical form. The sailor must navigate the
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extreme outliers, the tempest that symbolizes intemperance, to achieve a temperate and
ethical path.
Just as "My galy charged with forgetfulnes" relies on a classical metaphor of
Scylla and Charybdis to invoke the dangers oftemperance, Wyatt invokes another
classical metaphor in "Avising the bright beams ofthese fair eyes," a fairly confusing, if
not incoherent, translation of a sonnet by Petrarch (Rime 173). In this sonnet Wyatt says
that the mind complains ("playneth") about Love, who lives in the beams ofhis lady's
eyes. Here Wyatt invokes Plato's metaphor of the charioteer to indicate the mind's lack
of control over its passions. Properly, the sould should function as a chariot, with the
"inner ruler"-the charioteer--eontrolling both the "better," horse, which is "tempered
by self-control", and its teammate, which is "opposite" and "unruly" (Plato 28,38).53 The
speaker's mind, however, seeing the "woroldly paradise" that is the lady's love, has given
the reins of the chariot to Love, who wreaks chaos with his spurs and bridle.
Avysing the bright bemes of these fayer Iyes,
Where he is that myn oft moisteth and wassheth,
The werid mynde streght from the hert departeth
For to rest in his woroldly paradise,
And fynd the swete bitter under this gyse.
What webbes he hath wrough well he perceveth
Whereby with himself on love he playneth
That spurreth with fyer and bridilleth with Ise.
Thus is it in such extremitie brought:
In frossen thought nowe and nowe it stondeth in flame
Twyst misery and weith, twist ernest and game;
But few glad and many a dyvers thought;
With sore repentaunce ofhis hardines:
Of such a rote commeth ffruyte fruytles.
53 For an influential early modem gloss of the allegory of the chariot, see Ficino 67-71.
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Again, Wyatt chooses a poem ofPetrarch's that accentuates paradox and
"extremity," though here Petrarch's usual elevation of supreme love and the nobility of
suffering is deemphasized. Both versions include the temperature metaphor of fire and
ice, and both include the horsemanship trope. Wyatt departs from Petrarch, and manages
to include the temperature trope not once but twice, by mixing it with the horsemanship
metaphor. Petrarch describes love as a horseman ch' a si ca1di gli spron, si duro '1 freno
("whose spurs are so hot, whose bit is so hard"). Wyatt's charioteer, however, is not
merely a forceful influence; in his case Love wreaks havoc by spurring and bridling with
fire and ice, possibly at the same time: he "spurreth with fyer and bridilleth with Ise." As
always, Wyatt's speaker cedes management of himself to an intemperate love, and
subsequently and continually rues the loss of control over his own passions.
II
Wyatt's lack of emotional measure has an intrinsic analogue at the formal level,
and the extent ofWyatt's anxiety-as it is adumbrated in the content of his poetry-plays
out at the level of form, in terms of his lyric prosodic technique. These are related
questions: how may one control-that is, measure-~me's conduct, and how may one
measure the formal expression of that conduct? Here the ethical and the aesthetic
converge, for Wyatt's anxiety about the lack ofmeasure in his life is reproduced by a
critical anxiety-spanning centuries-about the lack ofmeasure in his lines. In "Process
of Time Worketh Such Wonder," Wyatt complains that the cruelty ofms love exceeds
everything alive, for in the natural order even the most obstinately unmeasured ("out of
frame") object is eventually subjected to the law of temperance:
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So cruel, alas, is naught alive,
So fierce, so froward, so out of frame,
But some way, some time may so contrive
By means the wild to temper and tame.
Wyatt's lyric measure-so fierce, so froward, so out of frame-has been
subjected to the regularizing impulse of critics from the date of its first publication. But,
like Wyatt's beloved, his wild lines have resisted those impulses to temper and to tame.
They remain unnatural and intemperate, and they obstinately resist the regularizing
impulse. And, as I hope to show here, the attempts of critics to rewrite and to remeasure
these lines-to make them "regular"-reveals the extent to which mismeasure produces
anxiety. This anxiety for critics is much like the anxiety that has produced the poems.
Wyatt's critics ironically reenact his own unease when confronted by something that will
not be tempered or tamed.
In my discussion of Wyatt's measure and mismeasure thus far I have deliberately
delayed addressing what Jonathan Crewe calls the "old question: that ofThomas Wyatt's
craft as metrist, and as a poet in conventional courtly forms" (23). This question, as
Crewe points out, has persisted for so long in Wyatt studies that its very intractability has
become a critical point of interest. Why has so much ink been spilt in explanations,
editions, defenses of, and attacks on Wyatt's meter? Why have Wyatt's poems become
one of the foremost sites of critical disagreement about meter in English? One reason, it
seems, is that Wyatt's work, in its entirety, represents a tantalizing mixture ofperfect
iambic pentameter and strange, rhythmically complex lines that flirt with, but often resist,
metric "regularity." His metrical craft famously embraces and resists forms that would
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become, within a generation of Wyatt's death, standards of English poetry. Because
this shifting in and out of metrical regularity is the most recognized and debated form of
mismeasurement available in the canon of Wyatt criticism, to say that Wyatt is "out of
measure," carries another, this time formal, connotation.
Yet the strangeness of Wyatt's meter is not, by itself, enough to account for the
critical obsession it engenders. Another-deeply related-aspect of Wyatt's poetry has
given rise to an equally divisive critical question: what is Wyatt's place in the history of
English poetics? In fact, the question regarding Wyatt's metrics cannot be considered
independently of the question of his position as an influence on the Elizabethans, for
critical anxiety about Wyatt's meter is a product of critical anxiety about his place in the
canon of English poetry. This has been true since Wyatt's earliest critics approached his
poetry. In fact, from the first publication of Wyatt's poems, considerations ofhis work
have been marked by a critical self-consciousness eager to establish Wyatt as the hero of
a nationalistic narrative ofEnglish greatness and, subsequently, by a counter-narrative
that sees him not as the father of Elizabethan poetry, but as a medieval figure
characteristic of the "drab" age in which he lived.
To study Henrician poetics is to practice a kind of archeology of forms. The early
Tudor poets did not publish arguments concerning the vagaries of accent or create
handbooks of metrical theory, as the Elizabethans did two generations later. But even
though no "practical" criticism from the period is extant, surely some set of formal
conventions governed the creation of the metric forms of Wyatt and Surrey, something
very different from Skelton's rhymes or the folk ballad forms. Surrey recognized the
potentials of blank verse even ifhe did not defend the theoretical value of the form self-
71
consciously, as Milton would do a hundred years later. Instead of handbooks or
pamphlets, Wyatt, Surrey, and their contemporaries produced the artifacts themselves:
the nascent decasyllabic lines that would come to be known as iambic pentameter. The
principles that governed the creation of the verse must be reconstructed by an exploration
of these artifacts, by an investigation into the prehistory ofmeter. Many critics ignore
pre-Elizabethan poetic theory,54 as though the poetic productions of the late sixteenth
century-stanza forms, generic choices, and above all, metric tendencies-were invented
out of thin air. Yet, even for those critics who examine the principles ofpoetic craft as
practiced by the generations before the Elizabethans, Wyatt represents a special case.
Indeed, there are clear ideological and nationalistic reasons why for centuries
critics have demonstrated anxiety about Wyatt's apparent lack ofmetric measure.
Wyatt's critical standing has always rested on his reputation as the man who brought the
sonnet to England. This etiological fiction-and it is a fiction, for Chaucer translated a
Petrarchan sonnet more than a century before Wyatt was born55_is the foundation of a
nationalistic narrative developed by two sixteenth-century arbiters of taste: Richard Tottel
and George Puttenham. In the forward ("The Printer to the Reader") ofhis immensely
popular anthology Songs and Sonnets (l557)-popularly called Tofte/'s Miscellany-
Tottel articulates an ideology ofnational linguistic achievement in which Wyatt, along
54 T.S. Gmond is representative of this approach, doing away with the earlier poets with a
flick of the pen: "English metrical criticism practically begins with the Elizabethans.
Nothing before that date needs notice here" (1).
55 Chaucer translated "S' amor non e" (Canzoniere 132), into three stanzas of Troilus and
Criseide. Chaucer thus translated a sonnet, but did not necessarily make a sonnet of the
translation.
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with Surrey, provides proof ofEngland' s potential for culturally measuring up to its
continental rivals:
That our tong is able in that kynde to do as praiseworthily as ye rest, the
honorable stile of the noble earle of Surrey, and the weightinesse of the
depewitted sir Thomas Wyat the elders verse, with severall graces in sundry good
Englishe writers, doe show abundantly. It resteth nowe (gentle reader) that thou
thinke it not evill doon, to publish, to the honor of the Englishe tong, and for
profit of the studious of English eloquence, those workes [... ]" (2).
In The Art ofEnglish Poetry (1589), Puttenham repeats Tottel's account of the
history ofEnglish poetry for the benefit of his upwardly mobile readers. Wyatt and
Surrey are again the heroes, the chief of the "courtly makers," who,
having travailed into Italie, and there tasted the sweete and stately measures and
stile of the Italian Poesie, as novices newly crept out of the schooles ofDante,
Arioste, and Petrarch, they greatly polished our rude & homely maner ofvulgar
Poesie from that it had bene before, and for that cause may justly be sayd the first
reformers of our English meetre and stile" (62-3).
According to this narrative, Wyatt and Surrey begin a literary "reformation" that makes
sense of the chaos ofverse forms remaining from the medieval period and translate, that
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is, convey from one place to another, continental Renaissance forms. 56 As Puttenham
emphasizes, these forms consist not merely of arbitrary rhyme schemes, but continental
"stately measures and stile," which must be remade into "English meetre and stile": The
poetry of the great traditions ("Latines, Italians, and other") must be reworked into the
reproducible form (iambic pentameter) and content (Petrarchan conceits) that flourish in
the Elizabethan age.57
Puttenham and Tottel championed Wyatt as a national hero partly because he
represented for them both a link to the past-to Chaucer and to Petrarch-and also a link
to their own age. In their search for beginnings, Wyatt's position is notable, for there are
few other examples of courtly poetics that seem to provide an example for the
Elizabethans. According to Tottel and Puttenham's account, the brief cultural renaissance
during the reign of Edward III that included the poetry of Chaucer, Langland, and Gower
was followed by a period of one hundred years that produced virtually no new court
poetry. Thus, even though the Elizabethans looked to Chaucer as the quintessential
example of an Englishman who could rival the great continental poets and who
demonstrated the potentials of the English vernacular, their invocation ofhis greatness
always included a sense of reaching backwards across a gap created by the dynastic wars
of the fifteenth century. Again, this is the narrative reiterated by Puttenham:
56 See OED "translate" (from Latin "transferre " "transfer" "to bear carry bring")
, " ".
57 As C.S. Lewis claims, "to translate Petrarch was not necessarily to introduce a new
note into English poetry; it depended on the poems you chose and on the quality of your
rendering" (223). Lewis agrees that Wyatt's reputation depends on his standing as a
precursor to a later age, but finds that Wyatt fails on those grounds: "The Elizabethan
sonnet might not have been very different if Wyatt had never lived."
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I will not reach above the time ofKing Edward III and Richard II for any that
wrote in English meter [... ] as beyond that time there is little or nothing worth
commendation to be found written in this art. And those of the first age were
Chaucer and Gower, both ofthem, as I suppose, knights. After whom followed
John Lydgate, the monk of Bury, and that nameless who wrote the satire called
Piers Plowman; next him followed Hardyng the chronicler; then in King Henry
VIII's times Skelton [... ]. In the latter end of the same king's reign sprung up a
new company of courtly makers, of whom Sir Thomas Wyatt the elder and Henry,
Earl of Surrey, were the two chieftains (147-8).
English poetry does not begin until the reign of Edward III, and following Chaucer,
Gower, and Langland-all poets of "the time ofKing Edward III and Richard II,"-there
is a lacuna of one hundred years, during which time Puttenham mentions only Lydgate
("the monk ofbury")--Chaucer's immediate follower-and the chronicler John Harding.
According to this account, during the reign of Henry VIII, English poetry had to be
rediscovered, the Chaucerian legacy reinitiated.58 And Wyatt is the poet-rather than
Skelton-who represents the reinstitution of the Chaucerian heritage, for it is his
measures that make the Elizabethan Renaissance possible. Of course, this is a fact in
retrospect; Wyatt's elevation is historically significant only because, subsequently,
58 Common to virtually all Elizabethan and subsequent critical discussions of pre-
Elizabethan poetics is an agreement about the relative paucity of notable poetic
achievements during the fifteenth century. Of course, poets did not stop writing between
Lydgate and Skelton, and scholars ofthe fifteenth century have attempted to counter "the
approach to the period, which we have inherited from late eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century writers, as an anticlimax to the age of Chaucer" (Ebin x).
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English poetic practice was supposed to have been built on Wyatt's metric blueprint
rather than any of the other metric possibilities, such as Skelton's "doggerel.,,59 But its
etiological and ideological importance cannot be overlooked: Wyatt is celebrated as the
poet who looks backward, reviving Chaucer and Petrarch, and as the poet who looks
forward, anticipating Shakespeare and Milton. Wyatt provides narrative continuity in the
quest to establish the roots of English poetic "greatness."
There are, however, two mutually exclusive characterizations of Wyatt at stake,
characterizations that, for Lewis's generation of critics, are framed by an argument that
has its origins with the Elizabethans: is Wyatt primarily a "medieval" or a "Renaissance"
poet? Those who would emphasize the former point to the fact that Wyatt depended
heavily on English poetry from the fifteenth century; Thomson notes that "many of
[Wyatt's] lyrics relate more closely to the immediate English past than to the Latins,
Italians and other influences stressed by Tottel" (6). Southall agrees that Wyatt's primary
influence is not Petrarch or other continental writers: "The Italian influence has no effect
upon [the early Tudor poets'] language, a dubious effect upon their metrics, nor can it be
held directly responsible for their conceits or their attitudes towards the business of
courtly love" (13). Indeed, Wyatt generally does not reproduce Petrarchan conceits; he
selects from Petrarch's canon poems that do not include the blazons and praises the
Elizabethans would later consider the essence ofPetrarchan convention; and ifPetrarch
elaborately praises his beloved, Wyatt usually uses the same opportunities to demonstrate
59 Skelton's place in the narrative of English literary history is further damaged by the
influence ofPuttenham, who says of him "I wot not for what great worthiness [he was]
surnamed the Poet Laureate" (148). Frank Wigham and Wayne Rebhom point out that
"Puttenham's references to [Skelton] are uniformly disrespectful" (148 n. 10).
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resentment towards his. Tottel's and Puttenham's emphasis on the bringing of
continental form and style to England, then, is an essentially ideological maneuver, an
attempt to frame Wyatt as what we would call a "Renaissance" poet. This move
legitimizes the poetry of the second half of the sixteenth century by connecting it,
through Wyatt, to both Chaucer and to the continent.
But although Puttenham and Tottel's account of Wyatt is convenient and
ideologically motivated, it is also not completely false. Wyatt certainly brought stanzaic
forms from the continent, and he had a demonstrable impact on the course of English
poetry in the sixteenth century. Not only did he influence Surrey, who more clearly
established iambic pentameter (in his sonnets) and blank verse (in his translation of The
Aeneid) as the proper "English meetre," but by promoting Wyatt as the first Englisher of
continental forms, Tottel also popularized the real work Wyatt did in bringing French and
Italian forms to England. Slender's comment in The Merry Wives ofWindsor, itself
composed about ten years after the publication of The Arte ofEnglish Poetry-"I had
rather than forty shillings I had my Book of Songs and Sonnets here"-suggests that
Tottel's version of Wyatt influenced Shakespeare (Rollins 121).60 In Hyder Rollins's
words, "practically every early Elizabethan poet accepted [Songs and Sonnets] as his
model" (3), and "the beginning of modem English verse may be said to date from its
publication in 1557" (4).
60 Wyatt's sonnets are variously structured, though one of his double sonnets consists of
two "Shakespearean" sonnets (Rollins 103). Generally Surrey is credited with originating
the Shakespearean sonnet form (103), though Wyatt also uses of the closed couplet to end
some sonnets. This characteristic is not found in Petrarch but is reproduced by
Shakespeare. Rollins also points out a reference to material in Songes and Sonnettes in
the Gravedigger's song in Hamlet. For a lengthy discussion of the impact of Tottel's
multiple editions on sixteenth-century poetry, see Rollins 107-21.
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As Puttenham points out, and as some of the quotes cited above suggest,
Wyatt's contribution to subsequent English literary history is primarily formaL By
(putatively) modifying Petrarch's hendecasyllabic line (or, alternatively, Chaucer's quasi-
pentameter line), Wyatt created the English measure by which other English poets
fashioned their poetry, and by which they are judged. But this narrative-so important to
Puttenham and Tottel-only makes sense if Wyatt did in fact create a new metric form, a
form with a lineage that may be traced from Wyatt's sources to the metrical examples of
his followers. The form in question is of course the iambic pentameter line, and its
somewhat mysterious appearance in England constitutes an ideologically and historically
important question for literary critics.
Some time in the early sixteenth century in England, out of the thicket of folk
ballad forms, crude continental imitations, and Skeltonic doggerel, emerged a poetic form
capable of sustained effect and almost infinitely subtle rhythmic distinctions, and here
critics are most interested in Wyatt's contributions. Though Chaucer's line was roughly
decasyllabic and possibly based on iambic rhythms, the forms of English poetry at the
beginning ofthe sixteenth century did not include the iambic pentameter. In fact, the
necessity of establishing a new metric form was created by the exhaustion ofnative
English forms in the fifteenth century, as Thomas Greene argues. Whereas Petrarch had a
wealth ofwhat Greene calls mundus signijicans available, verse forms, images,
commonplaces, myths, and tropes,
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whose resonance was far from exhausted [... ] the poetic vocabulary available
to Wyatt was seriously shrunken. Most of the verse forms and styles of the
fifteenth century in England were losing their appeal or had lost it as he began
writing: the ballade, the carol, the 'broken-backed' alliterative line, the aureate
style were fading rapidly, and the inspired doggerel of Skelton was not to find any
followers. (247)
The pentameter-the decasyllabic line of alternating stressed and unstressed
syllables-was used almost immediately from its first appearance in both lyric and epic
forms (and only slightly later drama) to great effect, for it could be sustained indefinitely,
with or without rhymes. This was a feature the late medieval folk forms--eommon and
long measure, fourteeners and poulter's measure-lacked. Within half a century of its
first appearance iambic pentameter had become the dominant form of poetic expression
in English verse, and it would remain so for nearly half a millennium. By modifying his
sources-especially Chaucer's five-beat and Petrarch's eleven-syllable lines-Wyatt
appears to have created a form of immense possibility.61 The success of the pentameter
form lies in its reproducibility: Puttenham can teach the measure to his readers, and they
can reproduce it themselves. As Southall notes, Puttenham says his purpose is "is to make
of a rude rimer, a learned and a Courtly Poet":
61 Although Chaucer scholars disagree about whether Chaucer wrote iambic pentameter
lines, Chaucer was probably less understood by Wyatt's generation than by ours,
particularly in terms ofpronunciation and in the delineation of the Chaucerian canon.
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The emphasis upon the need to cultivate a graceful manner arises from the
social requirements of the unmannerly nouveaux riches. It is with such people in
mind that Puttenham submits his new inventions; his 'rude rimer' is a phrase
which marks a social distinction and not merely a literary one [... ]. So that what
Puttenham is offering his readers is a book of manners in which prosody is
presented as a means by which ladies and new courtiers can polish up their verses
so as to acquire a reputation for social gracefulness. The means proposed, as
Puttenham was well aware, were not those proposed by poets writing 'till this
day,' but it could not be long before what was introduced as an aid to social
climbers became, after the climbers had arrived, the measure of good writing for
all" (121-2).
In J.E. Bernard's words, "All complicated measures were laid aside with the
advent of prose and blank verse about 1588" (x). And, although Bernard dates the advent
of the pentameter from its Elizabethan appearance rather than its earlier forms, his point
is well taken: iambic pentameter provided a simple, reproducible, but infmitely complex
template for poets to measure themselves, and as a measure it became a standard
measure, obliterating the more complicated, less regulated forms, the "medieval swamp"
it replaced. It was with Wyatt that the line emerged-possibly re-emerged-and found its
way to Surrey and Tottel, and it was on Wyatt's pentameter that Tottel and Puttenham
built their story of English achievement, a story that readers of Shakespeare and Mihon
subsequently turned into the narrative of English literary greatness. Iambic pentameter, in
the hands of these poets, revealed its potential as a measure of English poetry, and it is
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precisely its slipperiness that made it perfectly suited for this role. This is Wyatt's
place in the story of English poetry.
But because Thomas Wyatt is a poet out of measure, negative reaction to his
metric craft appeared early. The first earliest critical reaction is Tottel's: only fifteen
years after Wyatt's death, Tottel's edition extensively revised his poems to "smooth out"
the meter, and in doing so clearly indicated dissatisfaction with the metrical form of the
poems in manuscript. Subsequent discussion of Wyatt has been obsessed with metrical
questions, particularly after Wyatt's poems became widely available in their manuscript
form. 62 If the earliest critics-the editors ofSongs and Sonnets-were troubled by the
meter, readers who had read the extremely "polished" iambic pentameter of the post-
Elizabethans (and were likely to think of Dryden and Pope as the consummate masters of
English metrical form) found his manuscript poems nearly unreadable. This view found
its most enduring expression in a 1781 essay by Thomas Warton, of which I will have
more to say, and well into the twentieth century it was a commonplace that Wyatt was
"inferior to Surrey in harmony of numbers, perspicuity of expression, and facility of
phraseology" (Warton, qtd. in Thomson 41). Wyatt's "rough" verse is criticized by
George Gilfillan ("a certain ruggedness of versification"), George Frederick Nott
("crabbed" and "inharmonious"), Robert Bell ("harsh and refractory"), William Simonds
("crude," "harsh and inharmonious"), A.K. Foxwell ("hard and irregular"), "E.M.W.
62 Well into the twentieth century some prosodists continued to follow Wyatt's earliest
critics in analyzing Wyatt's verse as it appeared in the emended Songs and Sonnets.
Writing in 1930, Enid Hamer, for instance, praises Wyatt's development ofthe sonnet
and the innovation of the closed couplet ending, specifically in terms of the effect these
formal developments had on later English writers; Shakespeare is the implicit beneficiary
of Wyatt's formal innovation. Yet Hamer quotes from Tottel's edition, which often
reworked Wyatt's madrigals and closely related forms into sonnets.
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Tillyard ("intolerable," "grotesque," "uncouth" "hopelessly rough"), E.K. Chambers
("stiff"), and C.S. Lewis ("stumbling,,).63 Clearly Wyatt's metrics have made an enduring
and unsettling impression on critics.
The actual lines to which these assessments are attached comprise a relatively
small percentage of Wyatt's corpus. The poems by Wyatt that are comprised of short
lines or lines based on English ballad measures, like the poulter's measure, are not only
metrically regular, but consistently iambic. The lines open to debate are those R.A.
Rebholz calls the "long line,"-that is, lines of"9 to 12 syllables.,,64 Thus Bell can argue
that Wyatt's verse is only incidentally unsettling to the ear: "His versification,
incidentally harsh and refractory, is, generally, regular and sonorous" (59). This apparent
variance ofprosodic competence is a key factor in the critical unease created by Wyatt's
metrics: Wyatt can and does write iambically, but when he approximates the form of the
pentameter he seems to write much more "unmetrically"; the pentameter line thus
becomes a focus of increased critical attention and anxiety, for the pentameter is the line
of the sonnet and ultimately of blank verse and Elizabethan tragedy. Wyatt's refusal to
63 Found in, respectively, Gilfillan xvii, Nott, Simonds 54, Foxwell 122, Bell 58-9,
Tillyard 19,26-7, Chambers 121, and Lewis 223. Because Wyatt's verse is of mixed
prosodic regularity, these comments are often in reference to particular lyrics or lyric
genres, or are accompanied by praise for Wyatt when he is "regular." Lewis's reference is
in regard to "Myne olde dere En'mye, my forward master."
64 Rebholz says: "it seems safe to say that few readers disagree about the rhythm ofhis
poems written in 'short' lines of two, three, or, most commonly, four feet. Indeed Wyatt
is generally acknowledged as a master ofthe iambic tetrameter line. Nor are his poems in
'poulter's measure'-a couplet consisting of a line of six feet and a line of seven feet-a
matter of much metrical controversy (though their aesthetic value is debated and usually
disparaged)" (45). Wyatt's treatment of the pentameter in the ballads is lauded by
Chambers: "Wyatt, in the balettes, shows himself as finished a craftsman with the
pentameter as with any other measure" (121).
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make these lines scan iambically is troubling because it obscures his status as the
founding father in the grand narrative ofEnglish literary greatness.
Thus E.K. Chambers argues that the poetry produced during the fifteenth century
was of "folk or ecclesiastical origins" rather than poetry of the court:
A court poetry, which had grown up with Chaucer, wilted in the hurly-burly of the
Roses. And when the Tudors came, the energies of their first king, austere if not
already a little world-wearied, were too closely bent upon the establishment of a
dynasty and the reconstruction of a national life [to establish a culture of court
poetry] (98).
And J.P. Dabney finds that English poetry includes only a few "guide-lights"-including
Wyatt-to show the way from Chaucer to Elizabeth: "The times which follow Chaucer
are not prolific of great names until we approach that truly Periclean age of art, the reign
ofElizabeth" (9). Ian Robinson is more concise: after Chaucer the iambic pentameter
"became a lost art which was not again discovered until Wyatt's labors; but Wyatt often
[forgot] it again himself' (67).
Clearly Wyatt's importance to critics-from Elizabeth's era to ours--depends on
his historical position as an introducer of verse forms. Robinson's ambivalent remark,
however, points to a key issue in Wyatt studies, for if Wyatt forgot the art of Chaucer's
fonns, or ifhe never really knew them, Puttenham and TottePs argument for his place in
the history of English literature is mistaken. Thus C.S. Lewis argues that Wyatt merely
reproduces the poetry of an age dedicated to dying conventions. English literature during
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the first three quarters of the century, Lewis argues, is "dull, feeble, and incompetent":
the verse is "astonishingly tame and cold [... ]. Nothing is light, or tender, or fresh. All the
authors write like elderly men" (1). So far this depiction is in keeping with the narrative
of the Elizabethan critics and more recent historical characterizations of the sixteenth
century. But for Lewis, Wyatt is not so much the direct progenitor of the great poets of
Shakespeare's generation as he is a remnant of the Middle Ages, of what Lewis calls, in
reference to that period's metrical confusion, ''the late medieval swamp" (225). Lewis
says that the middle of the sixteenth century is "an earnest, heavy-handed, commonplace
age: a drab age" (1), and Wyatt is its "father" (225).65 Lewis's characterization is much
like Dabney's: the poetry produced between the ages of Chaucer and Elizabeth is not
"prolific of great names"; but, for Lewis, Wyatt is not a "guide-light" for the Elizabethans
as much as a reflection of the past. If anything, he is a negative influence. In fact, "The
Elizabethan sonnet might not have been very different if Wyatt had never lived" (224).66
E.K. Chambers agrees: "It is true that a dozen historians ofliterature acclaim it as
[Wyatt's] chiefmerit that he introduced the sonnet into England. But a writer's merit lies
in what he accomplishes, not in what baffles him" (122).
65 Lewis later mitigates the harshness of this claim by insisting that "drab" "is not a
pejorative term," but merely a descriptor of Wyatt's unadorned style (227). The
difference between Lewis's and Puttenham's characterizations of Wyatt may be observed
in the adjectives they use to describe Wyatt's style. Puttenham calls it "stately"; Lewis
refers to it as "flat, plodding" (224).
66 See also Schmidt: "Though [Wyatt] was the first great English sonneteer, the sonnets
he translated and composed had little effect on his smooth-mannered successors, who
went to the fountainhead in Petrarch rather than to Wyatt's efforts" (123).
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As long as critics, like Puttenham, believed that Wyatt wrote poems as they
appeared in Tottel's edition, his place in the narrative of English literary history was
assured. It was only when Wyatt's manuscripts became available that critics began
attacking his verse. And, famously, in the twentieth century the general trend of attacking
or dismissing Wyatt turned to defending him. This revaluation of Wyatt corresponds to a
number of developments, most importantly the rise of free verse and ofNew Criticism.
Accompanying these new approaches to poetry was a revaluation of John Donne and
other "rough" metricists, probably as a result of these poems' suitability for close formal
analysis.67 In a sense, the new approach to Wyatt revived Puttenham's narrative, but it
also provided Wyatt with a different (and more fashionable) lineage, extending through
Donne and other less "smooth" metricists to free verse. In this account Wyatt still
brought the pentameter to prominence, but he did so with a more sophisticated sense of
rhythm than Surrey or his followers.
But there remain a great number of instances in Wyatt's verse that simply do not
look like iambic pentameter lines. Thus critics who have attempted to excuse Wyatt's
long line have often done so by describing it as a kind of disguised iambic pentameter
that, unlike Surrey's pentameter, makes use of an enormous number ofmetrical
substitutions and variant pronunciations. The most famous example is A.K. Foxwell's
1911 approach. Here is her list of "Wyatt's rules of verse," the exceptions that make
Wyatt's pentameter "regular":
67 But see Ben Saunders for a discussion of the limited nature of Donne's reappraisal (19-
20).
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(a) Inverted stress of the first foot.
(b) Strong stress for the first foot.
(c) Strong stress after the caesura.
(d) Extra weak syllable before caesura with full complement of syllables after the
caesura.
(e) Trisyllabic feet are very common in Wyatt's verse, they are found in the first,
second, fourth, and fifth foot.
(t) Slurring takes place with weak syllables ending in r, 1, n, when followed by
another weak syllable; Enemy is dissyllabic.
(g) The termination -ayn in words such as rayn, fayn, is often dissylabic, and
pleasure in one instance has three syllables.
(h) Verbal ending -eth is usually slurred in the body ofthe verse: an extension of
this rule includes "hath" and "with" at times-
(i) Slurring ofvowels in juxtaposition. "y" is regarded as a vowel, and "h" as no
letter.
(k) Wyatt avoids syncopation; it is not found except in the words "ton," "tothr";
and "thevyn" (t'hevyn) occurs once in the Satire "My mothers maydes."
(1) Two stressed syllables without an intervening weak syllable is a favourite
device in Wyatt. It occurs in the first and second, and the fourth and fifth
foot-
(m) Lines occur in Wyatt which are quite regular ifa final "e" or plural
termination -es is regarded as syllabic-
(n) An occasional Alexandrine or octosyllabic line occurs in poems written in the
five-stressed line-
(0) The caesura is carefully marked after the fourth syllable in Wyatt's early
verse in the E MS. [Egerton manuscript]
(P) Enjambement or overflow ofthe line-
Foxwell demonstrates each of these rules with copious examples both from
Wyatt's verse and from Chaucer, Wyatt's putative model for metrical composition. Each
of the "rules" is a priori plausible; variable pronunciation, for instance, would be
necessary to make any sixteenth-century verse scan, and trochaic substitution in the first
foot is a common substitution in virtually all examples of iambic pentameter. Yet at least
one of the rules---{n)--damages the model's viability, as the phrase "occasional
Alexandrine [six-stress line] or octosyllabic [likely a four-stress line]" is another way of
saying notpentameter. Indeed, the difficulty with this approach is that it could account
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for almost any line of poetry that is approximately the length ofthe pentameter. The
reliance on Chaucer's metrics as an explanation for the meter is also telling; many of the
questions that trouble Wyatt critics are also at stake in a similarly intractable debate about
the prosody of Chaucer. Hitching Wyatt's meter to Chaucer's thus begs the question, as
Southall argues:
It is not yet possible to judge fully the rhythmical debt which the courtly makers
owe to Chaucer; the issue has been obscured by a pedantic insistence upon the
prosodic relationship. The dangers of this have already been seen, it is hardly to
the point to demonstrate that Chaucer is prosodically more exact than the courtly
makers if, simultaneously, he is rhythmically more clumsy. To say that Wyatt
writes pentameter because he strictly adheres to a version of Chaucer's prosody is
to make Wyatt's metrical troubles depend on a model with even more metrical
troubles and greater mysteries of pronunciation. (35)
Although versions of Foxwell's approach have reappeared as recently as twenty
years ago, they have encountered staunch critical resistance in every manifestation. Of
the poems written in the "long line," it is possible to describe two genres-the epistolary
satires and penitential psalms-as comprised of iambic pentameter lines (although with
numerous substitutions), for these poems consist of long lines that are more "regular"
than those found in the lyrics (Rebholz 49).68 Applied to the lyrics, however-and, again,
68 "About 75 per cent of the 775 lines in the Penitential Psalms scan as iambic
pentameter; if one allows the trochaic substitution common in the first foot, the
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metrical theorists have been most interested in the sonnet-the argument seems to fail.
As Raymond Southall has pointed out, the numerous substitutions-though they
accurately describe the verse-undermine the integrity of the approach as a convincing
account of Wyatt's methodology: "the more numerous the departures from the strict
iambic pentameter line become, the less schematic the verse becomes until, suffering
death by a thousand qualifications, observation of the rule or norm becomes merely
fortuitous" (118).69
A majority of critics agree that whatever Wyatt was doing in the lyrics, he was not
writing consistently regular verse: Thus E.K. Chambers in 1933 rejected the qualification
model: "much of [Wyatt's work], especially in the sonnets, is stiff and difficult to scan;
and even when full allowance has been made, both for Romance accentuation and for
textual corruption, many lines can only be regarded as simply unmetrical" (121). C.S.
Lewis followed suit in giving up on some of the lines: "A majority of his lines scan
according to the principles which governed English verse from Spenser to the
Edwardians: a fairly large minority do not" (Thomson 175). Rebholz agrees: "there are
too many lines not in iambic pentameter [excluding the Psalms and satires] to make it
Wyatt's metrical norm" (54-5). Southall's rejection of Foxwell's approach is insightful:
the attempt to make Wyatt "regular" proves "either that Wyatt wrote very 'bad' iambic
pentameter verse or that he did not write iambic pentameter verse at all" (119).
percentage is about 82 per cent. Of the 306 lines in the Epistolary Satires (not in Wyatt's
hand), about 64 per cent are iambic pentameter; if one allows the trochaic substitution in
the first foot, the percentage is about 70" (Rebholz 49).
69 Southall is in this case criticizing a conflated model proposed by A.K. Foxwell and
F.M. Padelford.
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But Wyatt scholars have been loath to concede that Wyatt wrote "very 'bad'
iambic pentameter," partly because so many of the lines that do not scan as pentameter
seem to be rhythmically interesting. The critical desire to regulate the long lines has
manifested itself in various efforts to suggest an alternate metrical methodology, a
governing principle that rescues Wyatt's reputation, even ifhe "did not write iambic
pentameter verse at alL" After rejecting iambic pentameter as the "metrical norm," critics
have turned to a dizzying array of alternate metrical approaches. Rebholz discusses the
attempt to describe the long line as a four-stressed line rooted in the Anglo-Saxon poetic
tradition (46). Given the number of lines with five and six stresses, it is difficult to see
how this model would work. Rebholz also notes the popular approach of describing the
line as a "flexible" meter that allows for four-to-six feet, possibly based on a (supposed)
misreading of Chaucer (47), an unlikely move, given the problems plaguing Chaucer's
prosody, as noted above. Another critic suggests that the verse is modeled "on the Greek
meters used by Catullus and Horace, ancient logaoedic meters which are themselves
composed of two parts.,,70 Additionally, after deftly dismissing the approaches he has
discussed, Rebholz trots out his own theory, one that allows a number of substitutions
and pronunciation variants, though not so many as the strict iambic pentameter model,
probably because ofRebholz's qualification that Wyatt's measure is "not necessarily
iambic" (50).
Southall argues that the broken-backed alliterative tradition is Wyatt's metrical
basis, but though his argument against the defenders of Wyatt's pentameter is strong, his
proposed alternative methodology fails. His theory forces him, at one point, to say of one
70 This is Ellen Caldwell's summary of an approach by Robert B. Ogle (Caldwell 233).
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of Wyatt's best known lines ("They fie from me that sometime did me seek"): "The
phrasing shows Wyatt departing from the more violent method ofjuxtaposing two
alliterative phrases and softening the effect by opposing a rhymed phrase to an alliterative
one and carrying the rhyme into the alliterative phrase: They fie from me that sometime
did me seke" (140). This convoluted explanation obscures the fact that in this case, at
least, the meter is clearly iambic pentameter. Thus if Southall effectively counters claims
that Wyatt is always writing pentameters, his own argument refuses adequately to
account for the pentameters that are there.
I think it is safe to say that the debate on Wyatt's meter is a mess. And, although
anyone who has ventured into the morass that is English metrical theory will point out
that these disagreements are not peculiar to Wyatt criticism, with Wyatt's work-
especially the sonnets-the stakes are unusually high and the lack of consensus is
remarkable. Most critics agree that Wyatt is aware of iambic pentameter and that he
consistently decides to reject it as his standard measure for the lyric long line. Besides
this, critics cannot agree on whether the line is based on four or five stresses, the
importance of the caesura as a structural principle, or whether the primary model is
classical quantitative poetry, Medieval Anglo-Saxon alliterative verse, the continental
decasyllabic line, or Chaucer. No totalizing approach has achieved anything like
consensus and most have been criticized at length by other scholars. The critical desire to
identify, regulate, and categorize Wyatt's poetic measures has sometimes proved
tantalizingly close to realization, for many ofthe theories proposed by critics are
plausible, but when it comes to a shared, agreed-upon metrical standard-a measure-the
tradition of Wyatt criticism has failed to account for the meter of his long lines.
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III
Thus far I have been discussing these issues in a relatively abstract way. An
example will perhaps shed some light on the metrical questions involved and move us
toward a solution to the question of why Wyatt lyrics resist "standard" metrical
formulations. In the course of his discussion on poetic proportion, Puttenham finds
himself puzzled by the first quatrain of a poem Wyatt has translated from Italian:
Like unto these immeasurable mountaines,
So is my painefulllife the burden of ire:
For hie be they, and hie is my desire,
And I ofteares and they are full offountaines.71
The critical anxiety produced by the irregularity of the lines is palpable. Puttenham is
concerned because at least three are not decasyllabic, although all are vaguely iambic
(that is, they hint at but do not fulfill a "regular" metrical expectation). Not to worry, he
says, for the lines can be measured according to technical precedent: here we have an
example of "acatalecticke" verse, that is, verse consisting of an extra syllable: "in your
first, second, and fourth verse ye may find a sillable superfluous, and though in the first
ye will seeme to helpe it by drawing these three syllables, im me su into a Dactil,72 in the
71 The poem is Egerton XXXIII. Muir and Thomson identify the source tentatively as a
sonnet by Sannazaro.
72 Sic. It is unclear how pronouncing these three syllables as a "dactil" would solve the
problem, as dactyls are three syllable feet and the extra syllable would remain.
Pronouncing the three syllables su ra ble as an anapest and then eliding that foot into an
iamb would at least be a possible solution and would reduce the line to ten syllables,
although a stress would fall awkwardly on the last syllable of the word "mesurable" and
"mountaines" would require an iambic (French?) pronunciation. It is not possible to read
the word "by drawing these three syllables, im me su into a Dactil" as Puttenham
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rest it can not be so excused; wherefore we must thinke he did it ofpurpose, by the
odde sillable to give greater grace to his meetre" (134-5). When confronted with metrical
"irregularity," Puttenham suggests that Wyatt does not write "very 'bad' iambic
pentameter verse" but intends the meter to exist as it does. Unfortunately for Puttenham's
emphasis on intentionality ("he did it of purpose"), the lines above are not those Wyatt
wrote; they are the emended lines found in Tottel's Songes and Sonettes. Puttenham is
attempting to account for the irregularity of lines that have already gone through a
regularizing process. In the Egerton Manuscript, the stanza reads as reproduced here on
the left side of the chart (Fig. 2). The regularized version in Songs and Sonnettes appears
on the right for comparison:
Like to these unmesurable montayns
Is my painfulllyff the burden of Ire,
For of great height be they, and high is my desire,
And I of teres, and they be full of fontayns.
Like unto these immeasurable mountaines,
So is my painefulllife the burden of ire:
For hie be they, and hie is my desire,
And I of teares and they are full of fountains.
Figure 2: Totters Emendation of Wyatt's Meter
This sonnet as it appears in manuscript is typical ofthe problems that confront
metricists who would offer a totalizing methodology for Wyatt's verse. Clearly the poem
cannot be read as standard iambic pentameter, or even loose pentameter on the model of
Chaucer. The first two lines appear to be decasyllabic, but the third is 12 syllables, and
recommends. Puttenham's examples ofthe dactyl include "temperance," "womanhead,"
''jollity,'' and "dutiful" (125).
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the fourth is 11 (hinting at but disappointing expectations).73 On the whole the lines
seem to consist of five accents rather than four, but it's difficult to read line three as
anything except a six-stress line:
For of great height be they, and high is my desire,
Lines three and four might be read on a "broken-backed" medieval model, with a strong
central caesura as a governing formal principle, but not so lines one and two. Confronted
with this metrical chaos, Tottel's strategy is clear and typical of his treatment of Wyatt:
assuming the prosodic standard exemplified by Surrey, he "fixes" the first two
unscannable lines by inserting monosyllables early in the lines, thereby moving the
second stress to the fourth syllable and creating a roughly iambic measure.74 Both lines
are left with an extra syllable, a vestige of Wyatt's original metrical instability that
Puttenham ironically and unwittingly approves on the model of ancient measures. Tottel
also excises the two extra syllables from the third line. In the fourth he changes the verb
form but leaves the extra-syllabic ("acatalecticke") structure intact. These measures are
73 Syllable count comprises one of the most basic elements and most difficult problems
for discussions of sixteenth-century metrics, as shifts in pronunciation and orthographic
and dialectical variance make accurate determination of syllables very difficult.
74 One of the surest indications that a poet is not using the iambic pentameter model
established by Surrey is a line in which the fourth syllable is not stressed. For Surrey and
the Elizabethan and 18th century masters of iambic pentameter that follow him, an initial
trochee is widespread even in the most "regular" iambic pentameter, but excepting the
(very) occasional anapest in the first two feet or the even less likely second-foot troche,
the fourth syllable of an iambic line is stressed. An indication of the reliability ofthis rule
is the verse of Spenser. By my count, ofthe 5,589 lines of verse that comprise Book I of
The Faerie Queene, there are only four (0.1 %) in which the fourth syllable is not clearly
stressed (and one ofthese-5.35.8-would be scanned as a fourth syllable stress
assuming Spenser pronounced "Theseus" as two syllables). Yet four of the lines in this
sonnet (1, 2, 5, 13) cannot be read with an accented fourth syllable.
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obvious, if uninspired, and it's hard to see how Wyatt, if he were trying for a
pentameter line, could not have discovered some (probably more graceful) version of
them himself. It does not seem possible, at least, that he could both try for a consistently
measurable line and simultaneously leave line three in its state of grammatical
inefficiency and palpable excess.
The force ofthe normalizing and normative-izing process employed by Tottel and
Puttenham is evident. They are in the business of establishing the accentual-syllabic five-
foot line as the paragon of English forms, and the extent of their achievement in this
regard is indicated by the centuries of the form's duration. The critical practice of
regulating Wyatt's metrics is, as Puttenham indicates, a process ofremeasuring Wyatt.
Poetic meter serves both to draw attention to an abstraction-in English, generally the
iambic line-while also emphasizing an individual line's departures from that abstract
constant. As Wallace puts it, scansion (the system of notation for poetic meter) "does two
things. It shows a line's sufficient approximation ofthe metrical norm; and, more
important, it shows those divergences from the norm [... ] that let us begin to discuss the
line's characteristic rhythm, its musical qualities, which of course also include such
effects as alliteration, assonance, or syntactical balance/imbalance" (28). Like other
measures, meter consists ofan abstract set of standardized rules against which extant
examples are compared and quantitatively labeled.
But what if the "norm" has not yet been completely established? How do we
measure the meter of the earliest forms of iambic pentameter? Wyatt's measures will not
cooperate, and a critical and ideologically charged desire to remeasure Wyatt-one that
reappears, as I have shown, among twentieth-century Wyatt critics-leads to Tottel's
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emendations and, in an intensely ironic instance of critical measuring, Puttenham's
attempt to manage the first line's (already re-measured) measure by dictating the
pronunciation (the measure) of the word "unmeasurable."
For these lines, as written, are unmeasurable. They do not conform to any critical
standard: broken-backed, quantitative, syllabic, iambic pentameter, or otherwise.
Assuming that Wyatt's choices are "ofpurpose," why is line three overcharged? The
answer, perhaps, is in the way that it runs over its (rejected) pentameter limit: it exceeds
that limit by precisely the quantity of its final word: desire. For it is this desire-out-of-
measure, this uncontainable and irrepressible desire, that constitutes Wyatt's standard
poetic posture. When, in the concluding couplet of the sonnet, Wyatt compares the birds
of the mountain to his own song ("Off that restles birdes they have the tone and note/and
I always plaint that passe thorough my throte") the word "restles" likewise contributes to
a line that cannot rest. It overflows itself, although a "metrical" emendation and
"correction" would have been simple to achieve. Just as Wyatt's passions always exceed
measure, so his metrical practice in the lyrics persistently exceeds the iambic pentameter
with which it flirts.
At this point it may be argued that I am simply restating an old argument in Wyatt
criticism: that the formal "roughness" is a reflection ofWyatt' s psychological state. Thus
Warton argues that Wyatt's inability to measure is itself the essence ofhis poetry:
[From his Italian models] Wyatt was taught to torture the passion of love by
prolix and intricate comparisons, and unnatural allusions. At one time his love is a
galley steered by cruelty through stormy seas and dangerous rocks; the sails tom
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by the blast of tempestuous sighs, and the cordage consumed by the incessant
showers of tears: a cloud of grief envelopes the stars, reason is drowned, and the
haven is at a distance. At another, it is a spring trickling from the summit of the
Alps, which gathering force in its fall, at length overflows all the plain beneath.
Sometimes, it is a gun, which being overcharged, expands the flame within itself,
and bursts in pieces [... ] (qtd. in Thomson 42-3).
On the whole, this is a fair description of Wyatt's usual recourse to conventional poetic
devices. It is also difficult to imagine a more effective catalogue of images of frustrated
desire: the ship unable to reach port, mountain streams gathering into an irresistible river
that "overflows" the land, an "overcharged" firearm that misfires and "bursts" into itself.
This language suggests that the critical charge against Wyatt's content is the same
as that against his form: it is "torture[d]," and "overcharged"; it "overflows" its measure.
Warton also nicely captures the early modem expression of uncontrolled desire as a sin of
intemperance, a crime against reason, which Wyatt's use of the storm-ravaged ship
allegorizes ("reason is drowned"). Moreover, if Warton leaves the connection between
the meter and content (puttenham's "meetre and stile") implicit, as both merely offend
his taste in the same way, Southall explicitly argues that Wyatt employs formal devices to
reflect his tempestuous emotions, and in the process reverses the value judgment: "[t]he
movements of Wyatt's verse express what, as a court poet, he felt to be the most
significant quality of contemporary life, namely its instability" (127). Rebholz also
attaches Wyatt's variant metrical lines to his troubled consciousness: they are "deliberate
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variations to reinforce the speaker's astonishment at the reality ofhis past union and
the strangeness ofhis present desertion" (54).
Rebholz's use of the word "deliberate" to describe Wyatt's "variations" echoes
Puttenham's "we must thinke he did it ofpurpose," and Foxwell's insistence that Wyatt
"wrote in this manner not from incapacity but from choice" (122). Michael Schmidt, on
the other hand, poses the problem of purpose as a question: "Are the irregularities poetic
flaws, manifestations of peculiar genius, or proof that his language is still in a state of
accentual transition?" (121). At issue here is not merely Wyatt's intentionality but also
his competence. All of the metrical structures suggested as alternative organizational
principles are designed to show that, although Wyatt was not writing pentameters, he was
nevertheless more than an incompetent versifier. But the failure of critics to agree about
any of those alternate structures only reproduces the general trend in Wyatt prosodic
studies: intractability.
Rebholz's claim that Wyatt makes use of "deliberate variations to reinforce the
speaker's astonishment" also suggests that Wyatt's formal roughness is (intentionally)
designed to reveal his psychological circumstances. Together with Southall's linking of
Wyatt's mismeasure to "contemporary life," these claims represent a version ofmetric
theory summarized by Lascelles Abercrombie in 1923:
[W]hen metre, e.g., is said to be "expressive," this will be understood to mean
"symbolically expressive." It may be asked, How does such symbolism arise? and
it must suffice to answer, Empirically: it has been found to work [... ]. If, for
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example, metre can effect certain feelings in the mind, then metre will be the
expression of those feelings, since by its means the poet who experiences them
can provoke them in his hearers: and to do that is his expression on the external
side. (15)
This frankly dubious explanation is historicized by Derek Attridge, who finds that
meter's "emblematic function" is rooted in a history of association that dates at least to
Plato:
As far as rhythm is concerned, the emblematic function which has been most
important in the history ofverse is a general one, located in the fact ofmetrical
organization itself: the Neoplatonic notion that language which obeys the rules of
a strict metre represents an ideal reality governed by order and harmony. The
heading ofthe final book ofSt. Augustine's De Musica (tr. Taliaferro, 1947, p.
324) presents this idea in a nutshell: 'The mind is raised from the consideration of
changeable numbers in inferior things to unchangeable numbers in unchangeable
truth itself.' Associated with this view is the feeling that metrical regularity
purges language of its haphazardness and redundancy, an attitude eloquently
expressed by Sidney [... ]. (289-90).
Wyatt's lyrics do not raise the mind "from the consideration of changeable numbers";
Wyatt's lyrics are changeable numbers. Thus, on Augustine's model, they refuse to allow
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readers to contemplate the "unchangeable numbers in unchangeable truth itself';
Wyatt's readers are forced to contemplate the world, in all its pain and mutability.
Wordsworth likewise takes up the question of the relationship between meter and
emotional effects. But, for Wordsworth, meter provides a regular expectation which
counters the "passion" produced by poetry's content: meter "tempers" poetry:
The end of Poetry is to produce excitement in coexistence with an over-balance of
pleasure; but, by the supposition, excitement is an unusual and irregular state of
the mind; ideas and feelings do not, in that state, succeed each other in
accustomed order... Now the co-presence of something regular, something to
which the mind has been accustomed in various moods and in a less excited state,
cannot but have great efficacy in tempering and restraining the passion by an
inter-texture of ordinary feeling, and of feeling not strictly and necessarily
connected with the passion... and hence, though the opinion will at first appear
paradoxical, from the tendency ofmetre to divest language, in a certain degree, of
its reality, and thus to throw a sort of half-consciousness of unsubstantial
existence over the whole composition, there can be little doubt but that more
pathetic situations and sentiments, that is, those which have a greater proportion
ofpain connected with them, may be endured in metrical composition, especially
in rhyme, than in prose (qtd. in Chatman, 218).
Wordsworth suggests that "metrical composition"-regular meter-allows poets more
effectively to portray pain; its role is manifested in "tempering and restraining the
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passion." This is the position taken by Spenser when he describes the function of
Erato-the muse of lyric poetry-in The Teares ofthe Muses, as to "rule in measure
moderate / The tempest of that stormie passion, / And use to paint in rimes the troublous
state / Of Lovers life in likest fashion [... ]" (379-82). Wyatt's lines threaten the rule of
"measure moderate," and it is little wonder that his lyrics, which clearly convey "a
greater proportion of pain" than most, are often disparaged because of their irregularity.
Together these arguments suggest a connection between the lack of regular meter
in Wyatt's lyrics and his own lack of measure, between expressive form and personal
experience. Of course, such claims risk naturalizing critical descriptive metaphors. It's
not clear how Wyatt's rhythms indicate psychological states any more than it's clear why
meter ought to be described by value-laden metaphors based on tactile experience
("rough," "smooth"), or why multi-syllabic rhymes ought to be referred to as "feminine."
Wyatt's "rough" meter may be, after all, closer to normal English speech patterns than
Surrey's "smooth" verse.75 The defenders of an affective theory ofmeter universally
appeal to tradition: meter reflects and tempers reality because generations of readers have
invested meter with the power to reflect and temper reality. Meter works, as Abercrombie
says, "Empirically: it has been found to work." It is with Augustine that the roots of this
association are brought to light: the theory of meter's affective capability is directly tied
to a theory of the universe, in which linguistic creations are successful to the extent that
75 Southall's discussion of "rough" as a critical descriptor of Wyatt's verse is iI1Sightful:
"In other words, 'rough' refers to the state of a piece or body of verse that students of
classical prosody have been unable to reduce to the standard permutations required or
prescribed by that one particular form of prosody. The fact that classical prosody is
incompetent to deal with all verse does not imply that the verse with which it cannot deal
is bad [... ]. (115-6)
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they imitate natural creation, which is notable, above all else, for its perfect harmony,
its concord, its measure.
Thus, as Puttenham argues at the beginning of a chapter called "Of Ornament,"
It is said by such as profess the mathematical sciences that all things stand by
proportion, and that without it nothing could stand to be good or beautiful. The
doctors of our theology to the same effect, but in other terms, say that God made
the world by number, measure, and weight [... ]. Of all which we leave to speak,
returning to our poetical proportion, which holdeth ofthe musical, because, as we
said before, poesy is a skill to speak and write harmonically; and verses or rhyme
be a kind of musical utterance, by reason of a certain congruity in sounds pleasing
the ear [... ]. And this our proportion poetical resteth in five points: staff, measure,
concord, situation, and figure, all which shall be spoken of in their places" (153-
4).
Puttenham here merges natural, theological, and aesthetic conceptions of measure in a
typical early modem portrayal of literature as reflective or derivative of nature. All things
properly made are things made in measure and proportion, and Puttenham includes his
own treatise, which will itself be correctly proportioned ("all which shall be spoken of in
their places").
The correspondences between meter and measure suggest that for sixteenth
century poets and critics, measure constitutes a field in which the aesthetic, ethical, and
natural converge. Just as it was common for early modem thinkers to describe a life well
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lived as a measured life, a temperate life, so it was common to consider a work of
art's greatness in terms of balance and proportion. At issue here is the morality of
aesthetic form, a problem confronted more famously by George Herbert in the
seventeenth century. As Yvor Winters says of Wyatt, "1fpoetry is [... ] a form of moral
judgment, then the poetic form, in regard to this matter [Wyatt's rejection of affected
courtliness and affected poetic style], is merely a more refined and precise embodiment
of the social form: poetry and morality are one" (8-9). For Wyatt, rough, plain-speaking
lyrics are a reflection of a desire to speak roughly in that other performative context-the
court, which, with its premium on eloquence and what Wyatt calls "dowbleness," nearly
cost Wyatt his life on more than one occasion. Wyatt's aesthetic form, according to this
argument, reflects his desired ethical content. This is a restatement ofRebholz's claim
that metrical deviations are for Wyatt "deliberate variations to reinforce the speaker's
astonishment at the reality of his past union and the strangeness of his present desertion"
(54). But unlike Rebholz, Winters is not invested in presenting a totalizing theory of
Wyatt's metrical practice. Of the critics who discuss Wyatt's metrics in detail, Winters is
alone in eschewing recourse to complex metrical theories that relieve critical anxiety: "I
see no reason to believe that the rough pentameters in general were the result of any
subtle theory ofmeter or rhythm" (5). Winters believes that Wyatt is a rhythmic master,
but is willing to accept that at times Wyatt did write "bad pentameter."
Thomas Greene restates the connection between aesthetic form and ethical
content in the context of Wyatt's style:
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The drabness of Wyatt's language is of course essential to his moral style. He
systematically reduced the tones ofPetrarch's highly ornamented surface. [... ]
This suppression of ornament and Petrarchan decorative richness, this imagistic
asceticism, is essential to Wyatt's language because it strips the word of its
esthetic pretentiousness and leaves it as a naked gauge of integrity. He seems
almost to have invested with value the impoverished formal poetic means
available to him. (256)
Greene's point about Wyatt's plain style is apropos of his metric style as well. But in the
field ofmetric studies, the self-replicating arguments about Wyatt's meter generally exist
in an environment of competitive explanatory ripostes. Critics demonstrate a fundamental
desire to "solve" the problem of Wyatt's metrics, but such a solution is not forthcoming,
and I would suggest that the intractability of the problem is itself a source ofattraction
(perhaps the major source of attraction) for critics. Confronted with Wyatt's irregular
metrical approach-an approach that clearly produces a massive amount of readerly
unease-critics remeasure the text to enforce an artificial "regularity" and relieve anxiety.
Thus Jonathan Crewe cogently points out that Tottel both praises Wyatt as "depe
witted" and implicitly criticizes Wyatt's metrics by regularizing them. This double
approach "implies recognition by Tottel that the irregularities he is correcting are not
necessarily inadvertent or merely old-fashioned but in some sense threatening to good
order;; (25). This is, it seems to me, the same concern that has vexed Wyatt studies ever
since: Wyatt's "irregularities" are a threat to "good order" and must be smoothed out,
defended, historicized, or otherwise accounted for in terms of Wyatt's intentionality. The
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vexed history of Wyatt criticism reveals a deeply engrained critical desire focused on
measuring and on traditional concepts ofmetrical conformity. And, as Ben Saunders has
argued in another context, metrical obsessions such as these can tell us something about
the obsessions themselves: they can point to "something about [... ] texts and the
responses they encourage," and, in the case of persistent metrical arguments, "something
about the pleasurable excitations, the ideological functionalism, and finally, the
explanatory limits of meter itself, as traditionally conceived" (95).
The attempt to provide a methodological, totalizing solution to the "problem" of
Wyatt's metrics both presents critics with the illusion that they will control (measure) the
line while simultaneously withholding that pleasure. The metric obsession reveals more
about the anxiety that produces the obsession than about the poetry that provokes that
anxiety. At issue here is the place of prosodic studies in the field ofEnglish literary
criticism. If the dream of the pentameter has enticed and eluded Wyatt's critics for four
hundred and fifty years, if critics have been driven to propose diverse alternative
approaches that have uniformly failed, if the most obvious point about a series ofmetric
arguments is that they are famously intractable, what is the function of prosodic study? In
the context of Donne studies, where similar arguments about the meter have not reached
resolution, Saunders has argued that the project of objectively describing metrical form is
a failed one:
Once we have accepted that the ability to 'recognize' an iambic pentameter is not
a neutrally descriptive act, but a productive, creative, interpretive one, more
closely resembling an act of conjuration than an act of discovery; and once we
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have accepted further that in some cases-such as that of Donne-the critical
conjurer is so determined to evoke the metrical spectre that he or she is often
driven to the rhetorical equivalent of smoke and mirrors; then we are still left with
the task of explaining the bizarre spectacle of metrical conjurers tricking
themselves into believing their own illusions, and leveling the terrible curse of
'bad reader' upon those who dare to dismiss their magic. (112)
"Smoke and mirrors" seems an apt description ofPuttenham's attempt to account for
Wyatt's emended meter, bolstered, as the argument is, with his theory of intentionality.
And subsequent prosodists have generally followed suit.
In the critical realm, the "solution" to the metrical question presents itself as a
displaced object of desire on the Petrarchan model: unattainable, capable of the minute
dissection of parts, continually (re)productive of literary/linguistic artifacts. The
unmeasurable line eludes the totalizing grasp ofprosodists while simultaneously
encouraging their attempts by hinting, just often enough, at a "regular" metrical
intelligence controlling their construction. We are left with a body ofpoetry that contains
lines that seem to produce the rhythmic expression that subsequently came to be known
as "iambic pentameter," and that also contains lines that seem to resist that rhythmic
expreSSIOn.
Wyatt's meter is a form of measure that he frequently utilizes to describe
relentless mismeasure. And it must be admitted that Wyatt's lines have effectively
communicated, among other things, the anxiety they are meant to describe. This suggests
that Plato's and Augustine's and Puttenham's theory of meter as a formal expression of
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natural order is more deeply rooted than perhaps we realize, for metrical expressions
that resist easily identified and categorized labels generate the same kinds of unease, of
restlessness, that their content describes. And this is Wyatt's ultimate achievement: for
Wyatt, meter is an aesthetic and an ethical construction, and one that should reflect the
moral or immoral order of the universe, as the universe seems to Wyatt at the moment a
poem is written. If this is the case, it should not be surprising if Wyatt, in his obsession
with the unmeasured responses of all those around him, should produce unmeasured
verse.
Yet what are we to make, then, of the critical reaction to Wyatt, which has always
attempted to remeasure his verse-first by rewriting it and subsequently by providing
speculative theories designed to ascribe to it a kind of order it manifestly lacks? The
history of Wyatt studies itself reveals that Wyatt's primary poetic stance-that of
anxiety-has replicated itself over and over again, for his unmeasurable line is both a
product and a producer of anxiety. But critical responses also suggest complicity with the
very language Wyatt is reacting against, the "smooth" lines of Surrey and his successors.
Ifwe accept Wordsworth's theory that poetic meter provides "the co-presence of
something regular," something to relieve the mind of the excitement of the emotions
communicated by the poem, then efforts to provide this measure to Wyatt's poems
directly counteract Wyatt's own purpose in writing the lines as he did, for the experience
of the world Wyatt attempts to communicate is one of disorder, anxiety, and excitement.
In 1536, when Wyatt was perhaps at his most disillusioned with court life, he was
released from the Tower of London and made his way to his father's estate in Kent,
where he penned the epistolary satire "Mine Own John Poyntz." In this poem Wyatt
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attacks the hypocrisy of court life, the ambition that causes courtiers to flatter and to
betray, and the craft that allows men to speak one thing and mean another. Wyatt argues
that he doesn't possess the personality traits that make for a successful courtier:
My Poyntz, I cannot frame my tune to feign,
To cloak the truth for praise, without desert,
Of them that list all vice for to retain.
Critical attempts to "frame" Wyatt's "tune" do not merely repeat or reflect his anxiety
about measure, but actively erase the expression of that anxiety by reframing it in the
very language that makes court life possible. And, as Wyatt here (and everywhere) makes
clear, there is a special and potentially inverse relationship between truth and eloquence
in the world of the court. Tottel's efforts to frame Wyatt's tune led directly to
Puttenham's project, in which Wyatt's re-measured poems are the examples provided for
"rude rimers" to learn to write metrically. In this form the poems could teach up-and-
coming courtiers how to maneuver at court smoothly and adeptly; it was what Southall
calls "a book of manners in which prosody is presented as a means by which ladies and
new courtiers can polish up their verses so as to acquire a reputation for social
gracefulness." This is the final ironic end for Wyatt's ethical poetic form, for his poems
reflect his disgust with court life and all its unmeasured unfairness, and yet Wyatt,
embittered and disillusioned with a culture founded on "smooth" and measured language,
is made by his critics to bear the mantle ofthat culture and to exhibit that very language.
Finally, then, the question of the place of prosody in modem criticism is central to
how we read the poetry of Thomas Wyatt, for the uses and misuses to which his metric
practice have been put must be reconciled with the content of the poems themselves and
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with Wyatt's continual efforts to express something about the unruly quality of his
life. Certainly the project dedicated to finding Wyatt's lost metric theory has failed. After
four and a half centuries of scanning Wyatt's poems, we can agree only that he
sometimes wrote iambic pentameter lines and that he sometimes did not. If, as I have
suggested, the project has always been motivated by a desire to make his poems-and his
place in the canon of English poetry-ideologically palatable, the failure of the project
represents the beginning of a new period in Wyatt criticism, one in which Wyatt's poems
might be considered in relation to his flawed but resilient ethical vision rather than in
relation to a lost theory ofmetrical construction. This is not to say that there is no place
for metric analysis, but that in Wyatt's case his unmeasured form has provided us a way
to read the poems without really looking at them, for they are difficult and troubling
poems full of difficult and troubling implications. Probably, however, the impulse "to
temper and to tame" Wyatt's wild lines will continue, for Wyatt's unsettling truth about
his unmeasured world-a truth he tried to write over and over again-remains as
troubling to critics of our age as it did to Wyatt's earliest readers, and our institutions are
as threatened by mismeasure as the institutions to which Wyatt dedicated his life.
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CHAPTER III
TO "MEASURE OUT A MEAN": PHAEDRIA AND THE TEMPTATIONS OF
GENRE IN BOOK II OF THE FAERIE QUEENE
Measure, noun: 2. a. Moderation, temperance, restraint; abstemiousness.
Oxford English Dictionary
At the beginning of the sixth Canto ofBook II of the Faerie Queene, the emaged
Cymochles stands in an allegorically significant position-at the "utmost brim" of a
river-looking across. He sees a small craft on the opposite shore and hails it. This is
Phaedria's "gondelay," a vessel she uses to ferry Cymochles, and later Guyon, to the
wandering isle, where she attempts to keep them in "joyous pleasure" indefinitely. Critics
have paid little attention to Phaedria's craft, even though Spenser is at pains to emphasize
its strangeness and the magic of its movements. When Cymochles first spies the
gondelay, it is moving "as swift as glance of eye," and once he is aboard it is "more swift,
then swallow sheres the liquid skie" (5.2). But the gondelay's most remarkable feature is
its ability to move at the whim of its captain. It traverses the water "withouten oare or
Pilot it to guide/or winged canvas with the wind to flie" (5.3-4). In moving without a
visible guide, the vessel mirrors the condition of CymocWes, who has been forced to
leave his companion Atin on shore, and the condition of Guyon, who is likewise forced to
abandon the Palmer when he steps aboard the gondelay. In the moral allegory of
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Faeryland, a vehicle fundamentally resistant to the allegorical representation of
rational control poses a moral-allegorical question: what does it mean to travel as
Phaedria and her passengers do, whimsically, easily, led by desire?
For once on Phaedria's boat, we are indeed in the world of desire, where mere
fancy dictates progress. Guyon is surprised when the boat departs without the Palmer:
"for the flit barke, obaying to her mind,lForth launched quickly, as she did desire" (20.3-
4). The final clause of this sentence is grammatically ambiguous: on the one hand,
Spenser indicates that it is the express intention of Phaedria to depart without the Palmer.
On the other hand, all movements of this craft are dictated as Phaedria desires, and this is
both the appeal and the threat embodied by Phaedria in general: just as Guyon leaves
behind the allegorical figure of reasoned temperance, he enters the world of unmediated
desire, a literally whimsical world. Readers are alerted to be wary of Phaedria' s boat not
merely because the Palmer is left behind, but because the motion of the boat, in its
"wandering" (10.2), already enacts the consequences of that abandonment. The
possibilities of such a vehicle are appealing, and in a book concerned with temptation it is
the appeal of this craft, its potential for easy progress, that signals the reader to be alert to
danger. As will be made clear to Guyon once he reaches Phaedria's wandering isle, ease
itself is perilous; it represents a threat not only to Spenser's Protestant sensibilities, but
more directly to his hero and to his poem.
But the ease with which Phaedria's craft moves is not the only marker of its
sinister nature. The fannal threat of instability represented by ease goes hand in hand
with the threat of artifice clearly symbolized by the gondelay. Phaedria's craft is
intricately decorated-"bedecked trim/with boughes and arbours woven cunningly, / that
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like a litle forrest seemed outwardly" (2.7-9)-and in the fourth stanza we are told
that it is "painted." In all of the Faerie Queene, but in Book II in particular, indications of
artifice serve as a warning, and the suspicion occasioned by artifice in the poem
reflexively indicts Spenser's poetic practice as well. Just as clearly as artifice is
represented (and critiqued) in Book II by Acrasia's Bower of Bliss and Phaedria's
Wandering Isle, it is embodied formally by Spenser's rhetorically sophisticated poetics,
creating an ironic commentary on art that complicates the otherwise consistently negative
valuation of artifice in the poem.
Coupled with Spenser's characteristic pun on "forrest"-jor rest-the description
of Phaedria's gondelay thus provides a double warning against her craft, first in terms of
the temptation to rest and second in terms of artifice. 76 And indeed, instead of taking her
passengers across the river, Phaedria ferries both Cymochles and Guyon to her artificial
island, where she invites them~mploying the art of song-to lie down and rest. Here
Phaedria's double temptations become indistinguishable: artifice is dangerous because of
its duplicity, but that duplicity can be used to disguise what is in fact continual rest with
the appearance of a noble--{)r even biblical-correct path. The apparent speed of the boat
noted by Cymochles (2.6) is thus ultimately a misapprehension, for the purpose of the
boat is the opposite of movement; it provides the illusion of motion, but it does not take
76 For another ambivalent treatment of artifice in Book II, see ix, 49-52, where the
allegorical representation of foresight, Phantastes, is likewise associated with artifice and
poetry, but also (unlike Phaedria) with restlessness: "He had a sharpe foresight, and
working wit, / That never idle was, ne once would rest a whit" (49.8-9).
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either character where they want to gO.77 Upon reaching the wandering isle, Guyon
becomes angry and accuses Phaedria:
Ah Dame, perdie ye have not doen me right,
Thus to mislead me, whiles I you obaid:
Me litle needed from my right way to have straid (22.7-9).
The end ofPhaedria's art and craft is to take Guyon where he does not wish to go.
But being "misled"-losing one's "right way"-is in fact as much a question for Spenser
as it is for Guyon. Indeed, Guyon's accusation that Phaedria has led him astray is
identical to the accusations leveled against Spenser in his own lifetime and voiced for
centuries afterward: namely, that he was misled by unfaithful guides and lost his right
way. For Guyon's right way is coextensive with Spenser's right way: in a heroic poem
the progress of the hero is identical to the progress of the poem. This relationship was
established in the classical epics and was a major feature in early modem readings of
Virgil's Aeneid, in which Aeneas' wanderings constitute the poem's wanderings, and his
success in founding Rome ends the poem. Furthermore, Phaedria's craft is deeply related
to Spenser's craft, which is the mechanism by which readers, led by desire, find
themselves enmeshed in an artificial imitation of natural delights, and-some critics
would say-led astray.
Readers who expected the Faerie Queene to follow the Virgilian model criticized
Spenser by insisting that he got lost on his way to the end of the poem. The earliest
example of this criticism is perhaps that of the "might peer"-likely William Cecil, Lord
77 See also Calidore's pastoral interlude in Book VI, canto x, where Calidore chooses to
remain among the rustics, and the abandoned quest is figured as a ship that appears to go
somewhere but in fact remains in the harbor, "sayling alwaies on the port" (2.9).
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Burghley-who apparently objected to the romance aspects of the poem, as Spenser's
defense of his poem in the proem to Book IV suggests.78 In the eighteenth century Joseph
Spense found that if Spenser had followed the ancient poets more closely than his Italian
influences, he "would not have wandered so often, into such strange and inconsistent
imaginations," and Thomas Rymer argued that Spenser "lost himself by following an
unfaithful guide" (my emphasis, qtd in Watkins 2). Rymer suggested, further, that
Spenser and Ariosto "miscarried in their Travels for want of direction to set them in the
right way" (my emphasis, qtd. in Watkins 2). For neoclassical readers such as these, the
ethical transgressions of characters mirror the aesthetic transgressions of the poet: "Like
Verdant or Redcrosse, [Spenser] neglects the sober rule of reason and abandons himself
to the wanderings of an undisciplined imagination" (Watkins 1). Thus one seventeenth-
century reader of the poem-Sir Richard Blackmore-implicitly connects Spenser's
aesthetic progress with the ethical progress of his characters:
Ariosto and Spencer, however great Wits, not observing this judicious Conduct of
Virgil, nor attending to any sober Rules, are hurried on with a boundless,
impetuous Fancy over Hill and Dale, till they are both lost in a Wood of
Allegories,-Allegories so wild, unnatural, and extravagant, as greatly displease
the Reader" (qtd. in Watkins 1).
78 Though Spenser's defense suggests that Burghley objected to Spenser's "looser rimes"
rather than to the structural elements of romance.
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As Watkins notes, this is yet another assessment that equates Spenser's putative
aesthetic failings with the ethical failings of characters in the poem: "The wood of moral
error into which Redcrosse first strays returns in Blackmore's critique as an image of
Spenser's aesthetic error, his flight from Virgil's judicious guidance into a wood of
fantastic, Italianate allegories" (1). To put it another way, Phaedria-an unfaithful
guide-misleads Guyon just as (critics of Spenser's romance influences would argue)
Spenser is misled from his "right way" by his Italian models.
The eighteenth-century reactions against the interwoven allegories that constitute
romance are merely the most strongly stated formulations of criticism already extant in
the early modem period. Thus Patricia Parker notes that it was the rise of Aristotelianism
during the Renaissance that increasingly informed criticism of Ariosto's Orlando
Furioso: "the catalogue of complaints against Ariosto's poem [... ] grew, both in Italy and
in France, as Aristotle's Poetics became increasingly the bible of narrative form"
(Inescapable Romance 17). Montaigne repeats an already-widespread early modem view
of poetic form when he uses the epic structure of Virgil' s Aeneid to demonstrate the
failure of Ariosto's narrative technique in the Orlando Furioso:
We see the former on outspread wings in lofty and sustained flight always
pursuing his point; the latter fluttering and hopping from tale to tale as from
branch to branch, not trusting his wings except for a very short hop, alighting at
every turn for fear his breath and strength should fail (300).
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The connection between Phaedria's watercraft and Spenser's poetic craft is
not accidental to the word "craft," though the pun was operative in the sixteenth century.
The figure of boat as metaphor for a poem's progress toward its completion was a
common and ancient literary trope; E.R. Curtius cites examples from Virgil, Horace,
Pliny, and Dante, among others (158-60). Patricia Parker calls the figure of ship as poetic
craft "one of the oldest ofliterary (opoi" (16) and notes that Ariosto begins the final canto
of Orlando Furioso by figuring the conclusion of the poem as a ship returning from a
long voyage. Following this tradition, Spenser regularly uses boats as signifiers of poetic
craft.79 He repeatedly asks us to consider watercraft as metaphors for poetic progress, as
at the end of Book I, when he frames the reader's journey through the poem as a sea
voyage:
Now strike your sailes yee jolly Mariners,
For we be come unto a quite rode,
Where we must land some of our passengers,
And light this weary vessel ofher lode.
Here she a while may make her safe abode,
Till she repaired have her tackles spent,
And wants supplide. And then againe abroad
On the long voyage whereto she is bent:
Well may she speede and fairely finish her intent.
And at the end of Book II, as Guyon and the Palmer prepare to travel from Acrasia's
island to return to Alma's castle, the Palmer's invocation to Guyon is also a directive to
the poet and the reader: "But let us hence depart, whilest wether serves and winde"
(12.87.12).
79 For examples see Dees, Edwards, and "ship imagery" in the S.Enc. For an emblematic
twentieth-century example, see Mallarme's "Salut."
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To read a long poem is to undertake a kind ofjourney, and it is to be at the
mercy of the poet, who steers the vessel from port to port. In a poem in which sailing is a
regular allegorical figure for poetic progress, Spenser's painted craft is as suspect as
Phaedria's. Thus when Cymochles is literally taken in by Phaedria's craft, both when he
steps into the gondelay and when he listens to her song, readers of Spenser's poem are
caught in a reflexive irony: just as we are prepared to judge Cymochles' failure to move
toward his goals, we must realize that we too are caught in Phaedria's web, enmeshed in
the music, magic, and song that is Spenser's poem.80 Cymochles' first apprehension of
the gondelay's movement '"as swift as glance of eye," interpolates the reader into the
poem by referencing our apprehension of the gondelay at the moment it is perceived by
Cymochles: we too are enchanted by the craft, taking it in as swift as glance of eye. Like
Cymochles, we face the danger of (mis)reading Phaedria. And like Cymochles, we are
made susceptible to romance, to the temptation to lie down and hear a song, to infinite
digression and delay.
In this chapter I will investigate the ethical consequences of aesthetic form, as it
was conceived in the early modem period and specifically in regards to Guyon's '"right
way." What does it mean, in a poem of nearly 35,000 lines, '"to have straid?" What would
constitute Guyon's '"right way," and what does it mean, in the context of Book II of The
Faerie Queene, to be misled? In the course of this discussion I will treat Spenser's self-
awareness of the process of creating and executing his poem, that is, of his view of the
poem as a kind ofjourney that entails repeated narrative choices. My approach
80 Parker notes that Ariosto also '"points not only to the digressive nature of his romanzo
but to the complicity ofthe reader in its deviance" (33).
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emphasizes the status of the poem as a made thing, a product of historical and
political forces, certainly, but also a product of an authorial awareness of the poem as a
poem and ofthe poet as operating within a particular tradition. Specifically, I will argue
that Spenser sees his poem progressing by a series of clear choices that must be
navigated, choices that are manifested as the possibilities of generic convention and are
analogous to the temptations of excess nominally treated in Book II of the Faerie
Queene. Furthermore, since the Faerie Queene is a poem in a conventional mode-a
work that self-consciously presents itself as a response to and critique of other poems that
confront similar generic problems-Spenser always sees this voyage as something that
has happened before. Consequently, his choices of narrative construction are mediated by
the poems to which they ostensibly respond.
In investigating these questions I will be discussing two very old questions in
Spenser criticism: first, the question of genre in the poem, as it is portrayed in Book II
and with respect to early modem theories of poetic form, derived largely from Aristotle's
Poetics; and second, the nature of Spenser's treatment ofthe virtue of temperance,
including the relationship between that treatment and Aristotle's theory of virtue as
elucidated in the Nicomachean Ethics. I will argue that these questions are inseparably
related and that ifwe are to take Spenser's engagement with his source materials
seriously, we must see his navigation through the poem as a journey-much like
Guyon's-in which various narrative possibilities must be encountered and rejected in
pursuit of a "middle way."
I begin this chapter with a description ofPhaedria's gondelay because-although
it is just such a moment in the Faerie Queene, a short hop from one tale to the next-it is
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one ofthe places where Spenser expressly frames Guyon's progress in terms of
motion and delay-a primary factor of generic form-and because it seems to me an
overlooked example of Spenser's consideration of his own poem. Another way to say this
is that in considering the nature and function ofPhaedria's craft, I wish also to consider
the nature and function of Spenser's craft. For Spenser's craft-the formal construction
of his poem-is, like Phaedria's ferry, "bedecked trim" and "woven cunningly," and like
Phaedria's craft, it does not always take readers where they think they may be going.
Both the boat and the poem are, essentially, diversions. They are also both clearly aligned
with art on the art/nature dichotomy expressly considered in the Bower of Bliss episode
in the final canto of Book II. The association of artifice with rhetoric and the generally
negative allegorical significance applied to these loci ofvalue is a repeated theme
throughout The Faerie Queene, and by attacking these values Spenser undertakes
questions about his own project in a highly complex and ambiguous way. IfPhaedria
represents artifice, and if she is a threat to the virtuous hero partly because of that
representation, what is the relationship between the poem and its virtuous reader? Does
Guyon's necessary rejection ofPhaedria entail the reader's ultimate rejection----or at least
suspicion----of the poem itself? 81
At issue here are questions of readerly responses to poetic forms. What is the
appropriate form for a long narrative poem? The answer must lie in the reaction of
readers to the form. If the poem takes readers where they do not wish to go-if it leads
them "astray"-the poem fails to ret1ect the proper order of the world. These are
81 Parker notes a similar paradox in terms of "imaging," noting that separating "the poet's
craft from that of Archimago" is "the crucial problem" of the poem (59).
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questions ofmeasure. Of the many overlapping definitions of "measure" in sixteenth-
century England, there are perhaps none so strikingly related as the two that refer, on the
one hand, to poetic form and, on the other, to moderate ethical behavior. The relationship
between the proper order of the self and the proper order of one's imitation ofnature-
which is how virtually all early modem theorists viewed poetry-is continually noted by
readers of poetry, and just as Wyatt's unsettled meter has seemed consistently to unsettle
his readers, so too early modem literary theorists considered the form of longer poems in
light ofethical effects on readers. One ofPlato's primary reasons for banishing the poets
from the republic was that they stirred up passions that the state has an interest in
regulating. Poems make their audiences intemperate:
And with regard to sexual emotions, anger, and all the passions and sorrows and
pleasures of the spirit, which we think are always with us, does not the poetic
imitation have [an undignified] effect on us? It feeds and waters these passions
that ought to be dried up, and puts them in command of us when they should be so
ruled that we may grow better and happier instead ofworse and more vile"
(Republic 53-4).
For the humanists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Plato's apparent critique of
poetry was a traditional obstacle that had to be variously excused, rationalized, disagreed
with, or-occasionally-accepted. But these readers always took for granted that there is
an ethical relationship between a poem and its readers, between the measure ofpoetry
and the measure of the self.
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In considering the ethical nature of poetic form and the relationship between a
poem and its audience I am touching on questions that constituted a major part of early
modem literary theory, for these were ancient concerns, well-suited to the rhetorical bent
ofmany of the Italian humanists who carried on the great literary debates of the
Cinquecento. While Horace's dictum utile et dulce clearly captured the medieval view of
poetry as a source of knowledge, Cicero's formulation-to teach, delight, and move-
locates poetry in the field of rhetoric,82 and the ability of poetry to move its audience was
as much a consistent source of poetry's denigration as it was of praise, both in the
classical and early modem periods.83 Thus, Plato's affective theory of poetics in the
Republic is not substantively different from that Sidney used to elevate the status of
poetry among the branches of knowledge.84 The question is never whether poetry moves,
but whether poetry is likely to move its audience to virtuous or vicious habits.
Spenser always assumes that poetry has an ethical function; he is of course a
precisely measured poet, and when he pursues what Sidney terms "that numbrous kinde
of writing which is called verse" (159) he does so with more attention to numbers than
perhaps any other poet of the early modem period. Spenser's interest in the order of his
poems is partly an attempt to achieve a perfect imitation ofnature, as in the
Epithalamion, in which the 365 long lines represent the number of days in the year, and
other numbers correspond to weeks, months, and seasons (359-61). Because creation is
82 Hathaway 23-4.
83 See Hathaway for a discussion of the sixteenth-century tendency to consider poetry a
branch of rhetoric (21-2).
84 Sidney 174-5. cf. 191-2 for Sidney's response to Plato.
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ordered by God, poetic works that imitate that order ought to elicit in readers proper
ethical measure. Thus in the Teares o/the Muses Spenser presents a view of poetry that
assumes Plato's theory of ethical poetic effects, but comes to the opposite conclusion; as
one editor has pointed out, "Theidea of rule appears in many ofthe [Muses'] speeches,
always in association with the Muses' power to discipline men, guide them, enable them
to keep proper measure in their lives. This measure is the product of the Muses' capacity
to enlighten man about his own nature and his proper relation to God" (266).85 The
function ofpoetry is to measure the lives of men and to bring them into alignment with
the measure of the created world.86
The way in which poetic forms align with the created world they ostensibly
imitate is not obvious, and the rediscovery of Aristotle's Poetics provided Italian
humanists with a blueprint against which they could test poetic works by genre.
Unfortunately, in the Poetics Aristotle deals only with rhetorical genres likely to be acted
or read to audiences: comedy, tragedy, and epic. Genres that were not included or that
were developed subsequently had to be considered speculatively based on what Aristotle
said about the genres he treated. The question at issue for Spenser's poetic measure is
whether it aligns with the created order in a way likely to produce virtue in its reader. In
Book II, in which temperance is self-consciously and allegorically investigated, these
questions ofmeasure are obviously foregrounded. The charge against Ariosto and
85 See especially Erato's complaint.
86 Thus Francesco Buonamici, in his reading ofAristotle's Poetics, argues that "verse is a
natural thing, requiring a certain force for understanding harmony which is natural in
some men. And because it is full ofnumber and of harmony, orderly motion moves in an
orderly way and according to nature; motion according to nature brings pleasure"
(Discorsi, 1597, qtd. in Weinberg 693-4).
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Spenser, as we have seen, is that they are forestalled on their way to the end of the
poem. Spenser explicitly takes up the question of delay in regard to his poetic voyage in
the first stanza of the final canto of Book VI, where he looks back at the course of his
poem and defends his own "right way":
Like as a ship, that through the Ocean wyde
Directs her course unto one certaine cost,
Is met of many a counter winde and tyde,
With which her winged speed is let and crost,
And she her selfe in stormie surges tost;
Yet making many a borde, and many a bay,
Still wineth way, ne hath her compasse lost:
Right so it fares with me in this long way,
Whose course is often stayd, yet never is astray.
The aural/orthographic pun on cost/coast, enforced by its rhyme with "lost" and "crost,"
suggests that poetic closure always comes at a price, and that the price is inescapable,
"certain." To close a poem is to circumvent its (potentially) endless circumlocutions, to
close off the possibility of endless digression and delay. Poetic closure is one ofthe
primary indications of genre, but closure is not determined merely by how a poem ends,
for a long poem is always considering its own end, is always both moving toward that
end and simultaneously deferring it.
In this defense of his poetic technique, Spenser describes the difference between
success and failure as equivalent to the difference between staying and straying,
suggesting that the distinction between these two movements-like the distinction
between these two words-is very small. It is the instances where Spenser "often stay[s]"
that constitute the primary threat to his right way, and the poem itself continually
suggests that to stay is to stray. Phaedria's craft-in the sense of both her song and her
gondelay-is designed to "stay" whomever it comes across; in fact, as Watkins notes, the
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key point about Phaedria's craft is indicated the moment she appears in the second
stanza of canto six: in a characteristically Spenserian pun, the function ofthe gondelay is
revealed in its spelling: it is a vehicle of delay (138).
As Parker notes, "[d]elay and deferral as moral categories are in Spenser's poem
almost uniformly bad, a version of the dangerous and enervating sin of sloth" (62). In a
poem in which narrative progress is explicitly figured as seafaring, any analysis of the
poem's craft must consider what it means to delay. For Spenser, this is perhaps the
crucial question of the poem, and its answer is worked out in the mapping of generic
conventions in Book II. When Guyon steps aboard Phaedria's craft he enters the world of
magic and of desire, offemale sexuality, pleasure, and ease. He enters a world where he
is asked to lie down and to rest and to abandon his journey. He enters the world of
romance.
II
Be on your way. Enough delays. An ever
Uncertain and inconstant thing is woman. -The Aeneid, 4.786-7
In the first paragraph of Spenser's letter to Walter Raleigh, he announces both that
the poem to which the letter is affixed will be a moral allegory and that it will "[follow]
all the antique Poets historicall," including Homer, Virgil, Ariosto, and Tasso. In these
two goals, the first identifying poem's telos, the second its method, lies a tension
grounded in the relationship between the aesthetic and ethical functions of literature and
related to literary forms, specifically in terms of genre. Following Sidney's defense of
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poetry, Spenser expressly indicates that the pleasure of reading the allegory is a
mechanism by which the moral lessons may be more easily apprehended by the reader.
He thus foregrounds the poem's interaction with its reader and privileges its moral
directives: "The generall end therefore of all the booke is to fashion a gentleman or noble
person in virtuous and gentle discipline" (Hamilton 715). The aesthetic pleasures of the
work constitute the mechanism by which its ethical purpose is enfolded and delivered.
Had Spenser written a straightforward moral allegory, as did Bunyan a century
later, this plan might have been carried out in a straightforward way, but the Faerie
Queene is not a straightforward moral allegory, as indicated by the models Spenser
himself names as his literary guides. Following the three epics of Homer and Virgil, he
lists the Italian romance-or, more accurately, what Gillian Beer refers to by the
oxymoron "Italian 'romantic epic'" (34)-works ofAriosto and Tasso. Spenser's
decision to base his poem on the widely popular romance-infused Italian epics seems
strange in conjunction with his intention to write a "moral allegory." Early modern
writers believed that in Aeneas Virgil portrayed the perfect man. James Nohrnberg argues
that, given this belief, "the heroic poem, according to Renaissance authors, has as its end
the 'institution' of a praiseworthy man who may be a model to other men" (30). Ariosto
and Tasso used their heroic poems to portray perfection in their heroes, but, as we have
seen, they were widely criticized for their choice of form. In the Letter to Raleigh,
Spenser thus foregrounds what has been a crucial critical question about his poem ever
since it was written: what are the formal allegiances of the poem? Specifically, how much
does the poem owe to romance and how much to epic? The Faerie Queene and the Italian
poems cited by Spenser are open to the objections quoted above because of their
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allegiance to romance form, which privileges multiplicity of action. But romance may
also be attacked because of the result of that action, which requires of readers a particular
attitude. Thus Beer gives two historical critical objections to the romance form, marking
out the difficult path the poet must tread between boredom and seduction:
[P]erhaps its principle artistic problem is, quite simply, that it tends to bore the
reader who does not succumb totally to it. The principle moral objection which
has continuously been made to it is that it seduces the reader: it offers him a kind
of fairy world which will unfit him (or more frequently her) for common life after
he has sojourned there. The two objections are not unconnected (14).
Because romance is more invested than other forms in creating an imaginative
world apart from that of normal life, in order to be successful that world must be utterly
compelling, must carry the reader wholly away from the concerns and preoccupations
that constitute everyday reality. But those concerns and preoccupations are the content of
ethical existence. This is the contradiction at the heart of Sidney's Roratian formulation,
a contradiction taken up by Spenser when he argues that his formal technique will teach
by enwrapping its sermons in "Allegoricall devises": "nothing [is] esteemed of, that is not
delightfull and pleasing to commune sence." The appeal to the delight and pleasure of
common sense is as much an appeal to the delight and pleasure of the senses, and as
Parker notes in the context of Ariosto's appeal to the senses, his "error was to come too
close to the dulce side of the famous Roratian dictum, to succumb to the attractions of
diverting fable over the essential, if perhaps less interesting, moral kernel (19).
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The successful romance removes the reader entirely from the realm of the
ethical and into the world of the imagination; in order for romance to engage the
imagination sufficiently, it must, as Beer says, "seduce" the reader. The tension between
dulce and utile, then, is most concentrated in the form of romance, and it is romance that
constitutes the greatest threat to Sidney's and Spenser's express ideology of literary
didacticism. Instead of the aesthetic pleasure of poetry serving as a delivery device for
the less pleasurable ethical message, in romance the aesthetic pleasure threatens to
overcome the ethical point entirely. Thus Beer points out that moral objections to
romance focus on the threat the form poses to rational, dispassionate ethical existence: "it
drowns the voice of reason, it offers a dangerously misleading guide to everyday life, it
rouses false expectations and stirs up passions best held in check" (14-5).
As has been pointed out by a number of Spenser's critics, the threats romance
offers to readers are the same as the threats Acrasia and Phaedria offer to Guyon and their
victims in Book II of the Faerie Queene: they drown the voice of reason, serve as
dangerously misleading guides to everyday life, rouse false expectations, and stir up
passions best held in check. Indeed, the temptations of romance must be met with
temperance, the putative subject of Book II. The question of whether Guyon is successful
in overcoming his intemperate passions is accompanied by an equally critical question of
whether Spenser is successful in overcoming the intemperate threat ofromance, leading
to the accusation that, as some critics have suggested, Spenser is "at heart ofAcrasia's
party" (Durling 113). This remark suggests that the seductive power of romance is too
strong for Spenser, that like Verdant, he succumbs to temptation and gives in to the
artificial world of the Bower. And, like the question at the heart ofa tradition of Milton
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criticism that suggests that Milton is secretly of Satan's party in Paradise Lost, the
possibility strips Spenser of his intentions and opens up powerful interpretive
possibilities.
In this chapter I will not undertake a thorough investigation into what constitutes
romance; romance is notoriously difficult to define, for its Protean qualities constantly
evade precise description. As a genre it is more like a Wittgensteinian complex of values
and affinities than a definitive category. It is perhaps best viewed in contrast to epic-
though, as we shall see, this contrast is more deceptive than first appears. Nohrnberg
notes that there are two requirements for a poem to count as epic above all others: "it
must contain the concept of a total action, and it must possess a nearly determinative
relation to a culture" (5).87 There are no such simple criteria for romance, and in fact The
Faerie Queene attempts both to establish its relation to the English people and to unify its
action by means of the perfectly virtuous man, Arthur.
Yet, in a sense, Guyon has been entangled in a romance from the beginning, as
was Redcross before him.88 Throughout the poem the elements of romance appear and
disappear, sometimes to be displaced by explicit allegorical set-pieces, and other times to
be displaced by the conventional similes and themes of epic, just as in Spenser's Italian
sources, where romance formed a baseline against which epic and allegorical conventions
could be placed in relief. Yet when Spenser announces in the Letter to Raleigh that he
87 Norhnberg argues that, while the matter of epic belongs to a particular people, the
motifs of romance are based in folklore and may be transferred from one culture to
another (5).
88 "Spenser's adoption ofthe materia of romance is clear from the moment he announces,
in the Ariostan echoes ofthe Proem, his intention to 'sing of Knights and Ladies gentle
deeds'" (Parker 54).
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will move from the Biblical and epic structures of Books I and II, respectively, to
"intermeddled" action in the third, he seems to announce a tum to romance, for the
interwoven stories that follow the first two books seem far less invested in the epic ideal
of "total action.,,89
The concept of total action is difficult to apply to particular examples, for epics
always consist of a variety of actions, and in the Poetics Aristotle describes epic as "a
poem made up ofmany actions." Yet the "intermedl[ing]" ofnarrative threads is a
hallmark of early modem romance, and the third book of the Faerie Queene is certainly
more like a romance than the first two books. According to early modem theorists of
narrative, "adventures" which are accidental have an apparently small place in epic, in
which a single goal acts as an organizing principle for the narrative events. For example,
the fIrst line of the Iliad announces the wrath of Achilles, and the fInal line concludes the
burial of Hector. The space between consists of more or less related activities that are
caused by Achilles' anger and that ultimately lead to the death and burial of Hector. The
skirmishes, voyages, speeches, and other action of the epic plot are "intentional" and
work in service to a single goal. Certainly Books I and II of the Faerie Queene better fit
this model than does Book III.
Yet like Proteus, romance is difficult to pin down, and the Odyssey provides
another possible model for generic tension. In that book, the subject is the wandering of
Odysseus, as Homer announces in the poem's opening lines. The various obstacles to that
return, the encounters, shipwrecks, and commitments that postpone Odysseus's
89 "[B]y occasion hereof, many other aduentures are intermedled, but rather as Accidents,
then intendments" (79).
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homecoming, constitute both the threat that the hero must overcome and the content
of the poem itself. According to Nohrnberg,
The art of the Iliad observes aesthetic criteria analogous to the unifying shield of
Achilles; the art of the Odyssey resembles the overelaborated, repeatedly woven
shroud of Laertes. Both the critics Cinthio and Pigna note the analogy between the
Odyssey and the romanzi: the pleasures of uninhibited fabrication belong to it"
(11).
This double function of events of postponement-as obstacle and as poetic materia-is
the feature of romance that presents itself even in the most classical epics, especially the
Odyssey and the Aeneid, and one that is at least as important, in early modern heroic
poems, as intermeddled events. In fact, one of the functions of narrative structured around
intermeddled "accidents" is to prolong and complicate the progress of the poem.
Intermeddled action thus serves romance to the extent that it frustrates poetic closure. In
his defense of method in the second Discourse, Tasso explicitly connected the
multiplicity of action inherent to intermeddled storytelling with a poem's "end"-that is,
its closure and its te1os:
I presume that the fable is the end of the poet, as Aristotle affirms, and there have
been none who deny it: if the fable is one, the end wiH be one; if on the other hand
the fables are diverse, the ends will be diverse. But how much better the work
where the author has regard to a single end than one who proposes for himself
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diverse ends, distractions in the soul and impediments in execution originating
from the diversity ofends; how much better does the imitator of one sole fable
perform than the imitator ofmany actions. I would add that from the multiplicity
of fable indeterminacy is born; and this process could go ad infinitum, when there
is no end either fixed in advance or determined by art. (qtd. in Nohmberg 12-3)
Inherent to the concept of romance is the anxiety of the eternal poem, the tapestry
ofPenelope forever unfinished and indeterminate, stories woven and unwoven in an
endless cycle of digression, dilation, and deferral. I have already noted the affinity of the
Odyssey with romance, and one of the effects of attempting to pin down romance is an
ever-receding number of "pure" epics against which romance may be delineated. The end
of the Aeneid is of course the founding ofRome, but that end must be considered in
relation to the narrative structures that produce it: the first half of the Aeneid is a retelling
of the Odyssey-based around a sea voyage and a woman who would forestall the hero
indefinitely-and the second half is a retelling of the Iliad, a story of siege, land war, and
border disputes. But the epic half of the Aeneid entails a separate anxiety, for though
Aeneas eludes the deferral represented by Dido, he succeeds in founding Rome at a price.
Seeing the belt ofPallas, which Tumus had taken as a prize and worn as a token of
victory, Aeneas rejects Tumus' plea for mercy:
And when his eyes drank in this plunder, this
memorial of brutal grief, Aeneas,
aflame with rage-his wrath was terrible-
cried: "How can you who wear the spoils of my
dear comrade now escape me? It is Pallas
who strikes, who sacrifices you, who takes
this payment from your shameless blood." Relentless,
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he sinks his sword into the chest of Tumus.
His limbs fell slack with chill; and with a moan
his life, resentful, fled to Shades below. (12.1262-71)
To fulfill his destiny, Aeneas must enact the part of the emaged attacker, like Achilles or
Pyrrhus. Playing the part of a Greek against a Trojan, he founds Rome on the blood of an
honorable opponent-just as the wrath of Achilles led to the death of Hector and Pyrrhus
spilled the blood of Priam on his own altar. The destined shores of Latium toward which
Aeneas strives throughout the Aeneid and upon which Tumus dies thus represent, as
Spenser might say, "a certain cost," the price that must be paid for the future of Rome.
The final lines of the Aeneid, filled with wrath, represent the end-that is, the
conclusion and the telos--{)fthe epic, for epic requires of Aeneas that he reject the
temptations of love, as represented by Dido and Carthage, and give in to the temptations
offury. Such are the demands of the Roman empire, and epic always entails a special
relationship with empire and with wrath. Perhaps the most clearly epic ofpoems, the
Iliad begins with the wrath ofAchilles as the Aeneid ends with the wrath of Aeneas.
According to N ohrnberg, epics carve out for themselves the part of a story "that has the
greatest implications for the whole" (7)-that is, the part that centers around strife-
while the remainder of the story is taken up by romance. Thus the Odyssey, with its
motifs of adventure and delay fills in where the Riad leaves off.9o This is not to say that
there is not strife in romance, but that it is treated on a different scale, with different
implications and consequences. By the time epics like the Aeneid are written, some of the
90 According to Nohrnberg, "The art ofthe Iliad observes aesthetic criteria analogous to
the unifying shield of Achilles; the art of the Odyssey resembles the overelaborated,
repeatedly woven shroud of Laertes. Both the critics Cinthio and Pigna note the analogy
between the Odyssey and the romanzi: the pleasures of uninhibited fabrication belong to
it" (11).
131
original sense of strife is already beginning to disappear; it survives in Virgil's re-
vision of the Iliad, but is not a structural principle, as it is in the Iliad proper. Nohrnberg
says "the primary epic is organized fictionally, often around strife" (7). Its matter
includes: "tales of exile, foreign service, local courts, war parties, border raids, raids for
plunder, heroic last stands, feats of arms, blood feuds, and family revenge" (8).
When Spenser undertook to write an epic, however, he had to consider the
relation of the poem to the literary history and dynastic future of England, and when he
chose to make his virtuous hero Arthur he committed to a tradition of storytelling based
on the Medieval romances ofMallory and the gestes ofFrance. Just as the epic is caught
up in themes of strife and wrath, the early modern heroic romance-epic hybrids followed
Homer's and Virgil's cue in figuring women as the instruments of delay and deferral that
would frustrate the ends of the hero. In the Aeneid, when Mercury arrives to inform
Aeneas that his stay in Carthage has lasted too long, and to remind him of his
responsibility to found Rome, he couches his protest in terms of the uncertainty of
women: "Be on your way. Enough delays. An ever I uncertain and inconstant thing is
woman.,,91 The conception of female sexuality as a threat to the single-minded goal of the
epic is obviously present in Homer's Circe and Calypso, Ariosto's Alcina, and Tasso's
Armida. These women, like Phredria, invite the heroes to focus on the present at the
expense of the future and the quest. This repeated motif of romance, in which the forms
of narrative deferment are highly gendered, makes female characters responsible for both
91 Trans. Allen Mandelbaum (4.786-7).
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the ethical faults of the poems' heroes and the aesthetic faults leveled against the
poets. Gordon Teskey points out that
The hero of the romantic epic is never quite free of the goddess of love. And
what is true of the hero is also true of the form, which by allowing itself to digress
from the main action is in danger of falling back into its original and morally
ambiguous state. (6)
In portraying the forces of delay and deferral as seductive women, early modem
romances comment on the epic tradition, in which representations of obstruction are
always female. Circe is seductive and magical; the Sirens of the Odyssey are seductive
and vocal. In the combination of these values is the genre of romance, which is gendered
female and complicates linear narrative progress. As symbols of narrative deferral, intent
on forestalling the quests of the heroes they encounter, these women represent the
problems ofpoetic closure inherent to the romance genre. Thus in Phaedria's role as
temptress she represents narrative deferral, what Spenser would call an "Accident" rather
than an "intendment." Like Dido, she represents an obstacle to the primary narrative
goal; as such, she embodies the romance or proto-romance form.
The hybrid forms of the Ariosto and Spenser thus incorporate varying degrees of
interplay between epic and romance. They complicate generic expectations by liberally
infusing romance tropes and plois into the narraiive, and, as Parker says of Ariosto, excei
in the "playing of epic conventions off against the 'errors' of the romanzo" (5). Critics
influenced by Aristotle's Poetics could find fault with the hybrid forms precisely because
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they were hybrid forms, but the presupposition on which this criticism was based-
that a form should be "purely" epic-was predetermined to produce failed poems, for
early modem poets clearly wanted to include elements derived from Medieval romance.
Romance thus exists in these poems as an object of desire, for the allure of romance is
desirable both to the poet and to the reader; but romance is also a threat. As Gordon
Teskey argues, "there is a sense in [... ] Renaissance epic poets generally, that because the
heroic poem has its origin in the romance it is almost constantly in danger of an ethical
and aesthetic relapse" (4-5). The potential relapse is both a moral and formal threat;
indeed, in the world of the heroic poem, these categories repeatedly merge.
Aristotelian precepts of unity are not very helpful guidelines for determining the
success or failure of narrative technique in terms of early modem heroic poems. As
Teskey points out, the categories "epic" and "romance" are not adequately sufficient to
describe the poems of Ariosto and Spenser:
[I]n trying to decide whether romance is being included in epic or epic in romance
we encounter a problem [... ] For genre theory has its basis in the categories of
identity and difference and demands that the sameness of some thing, its ethos,
remain true to itself, whatever complicated relations it enters into with others.
And the relations into which romance and the various classical forms are brought
in Renaissance literature are just the sorts of relations that undermine the
categories on which genre theory relies [... ]. (9)
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For even in the classical epics, romance encroaches. Just as the epic Odyssey
reveals affinities with romance, romance seems to creep into all stories, and in the early
modem period it is, as Parker says, "inescapable." The distance from epic to romance is
measured not only in the distance from wrath to love-fromjurioso to inammorato-but
from Iliad to Odyssey, from Tumus to Dido, from Mammon to Phaedria. And in the early
modem heroic poem these elements combine in complex and productive ways. Spenser's
decision is not whether to write an epic or a romance, but how best to play the
conventions off one another, how best to take advantage of each form's potentials. It is to
those potentials-and dangers-that I wish now to tum, for the context of Book II is
where Spenser determines the possibilities of romance in the Faerie Queene. When he
wishes to play epic and romance off one another, Spenser tums to the Legend of
Temperance.
III
But temperaunce (said he) with golden squire
Betwixt them both can measure out a meane...
The questions of narrative structure and closure are, for Spenser, questions that
originate in the classical period, and Book II of The Faerie Queene is a classical book,92
In this book Spenser sets his hero forth on a quest to destroy a bower replete with images
of romance and delay and armed with commitment to an Aristotelian view ofvirtue.
92 The word "temperance" is not originally a Christian word and does not appear in the
Vulgate. It is derived from Latin; Cicero uses its cognate to translate Plato (OED
"temperance"). For a reading of Book II that investigates Spenser's commitment to an
exploration ofclassical virtue, see Miller.
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Though Book III, as Spenser wrote to Raleigh, initiates the "intenneddled" narrative
structure of The Faerie Queene, it is in Book II that questions of genre are first
investigated; it is here that the implications of both romance and epic are explored and, I
will argue, rejected in favor of a third, middle way. Book II asks readers to revise their
view of moral decision-making, if that view is based on the moral system portrayed in
Book I. In that book the Redcross Knight's ethical universe it generally portrayed as
dualistic: one is either in obedience to God or one is in sin. If Redcross's ultimate success
lies in his ability to navigate a middle way between (heavenly) contemplation and
(earthly) action, his decisions are nonetheless products of a dualist ethical system. Yet
even in Book I there are examples where Redcross would have been better served to view
his ethical universe through the lens ofthe tripartite classical system than the dualist
Christian conception of obedience/sin. Redcross's decision to enter the Wandering Wood
and to encounter Error, for instance, might be viewed not merely as a decision to be
courageous or cowardly, but to choose a mean between cowardice and foolhardiness. He
must not merely steer the ship to port, but go, as Thomas Wyatt would say, between
"rock and rock," between Scylla and Charybdis.
Just as watercraft constitute a traditional representation of a poem's movement
from beginning to end, so they also represent, for early modem readers, a pictorial
representation of the ethical life. Odysseus' journey between Scylla and Charybdis was
allegorized by Classical and Medieval readers as a template for finding the middle way,
and Guyon's journey in Canto 12 operates in this tradition.93 The way in which boats
function to allegorize both the moral life and the poet's journey provides a clue to
93 See Nohrnberg (291) for examples.
136
Guyon's wanderings by boat-both to and from Phaedria' s wandering isle and to and
from Acrasia's Bower ofBliss. Watercraft tie the ethical path ofthe hero to the aesthetic
path of the poet in a way that prefigures and highlights the tension between the ethical
and the aesthetic that is one ofthe subjects of this chapter.
Inherent to most understandings of temperance as a virtuous mean is the division
of particular moral failings or temptations into dialectical sets of opposed terms, and
Spenser takes advantage of this view of temperance to fill Book II with as many
examples as possible of opposing faults. In fact, Book II might be the best example of
Spenser's proclivity for the schematic investigation of subjects in his poetry. Over and
over again in Book II Guyon confronts pairs: Mordant and Amavia, Pyrochles and
Cymochles, Sansloi and Huddibras, Elissa and Perissa, Mammon and Phaedria. Each of
these pairs represents a failure to achieve virtuous mean; specific examples may be
classified under broader dichotomous terms like forward/froward, excess/deficiency, and
(most notably) irascibility/concupiscence.94 In Book II, virtually everything is
represented as belonging to the sphere of intemperance, either too much or too little. The
path of Guyon entails rejecting these versions or mediating between them. Spenser does
not invent the use of temperance as a method for separating and classifying values into an
oppositional dichotomy, but relies on Aristotle's model. 95 In the Letter to Ralegh Spenser
explicitly ties his schema for the Faerie Queene to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics96 :
94 For a discussion of these broader terms, see Carscallen.
95 For a discussion of the Renaissance interpretation of Arisotle, see Sirluck 76.
96 As a number of critics have pointed out, Spenser, in treating temperance, combines
Aristotle's sense of temperance with his notion of continence. Continence, according to
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I labour to pourtraict in Arthur, before he was king, the image of a brave knight,
per-fected in the twelve private morall vertues, as Aristotle hath devised.... So in
the person ofPrince Arthur I sette forth magnificence in particular; which vertue,
for that (according to Aristotle and the rest) it is the perfection of all the rest, and
conteineth in it them all, therefore in the whole course I mention the deedes of
Arthure applyable to that vertue, which I write of in that booke. But of the xii.
other vertues, I make xii. other knights the patrones, for the more variety of the
history.
By claiming the influence ofAristotle, Spenser may have bolstered the authority
ofhis treatment of the virtues, but he created a major controversy for twentieth-century
critics who actually investigated his use of the Nicomachean Ethics. If Spenser actually
drew his list ofvirtues from Aristotle, he made a number of modifications. There is no
clear correspondence between Spenser's twelve virtues and the virtues discussed by
Aristotle. Holiness and courtesy, for instance, are not among Aristotle's virtues, though
they could be conceived as conflations of several of the virtues Aristotle discusses. Of
course, twelve is the number of books of The Aeneid, and thus an ideal pattern for an epic
Aristotle, is different than temperance in that involves overcoming temptation. The
temperate man is not tempted by excessive or deficient vices because he only desires the
good, which always exists as a form of the mean between vicious extremes. The
continent man, on the other hand, is tempted by the extremes of excess or defect, but
depends on reason to choose the mean as the right course of action. Conversely, whereas
the intemperate man succumbs to desires of excess or defect, the incontinent man is more
blameworthy because he recognizes the irrationality of choosing vice but does so
anyway. See Berger (Allegorical Temper) 10, Nohrnberg 290, and Durling 119.
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national poem. Spenser's classical influences thus converge with his proposal of
twelve (quasi-Aristotelian) virtues represented by twelve (Virgilian) books.
In fact, Spenser's use of Aristotle is consistently mediated by the scholastic critics
who Christianized Aristotle in the late middle ages and whose understanding of Aristotle
still dictated university curricula in the sixteenth century. Whether or not Spenser drew
directly on the Nicomachean Ethics, he certainly treated the virtues in the tradition of
Aristotelianism as it was conceived in sixteenth-century England: "it is inconceivable that
[Spenser] in Christianizing his Aristotle or in Aristotelianizing his Christianity should
have been uninfluenced by the tradition of Christian Aristotelianism that carried over
from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance" (Jones 284). Spenser thus does not follow
Aristotle so much as he follows, in his words, "Aristotle and the rest." In this tradition,
Aristotle's virtues, by various additions, subtractions, and conflations, were both
Christianized and made to number twelve, a number compatible with scholastic
numerology.
It should be clear at this point that Spenser's treatment of Aristotle's Poetics
mirrors in many ways Spenser's treatment ofAristotle's Ethics. Spenser's usual practice
is to transform the aesthetic and ethical precepts originating in Aristotle's classical texts
(and, in the case of the Ethics, mediated by Medieval interpretation) to fit his purposes,
while simultaneously invoking Aristotle as a guide, thus capitalizing on the prestige of
Aristotle's growing influence on early modem thinkers. Yet, whereas early modem
theorists valued epic form at the expense of romance, for Spenser, fcHowing the hybrid
models of his Italian predecessors, the Poetics must be considered in light of the Ethics,
and it is in this regard that temperance becomes an ideal virtue for exploring not only
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man's relationship to the exterior world, but also a poem's relationship to the possible
genres that govern its narrative coherence and closure.
If we are to take seriously a world in which the hero is consistently called upon to
reject two equally incorrect responses in favor of a middle way, and ifwe are-following
most critics of Book II-to take Guyon's journey as representative of Spenser's poetic
progress, we should consider the possibility that Book II is an investigation into the
possibilities of genre, in which possible narrative structures and closures are investigated
and rejected in favor of a middle way. Accordingly, Spenser may see epic not as an ideal
form, but as one of two equally dangerous "errors," a form based in wrath that is in
reality nearly impossible to achieve. Spenser's influences, from Homer and Virgil to
Ariosto to native English Medieval romances, represent powers that pull him in various
directions, and he pays homage to each in the Faerie Queene, but Book II suggests that
his object is to reach the end of the poem without unduly giving in to any of these formal
influences. Many of the pairs confronting Guyon may be classified as representing the
concupiscent and irascible passions, and the affinities of these moral stances with the
genres romance and epic are obvious: irascibility is the disposition to wrath, and
concupiscence is the disposition to indolent (sexual) pleasure. My argument here is that
Spenser uses the schematic opportunity of Book II to experiment with oppositional
values, and two of these opposed values are epic and romance. In the sense that Guyon,
the book's hero, has to negotiate a path between these forms, he is representative of
Spenser, who, in The Faerie Queene, must bring "romance and various classical forms"
into relation with each other.
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Thus Phaedria represents to Guyon what romance represents to Spenser: a
magical, artificial world that threatens infinite delay. In claiming that the narrative
deferrals in this canto are loci of the cultural connotations associated with romance, my
argument is not that these values define romance, but that Spenser uses the divisionary
model to set systems ofvalue apart from each other and investigate their effects on
narrative action. The values associated with romance are consistently those that, when
considered in relation to those associated with epic, are denigrated. This is not surprising,
given the regular devaluation of romance in respect to epic noted above. What is
surprising is the way that Spenser locates these values in terms of character and space and
reveals their negative potential not as instances of narrative failure, but as a form of
temptation-a form of temptation that also threatens the poem itself. Though many critics
have noted the ways that in Book II extreme choices are brought into opposition with
each other, and likewise have noted the ways that epic and romance are played off one
another, no critics that I am aware ofhave argued that Book II is an explicit investigation
into poetic form--one that explicitly and clearly allegorizes its hero as a poet who must
avoid the twin dangers oftoo much epic and too much romance. In fact, the way these
narrative possibilities are brought into relation with each other in Book II seems clear
once the values associated with each form have been sufficiently analyzed.
If my reading ofBook II is correct, its allegorical function is not primarily
historical or religious, but creative: it is an allegory ofwriting. Spenser's self-consciously
constructed poem of narrative choices both enacts and critiques the writer's process, and
Guyon--often considered a dull hero, without personality-in his role as poet and maker
mirrors Spenser's role. His decisions are Spenser's decisions; he has the power either to
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derail or to end the poem at any moment. The burden on a writer such as Spenser,
familiar with Greek and Roman epic, with Ariosto and with Tasso, and with Chaucer and
the heritage of native English romance, is to sort these genres out in a way that makes
sense, and to avoid the danger of giving in to any particular influence to too great a
degree. That is, the task of the writer is to achieve a form of generic measure.
To give in to the temptation of romance is to create a poem in which narrative
deferral prevents a conclusive end: like Penelope's weaving, the text is always going
somewhere but never arriving. To give in to the temptation ofepic, on the other hand, is
to risk flying too close to the sun, to risk narrative failure: like the end of the Aeneid, the
poem risks instant closure, having succumbed to wrath. The ending of the Aeneid-a
famously "bad ending"-stands as a dim possibility for Spenser, whose actual epic-
romance is famously un-ended. In introducing the Phaedria canto, Spenser makes it clear
which of the two threats to his "right way" is a more difficult temptation:
A Harder lesson, to leame Continence
In ioyous Pleasure, then in grieuous paine:
For sweetnesse doth allure the weaker sence
So strongly, that uneathes it can refraine
From that, which feeble nature couets faine;
Bur griefe and wrath, that be her enemies,
And foes of life, she better can abstaine; (1, 1-7)
For Spenser, Phaedria's Wandering Isle is the stronger of the temptations, an
"allure" difficult to resist. Phaedria easily shows her mastery over the opposite,
"forward," irascible passions when Cymochles and Guyon give in to the epic passion of
fury (they fight "to proue extremities"-to the death, but also with the pun on their
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movement from one extreme to the other).97 Unlike Medina, who earlier in the book
harmonizes between extremes, Phredria can only represent one extreme of intemperance
opposing another, like Elissa and Perissa in Canto ii. Yet Phredria easily overcomes
Cymochles's and Guyon's violence, and she does so rhetorically: "Such powre haue
pleasing wordes" (36.5). The form of intemperance represented by poetry, rhetoric, and
female sexuality seems to be stronger than that represented by violence and masculinity.
But what constitutes the allure of concupiscence? What is the content ofthe island
and its temptation to rest? The arrival of Cymochles and Phaedria on the island
corresponds with a textual crux, for Spenser begins his description of the island by noting
that it is "waste and voyd" (11.3), but it is soon evident that it is in fact full of apparently
natural pleasures:
It was a chosen plot of fertile land,
Emongst wide waves set, like a lide nest,
As if it had by Natures cunning hand
Bene choisely picked out from all he the rest,
And laid forth for ensample of the best. (12.1-5)
In the description of the lush pleasures of the island that follows, the initial adjectives
"waste and voyd" fade into a sense of the isle's fullness. In fact, it seems to be a kind of
Eden in which no work is required of its inhabitants, who are free to enjoy its bounty at
their leisure. Why is the island initially defined as waste and void if it is in fact a bower
full ofdelights? The answer to this seeming contradiction lies in the particular powers
Phaedria perfonns on her island, which are aU forms of linguistic coercion. The radical
97 36.2. See note, Hamilton. The perfect epic heroes given to this excess are Achilles,
when he slays Hector, and Aeneas in the final lines of the Aeneid.
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threat Phaedria represents to Guyon is one of instability, of delay, of the "aesthetic
and ethical relapse" associated with romance.
Like romance itself, Phredria is alluring, highly gendered, and proliferate.
Guyon's first negative reaction to Phredria is when she passes "the bonds of modest
merimake" (21.8), that is, she exceeds the conventions governing acceptable interactions
between male and female. Like romance, she is superabundant-in words, actions, and
sexuality. Spenser's primary rhetorical goal in the description of Phredria' s Island is to
place it within the romance archetype that Parker calls the "protective but potentially
indolent bower" (8). This is a space that represents the temptation to lie down, rest, and
forget about the future. 98 Phredria's song to Cymochles is a reading of the sixth chapter
of the Gospel of Matthew:
The lilly, Lady of the flowring field,
The flowre deluce, her louely Paramoure,
Bid thee to them thy fruitlesse labors yield,
And soon leaue off this toylsome weary stoure;
Loe loe how braue she decks her bounteous boure, [... ]
Yet nether spinnes nor cards [.] (16)
Phaedria's power over forms of language allows her to recast the biblical passage for her
own purposes, turning what is in the gospel passage a direction to trust in God into a
hymn of self-indulgence. Phredria's lyrical and verbal skills allow her to assimilate and
control the passage by rephrasing it in her own image. But Phaedria is not the only person
exercising power over the written word in this canto. It is not only her magic that makes a
waste and void space into a wondrous bower. For the portrayal ofPhredria's Island is as
98 Parker suggests that subsequently this particular romance motifbecomes synonymous
with the romance genre itself "in the increasingly commercial world of the English
'Mammon'" (8)
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rhetorically subtle as any single canto in The Faerie Queene, implicating Spenser's
poetry in its own critique of the misuse of language. Thus Spenser's description of
Phaedria's "pleasing words" places his own pleasing words under suspicion; unlike the
rhetoric of Mammon, which belongs to the tradition of Medieval scholasticism, the
rhetoric of Phaedria belongs to the tradition of Medieval romance poetry. The virtuoso
stanza of the canto is 13:
No tree, whose braunches did not brauely spring;
No braunch, whereon a fine bird did not sitt:
No bird, but did her shrill notes sweetely sing;
No song but did containe a louely ditt:
Trees, braunches, birds, and songs were framed fitt,
For to allure fraile mind to careless ease,
Careless the man [Cymochles] soone woxe, and his weak witt
Was ouercome of thing, that did him please;
So pleased, did his wrathful purpose faire appease.
Here Phaedria overcomes Cymochles and the reader with the prospect of aesthetic
pleasure and indefinite entertainment.99 In the final two lines of Book VI The Faerie
Queene, Spenser explicitly links aesthetic form to pleasure-though his tone implies a
cynical defense against his poem's detractors: "Therfore do you my rimes keep better
measure, / And seek to please, that now is counted wisemens threasure." As Spenser is
well aware, both Phaedria's island and poetry are imitations of nature, and as such they
represent the threat to reason that Plato warned against in the Republic. We are told in the
final line of stanza 13 that the appeasement of purpose is the effect of this form of
intemperance ("So pleased, did his wrathful purpose faire appease"); that appeasement is
accomplished rhetorically, both by Phredria's song and by Spenser's poetry. Here the
99 Nohrnberg classifies epic and romance by their primary goals: the end of epic is
glorification, and the end of romance is entertainment.
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word "ease" winds through the lines, appearing as "ease," "please," "pleased," and
"appease."lOO This echo insidiously invites the reader to lie down, and Guyon's
temptation to give up his quest in pursuit of indolent ease is a particularly apt
representation of the seduction of romance, which threatens the single-minded pursuit of
a goal that characterizes epic: thus Cymochles is derailed from his purpose (of "wrath")
by the unstable and seductive forces employed by Phaedria.
Waste and void, the island seems to be full of delights. But those delights are the
products, in the poem, ofpoetry, language, and the imagination. Underneath the Island's
bountiful appearance is a profound emptiness that suggests the consequence of
succumbing to its persuasive invitation. The hint that all is not as it seems lies in the
linguistic negation of objects as they are described. Beginning at 12.6, six out of eight
lines, and the first four lines of 13 begin with the word "No." The island is described as
full to capacity with wondrous delights, but the rhetorical effect is the repetition of the
negative syllable resounding throughout the lines:
No dainty flower or herbe, that growes on grownd,
No arborett with painted blossomes drest
And smelling sweete, but there it might be fownd
To bud out faire, and throwe her sweete smels al arownd.
[13]
No tree, whose braunches did not bravely spring;
No braunch, whereon a fine bird did not sitt:
No bird, but did her shrill notes sweetely sing;
No song but did containe a lovely ditt [... ].
The negative syllable introducing most of these lines cancels the assertions even at the
existential level: the statement "[There was n]o braunch, whereon a fine bird did not sitt"
100 As it did in Despayre's argument, I xi 40.
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is logically ambiguous. The answer, then, to how the island may be both "waste and
voyd" and "a chosen plot of fertile land" is poetic: it is both of these things through a
grammar of ambiguity. 101
Spenser insists that the island's delights are not natural: they appear "[a]s if [they]
had by natures cunning hand, / Been choycely picked[.]" Here Spenser perhaps plays on
the alternate sense of "cunning," that is, "directing the helm," Phredria's method of
controlling her craft: "Onely she tumd a pin, and by and by / it cut away upon the
yielding wave" (5.5-6). She is literally cunning, and nature is personified in the same
terms: carefree, bounteous, crafty. 102 Like the song of the Sirens, the island appears
beautiful, but that apparent beauty is artificial and masks a sinister reality. It is Spenser's
rhetorical skill that allows him to present the Island in this ambivalent way: the words
"As if' work to negate the description even as it is offered, just as "waste and voyd"
impart a dissonance to the rest of the description that implicitly challenges its reality.
These attributes of the island-fertile, misseeming, artificial-place it in the
realm of romance, but they also suggest romance's associated categories of poetic
indolence and female sexuality. Phredria's method for completing the seduction of
101 Spenser's stylistic predecessor here is Dante, who uses a similar device to indicate
negation in the forest of suicides in The Inferno:
Non era ancor di Iii. Nesso arrivato,
quando noi ci mettemmo per un bosco
che da neun sentiero era segnato.
Non fronda verde, rna di color fosco;
non rami schietti, rna nodosi e 'nvolti;
non pomi v'eran, rna stecchi con tasco.
Non han S1 aspri sterpi ne S1 folti [... ] 13, 1-7
102 OED cunning, vbl. n. The earliest entry for "cun" in this sense, however, is 1628.
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Cymochles is to lay his head "[i]n her loose lap" and sing him a song. Here poetry
and sexuality become difficult to separate, as in the song ofthe sirens. Phredria literally
disarms Cymochles with this form of power, a power that asks the subject simply not to
act, as opposed to earlier representations of the opposite values, in which the sin is too
much action. Again, this is to say that one path away from the middle road is symbolized
by male, active, physical, violent, and epic values, and that the other is female, sensuous,
emotional, sexual, and romantic.
Spenser's investigation into the forms ofepic and romance in Book II, then,
recognizes that of the two forms of temptation, with their associated values, romance
presents a greater threat to the narrative's movement towards conclusion. The tension, of
course, is that romance, through its superabundance and fertility, simultaneously
generates narrative action. Thus Spenser both affirms the power of this temptation and
interrogates its substance. This is true for each manifestation of "loose desyre": female
sexuality, artifice, and poetry. His rhetorical effort both to describe the wonders of the
island and simultaneously suggest that its contents are "waste and voyd" reveals the
slipperiness of rhetoric itself. When the Phaedria canto is considered as a meta-discourse
about poetry, in which the "powre ofpleasing wordes" is a serious danger, one that deters
from the pursuit of noble virtues, the ability of those words to describe the danger
becomes also an example of its powers of seduction. Phredria, as romance's gendered and
rhetorical embodiment, represents both a threat to the narrative and a temptation to the
hero.
Phredria's song lulls Cymochles to sleep in stanza 14, a stanza in which the word
"lay" is woven throughout ("and laid him down"; "playn"; "laying his head"; "with a
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loue lay she thus him sweetly charmd"). In the final use of the word the sexual
connotation combines with the musical definition, and the two become inseparable: song
(poetry) is seduction. Together they constitute romance's threat to defer narrative
progress. Cymochles' s progression through the poem is completely halted by this power;
he is especially vulnerable to this power of words, as the archaic spelling of "worldly"
implies in the couplet that describes the effect on him:
By this she had him lulled fast a sleepe,
That ofno wordly thing he care did take; 103
Hamilton notes that wordly is an obsolete form of "worldly," and in the 1596 edition the
latter word is substituted. But the substitution is not necessary, for on Phaedria's island,
the word is the world, in all its instability and peril. An ever uncertain and inconstant
thing is romance.
IV
Finally, we may return to the criticism raised by Montaigne against Ariosto.
Unlike Virgil, Montaigne argues, Ariosto cannot achieve truly epic flight:
We see the former on outspread wings in lofty and sustained flight always
pursuing his point; the latter fluttering and hopping from tale to tale as from
branch to branch, not trusting his wings except for a very short hop, alighting at
every turn for fear his breath and strength should fail (300).
103 18.1-2, 1590. 1596 has "worldly."
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The metaphor of poet-as-bird is, like the nautical metaphors for poetic progress, a
commonplace allegory of writing. Ariosto uses the same metaphor in Orlando Furioso
(3.1), and Spenser follows him closely in the Faerie Queene (2.10):
Who now shall give unto me words and sound,
Equall unto this haughtie enterprise?
Or who shall lend me wings, with which from ground
My lowly verse may loftily arise,
And lift it selfe unto the highest skies?
More ample spirit, then hitherto was wount,
Here needes me, whiles the famous auncestries
Of my most dreaded Soveraigne I recount,
By which all earthly Princes she doth farre surmount.
Here Spenser introduces the canto on British history; the catalogue is an epic convention
that defers narrative progress in the service of (usually) etiological justifications of nation
or empire. Inherent to this metaphor is an irony Spenser surely understood: unconstrained
ambition, as demonstrated by Spenser in his desire to "overgo" Ariosto, surely
"overgoes" the bounds of modesty and smacks of the sin of pride, and in a book
investigating temperance even the ambition of the poet comes under investigation. The
attempt to "loftily arise," to lift oneself "unto the highest skies" is an attempt to achieve
immortality, to reach heaven, and Ovid, in a poem replete with examples of the failure of
those who would compete with the gods, nonetheless writes his own apotheosis into the
closing lines of The Metamorphoses:
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Now have I brought a woork to end which neither loves feerce wrath,
Nor swoord, nor fyre, nor freating age with all the force it hath
Are able to abolish quyght [... ].
Yit shall the better part ofmee assured bee to clime
Aloft above the starry skye. And all the world shall never
Be able for to quench my name. For looke how farre so ever
The Roman Empyre by the ryght of conquest shall extend,
So farre shall all folke reade this woork. And tyme without all end
(If Poets as by prophesie about the truth may arne)
My lyfe shall everlastingly bee lengthened still by fame.
(15.984-95, my emphasisio4
Perhaps sensitive to the blasphemous nature of Ovid's claims, Arthur Golding closes this
translation (with which Spenser would have been familiar) with the Latin caveat Laus &
honor soli Deo. The danger of asking the muses (or one's patrons, in the case of Ariosto)
to help one fly to epic heights is the appearance of ambitious pride and the belief that art
can reach to heaven. When Spenser continues his invocation in the third stanza, he
compares what he must do with the achievement of Homer Mreonides:
Argument worthy of Mreonian quill
Or rather worthy of great Phoebus rote,
Whereon the ruines of great Ossa hill,
And triumphes of Phlegraean Jove he wrote,
That all the Gods admird his loftie note.
The appeal to the quill of Homer naturally follows the epic metaphor of flying, but
Spenser cannily follows with a reference to the rebellion of giants against "Jove" on
"great Ossa hill," a classical analogue to the rebellion of Satan, emblematic of ambitious
pride. Following Ariosto, Spenser thus inserts a criticism into his claim on immortal
104 For Spenser's familiarity with Ovid, see "Ovid" in the Spenser Encyclopedia. In that
entry, Michael Holahan notes that "Spenser knew Ovid so intimately that to write poetry
was to use him, even if that use led ultimately to the dismissal of 'flowring pride, so
fading and so fickle' (FQ VII viii I)" (522).
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poetic achievement. Even the hill on which Horner wrote, and which is now invoked,
is a hill built on the ruined pride of giants who carne before. Again, it is the fact that this
invocation occurs in the Book of the Legend of Temperance that throws the poet's claims
into self-critique, for temperance demands a more moderate-a more measured-
approach to poetry. Yet the claims for the greatness ofElizabeth (or the princes of d'Este)
require a particular tact in presenting this criticism.
Ovid's poem already contains its own criticism ofhis claims of apotheosis. In
Book Eight the artist-as-bird is allowed to attempt "to climb aloft above the starry sky."
Daedalus, the traditional figure of the artist,
Did teach his sonne how he should also fEe.
I warne thee (quoth he), Icarus, a middle race to keepe.
For if thou hold too Iowa gate, the dankenesse of the deepe
Will overlade thy wings with wet. And if thou mount too hie,
The Sunne will sindge them. Therfore see betweene them both thou fEe. (8.272-6)
Ovid thus places in the mouth ofhis craftsman the advice of the Palmer, to keep to the
middle path, avoiding, as it were, the higher path of epic and the lower path of romance.
The poet who would truly follow his literary guides should take note ofIcarus, who
Forsaking quight his guide,
Of fond desire to fEe to Heaven, above his boundes he stide. (300-1)
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CHAPTER IV
"0, MADNESS OF DISCOURSE": PRAISING, PRIZING,
AND MEASURE ANXIETY IN SHAKESPEARE'S TROlL US AND CRESSlDA
In this dissertation I have been investigating cultural-literary correlations of a
major shift in the way measure-making and measure-breaking were conceived in Europe
during the late medieval and early modem periods. In Chapter I, I argued that Dante
treats failures ofmeasure in economic terms because money is a particularly pervasive
way to measure the world. 105 For Dante, misers and spendthrifts are analogues for a wide
range of mismeasurers because those who cannot value their money properly cannot
value anything properly. Spenser likewise acknowledged the power ofmoney to threaten
temperance when he made the Cave ofMammon a pivotal trial for Guyon. I06 During the
early modem period, as the systems of exchange and circulation that constituted early
capitalism became increasingly complex, discourse about measure in general continued
105 In Chapter I, I argue that the rise of early capitalism coincided with (and resulted
from) massive technological advances in the way literally everything was measured,
including time, distance, and the earth itself The increasing realization that everything
can be monetized, including labor and time, played into the predominant feature of
measure-anxiety from Dante to Shakespeare: fear of the cross-categorical (epidemic)
effects ofall forms ofmismeasurement.
106 See especially the Faerie Queene 2.7.15.
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to be associated with the economic sphere. The symbolic representation of value
treated by Dante, however, in which money could be mismeasured merely by over- or
under-valuing-and therefore stood as a convenient metonymy for temperate ethical
behavior more generally-gave way, in the sixteenth century, to an increasingly complex
and anxiety-ridden understanding of credit, in which value might be attached not only to
money, or the various articles of exchange that could be assigned monetary value, but to
people themselves, who represented entities more or less capable ofmaking good on
monetary promises.107 The increasing complexity of economic relationships created a
corresponding increase in anxiety about the measure of things, for the nascent capitalist
structures that replaced the feudal economic relations threatened to order the world in an
entirely new way. lOS
Troilus and Cressida belongs to that new world, a world fundamentally different
from the economic reality confronted by Dante. While money still might (metonymically)
indicate Aristotelian theories ofvalue and measure, its relationship to measure in the late
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries was no longer as univocal as it had been during the
late medieval period. In this chapter I read Troilus and Cressida as a meditation on the
early modem anxieties ofmis-measure. While Troilus and Cressida has been a favorite
object of theorists foregrounding deconstructionist and feminist approaches, it has also
107 Craig Muldrew points out that "credit was as dominant a feature of the medieval
economy as it was of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries" (38). Yet a continent-wide
depression during the fifteenth century (caused by plague-related decreases in population)
delayed the onset of the more complex networks of exchange described here (see
Muldrew 15-16).
lOS See Agnew for an account of the transition from medieval to early modem market
processes in England (27-56).
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received a lot of attention from critics interested in its portrayal of economies of
desire. These critics usually focus on two threads of imagery in the play: first, a recurring
set of images of eating and digesting, and second, frequent recourse to the marketplace as
metaphor for competing theories of exchange and value.109 The play is obsessed with
images of eating, disgorging, starving, and defecating; it also repeatedly treats its
subject-the Trojan War-as a marketplace. Jean-Cristophe Agnew defines the putative
object of markets as ''the allocation of scarce resources among competing interests" (xi);
obviously Helen is such a resource and the Greek and Trojan armies are "competing
interests," but the play's marketplace mentality does not stop with Helen, who is merely
the most explicitly foregrounded site of disagreement about commodity exchange in the
play. In fact, characters in Troilus and Cressida generally attempt to place value on
literally everything, including (and perhaps especially) themselves.
Metaphors of eating and metaphors of economics are ultimately interconnected,
as in this example in which Troilus argues for keeping Helen and continuing the war:
We turn not back the silks upon the merchant
When we have spoiled them; nor the remainder viands
We do not throw in unrespective sewer
Because we now are full. (2.2.68-71)110
Here Troilus commodifies Helen as both the "silks of the merchant," with its resonances
of imperialist trade, and as "remainder viands" (leftover food). Both metaphoric strands
109 For a survey of approaches to economic analyses of Troilus and Cressida, see Grady
(85 n. 38). For an example of approaches to the digestive imagery of the play, see
Hillman.
110 All quotes from Troilus and Cressida are taken from the Norton edition unless noted
otherwise.
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might be conveniently thought of, somewhat anachronistically, as tropes of
"consumption." This word did not carry, for early modems, a specifically economic
connotation, but its moral weight-and the play's general pessimism-may be suggested
by another sense it did have: "The action or fact of consuming or destroying; destruction"
(OED 1). Reading Troilus and Cressida one feels that consumption-both appetite and
market exchange-are never treated as promising or even neutral activities: they are
always indications of potential destruction, and it is this anxiety, the fear that a
fundamentally unjust exchange system will ultimately destroy the world, that, I will
argue, infects all relationships in Troilus and Cressida.
Because hunger is a primal expression of desire, both image-threads (eating and
market exchange) treat questions of acquisition, accumulation, destruction, and exchange,
and the recurrent return to images that emphasize the destructive significance of
consumption reflects the general tone of Troilus and Cressida, a play that continually
reverts to registers of disgust in response to its own terms of value and misvalue. In fact,
perhaps more than any other of Shakespeare's plays-including its "sister" problem play,
Measure for Measure-Troilus and Cressida is a play about value and the measure of
things. It asks us again and again to contemplate what things are worth, and how that
worth is determined. This chapter examines the recurring expressions of value that
circulate through Shakespeare's Troilus and Cressida and the implications of those tropes
on language. I focus on the play's persistent attempts to fix value on literally everything,
including the play itseif, attempts that uhimateiy remain groundless because of a lack of
objective, intrinsic measure of value. The play, I argue, both creates and undermines a
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world without objective measure and depicts that world as a hell in which language
and individual distinction fail.
I want to begin by setting aside Troilus and Cressida for a moment and examining
how some questions of value are considered in a related text. David Baker notes that the
"economic implications of this play and its actual economic fate, its 'box office' history
[... ] are rarely, if ever, discussed together" (70). In fact, because the quarto appeared in
two initial states, each with its own prefatory matter, contradictorily implying (in the first
state) that the play had been performed at the Globe and (in the second state) that it had
not been staged at all, the box office history of Troilus and Cressida is unclear. Whether
it was actually staged or not, we know at least that it was not a commercial success. This
play, obsessed as it is with the early modem marketplace, was nonetheless itself a
spectacular market failure (Baker 71). By looking closely at the prefatory matter of the
second state of the quarto, however, we may set aside the "box office history" and still
examine the relation between the play and its market circumstances, the realities of
commodification, value, and measure anxiety at the tum of the seventeenth century.
When the First Quarto edition of Troilus and Cressida appeared as a market good
in 1609, the publisher appended to the second state an anonymous prose epistle-an
advertisement-appealing to the would-be purchaser. Addressed from "A never writer, to
an ever reader," the epistle praises the play and flatters the buyer, providing a kind of
introduction between the two:
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Etemall reader, you have heere a new play, never stal'd with the Stage, never
clapper-clawd with the palmes of the vulger, and yet passing full of the palme
comicall; for it is a birth of your braine, that never under-tooke any thing
commicall, vainely [... ].
The attempt to assign a value to the play-to "market" it---entails a series of strategies
designed to raise its worth in the mind of the buyer. The most obvious of these is the
appeal to the logic of associative value, in which the relative value ofobjects is
determined by comparing those objects to other, similar objects. Thus the writer asserts
the superiority of Shakespeare to other plaYwrights: even those who are most likely to
disapprove ofplays generally, the writer argues, would still enjoy this author's plays:
"especially this authors Commedies, [...Jthat the most displeased with Playes, are pleasd
with his Commedies." Furthermore, this is the best of Shakespeare's plays: "Amongst all
there is none more witty then this." Finally, the play is equal in "worth" to the plays of
the greatest Roman dramatists:
And had I time I would comment upon it, though I know it needs not, (for so
much as will make you thinke your testeme well bestowd) but for so much worth,
as even poore I know to be stuft in it. It deserves such labour, as well as the best
Commedy in Terence or Plautus.
The point ofall these comparisons is of course to fix the play's value in the
economic register, to convince the buyer to exchange money to obtain the quarto edition.
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Although this final question of "worth" is subverted by the writer, placed in
parentheses and syntactically deemphasized, the message is clear: economic value is
determined by the same logic of comparison by which literary value is determined, and in
this case is predicated on that value. The question implied by the epistle-what is the
play "worth?"--ean thus be answered multiple ways. It is worth as much as a play of
Terence. Or it is worth "your testeme."
In his attempt to make a match between the buyer and the play, the writer of the
epistle assumes the role ofPandarus, praising the play by comparing it to other plays,
placing them collectively in a system of comparative competition that could be called
"emulative." And like Pandarus, the writer flatters the potential consumer, transparently
appealing to the taste ofthe would-be buyer and focusing on the exclusive and private
experience entailed by agreeing to his proposed match. He hints at the exclusive class of
the buyer by making a classical allusion (to the birth of Venus); he further distinguishes
the buyer from the "vulgar" masses who attend plays-many ofwhom would have been
illiterate-by referring to the consumer as a "reader" in the title and the second word of
the epistle proper. In fact, the putative lack of a stage history is portrayed as a distinctive
quality: "you have heere a new play, never staI'd with the Stage, never clapper-clawd
with the palmes of the vulger [... ]." The quarto edition of the play is here offered, like
Cressida on the marriage market, as a kind of virgin.
There are additional similarities between the advertisement and the play. The
author's persistent wordplay points to an obsession with the slipperiness ofianguage that
is a recurrent feature of measure anxiety and a major component of Troilus and Cressida.
He puns on "common," "commodity," "comedy," and "commentary"; on "plays,"
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"please," and "pleas"; and on "pray" and "praise." When the epistle writer says that
the play has never been "clapper-clawed with the palms of the vulgar" he initiates a
complex series ofpuns on "clap" and "palm" in which the referents ofwords themselves
are destabilized. Thus "clapperclaw," a word Shakespeare uses in Merry Wives of
Windsor that means to scratch, beat, or revile (OED) becomes associated with applause
by virtue of its (etymologically incidental) association with "clapping."!!! This
connection is emphasized by subsequent punning on "palms," which here identifies the
means by which the audience claps and (thereby) reviles plays and also initiates further
wordplay, this time on the palm as signifier ofliterary achievement (OED 2b: "Victory,
triumph; supreme honour or excellence, as in martyrdom; the prize; the first place"). This
allows the author to identify "palm" with two separate referents: on the one hand, it refers
to the applause of the vulgar-that is, with praise-and on the other hand it indicates a
mark of distinction. Those who "consume" the play, in their (ap)praising indicate the
extent to which they value it. Thus the epistle, in its first sentence, suggests a complex
relationship between distinction and epideictic practice-that is, between prizing and
praising.
I begin my discussion of Troilus and Cressida with a reading of this
advertisement because-as I hope is clear-the questions of comparison and value raised
by the epistle are the same questions raised by the play itself. That is, in its attempt to fix
a value on the quarto (apparently at one testem, or testoon-a six-pence coin112) the
11! See, for instance, Shakespeare's use of "clap" in Julius Caesar: "lfthe tag-ragge
people did not clap him, and hisse him, according as he pleas'd, and displeas'd them" (1.
ii. 261).
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epistle reproduces the very strategies designed to elicit desire-strategies dependant
on realities of exchange and circulation rooted in early capitalism-that are satirized so
mercilessly in Troilus and Cressida. While a number of critical responses to Troilus and
Cressida have recognized the role ofvalue and comparison in the play, the epistle
suggests that the anxieties that run rampant in the play are not merely an exaggerated
relativist nightmare, but in fact reflect the reality ofthe early-modem economic sphere.
II
The epistle's treatment ofvalue is predicted by the play itself. When Diomedes
and Paris are on their way through Troy to fetch Cressida back to the Greeks, Paris asks
Diomedes whether he or Menelaus "merits fair Helen most" (4.1.55). Diomedes
articulates a misogynistic view common in the play, calling Helen a "whore," whom
Menelaus and Paris equally deserve. Paris responds by questioning Diomedes' motive for
criticizing Helen:
Fair Diomed, you do as chapmen do:
Dispraise the thing that you desire to buy.
But we in silence hold this virtue well:
We'll but commend what we intend to sell. (4.1.77-80)
Exchange in Troilus and Cressida--even forced exchange-is always a market
proposition, and marketing entails a dialectical relationship between praising and
112 Stating the price of the playas one "testem" additionally complicates the equations of
value because of the notoriously wide range of the value of that coin during the Tudor
and Jacobean periods, during which it continually lost value due to the quality of alloy
from which it was minted.
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dispraising the object in question, as buyer and seller attempt to manipulate the price.
The idea that the proper value of a thing lies not in some inherent worth of the object, but
in a socially-agreed-upon price fuels general early modern anxieties about measure-
making and measure-breaking. But it always also entails a correlating anxiety about
language, for prizing entails praising and dispraising, and praise places economic
exchange in the even murkier and more slippery world of language. Once the value of
Helen becomes a question, competing parties have an interest in either over- or
undervaluing her, using words in an attempt to change her market value.
As Paris understands, praising and dispraising are mechanisms of value-
manipulation, and hence loci ofmeasure anxiety. The question asked over and over again
by the play is how do we know what something is actually worth? The possibility, lurking
behind almost every scene in the play, that "actual" worth may be unknowable, leads to
unease about value and measure generally, and-as Paris's attack on Diomedes'
motivation for dispraise indicates-uncertainty about objects of exchange leads to
uncertainty about language. Once the relationship between epideictic practice and
measure is recognized, the relative nature of praise becomes even more clear, for praise
becomes a function not ofthe worth of some object, but of the position of the speaker in
terms of acquiring or divesting that object, that is, of the economic motivations of
exchange. Thus Aeneas, catching himselfpraising the qualities of the Trojans to the
Greek camp, notes that who is praising and dispraising makes all the difference:
Peace, Trojan; lay thy finger on thy lips.
The worthiness of praise distains his worth,
If that the praised himself brings the praise forth. (1.3.237-9)
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Again, value is not fixed in objects, but is relative to the position of (ap)praisers.
An example of the way the play highlights the relationship between praising and
prizing occurs in one of its many literary borrowings. The reworking of texts key to the
Western tradition is of course one of the most obvious features of Troilus and Cressida,
and critics have profitably examined the play's relationship to Homer, to Chaucer, to
Harington. 113 Yet, in looking at the worth ofHelen, Shakespeare turns to a contemporary
dramatic text. Christopher Marlowe's reference to Helen is ambivalent even in its
epideictic context:
Was this the face that lancht a thousand shippes?
And burnt the toplesse Towres of Ilium?
Shakespeare recontextualizes this cliched praise into the debate between Troilus and
Hector about Helen's worth, moving from the implicit to the explicit register. In this
context, Shakespeare replaces Marlowe's word "face" with "price":
Is she worth keeping? Why she is a pearl
Whose price hath launched above a thousand ships
And turned crowned kings to merchants. (2.2.80-2)114
By citing one of the period's most well-known examples ofpraising-even as potentially
ambiguous as Marlowe's praising may be-Shakespeare consciously reframes praise of
II3 See Hopkins for an analysis of Shakespeare's use of sources in this play.
114 Shakespeare's version alludes to Matthew 13:45-6: "Againe, the kingdome of heaven
is like unto a merchant man, seeking goodly pearles: Who when he had found one pearle
of great price, he went and solde all that he had, and bought it." For Christian audiences
Troilus thus makes Helen equivalent to the kingdom of heaven, supporting Hector's
assertion that that Troilus's theory ofworth entails "idolatry" (line 55).
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Helen in economic tenns. Everyone in Troilus and Cressida is at one time or another
a merchant, and everyone is at one time or another a prize, if only because almost all
characters self-consciously market themselves.
Just as Troilus and Cressida suggests that to praise something is always to prize
it, so it suggests that to prize something is always to put a price on it. In the early modem
period the words "praise" and "prize" were not as clearly distinguished from each other
as they are now, for they share the same etymology via French and Latin, and their
meanings had not yet become clearly distinguished. I IS Thus both the etymology and the
definitions in the Oxford English Dictionary's entry for "praise" (v) are riddled with
cross-references to "prize," and the definitions for "praise" include (besides obvious
senses associated with commendation and lauding) meanings current for Shakespeare that
suggest prizing ("To value, esteem; to attach value to; = prize v. l ,,) and even pricing ("To
estimate or fix the monetary value of; to fix the price of [something for sale]; to
appraise." [def. 5]). The verb "appraise" in fact marks the quasi-hidden historical and
semantic relationship between "praise" and "prize," including the word "praise" in its
sound and spelling but meaning something much closer to "prize" or "price."
The word "prize" is thus a key tenn for the play, semantically connecting on the
one hand "praise," and on the other "price." There is a complex but direct relationship
between the palms (praise) of the vulgar (appraisers) and the palm (prize and ultimately
price) the play may achieve. Shakespeare's decision to slip "price" into Marlowe's praise
reveals, then, a reality already present in the epideictic context: to praise something is to
llS See note in the OED etymology for "prize vI": "In early use there is no clear semantic
distinction between this verb and PRAISE v."
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suggest not only how much one values the object, but also exactly-and in crass
economic terms-how much something costs. "Prize" performs just such a function in
2.1, when Cressida, after Pandarus has exited, comments on his praising of Troilus:
"more in Troilus thousandfold I see I Than in the glass ofPandar's praise may be" (262-
3). Pandarus and Cressida have just engaged in a game ofmarketing in which Troilus is
the object ofexchange. Pandarus praises Troilus while Cressida wittily devalues him,
essentially dispraising him even though she in fact values him even more than Pandarus
does. As Troilus' value becomes subject to market forces, language becomes
simultaneously untrustworthy. It is only when Pandarus exits that Cressida can reveal her
actual feelings about Troilus' "worth." Once again, uncertainty about the value of an
object of exchange creates uncertainty about the linguistic mechanisms employed to
manipulate that value, generally manifested as praise and dispraise.
But Cressida then turns to the question ofher own value, another "price" subject
to praise and dispraise, and we learn that, like Achilles, she is "holding off," removing
herself from the market for a period of time in order to create scarcity and increase
demand. The fact voiced here by Cressida-that limited market availability would drive
up price-is recognized also by the author of the quarto's prefatory epistle, who notes
that the price of the quarto edition will rise when it is no longer readily available: "And
beleeve this, that when hee is gone, and his Commedies out of sale, you will scramble for
them, and set up a new English Inquisition." To say that scarcity increases price because
it increases demaIld is to recognize the role of desire in economies of exchange. Cressida
also explains economic scarcity in terms of desire: "Men prize the thing ungained more
than it is" (1.2. 267). So reads the folio. But the quarto's change suggests the fluid
165
semantic relationship between praise, prize, and price, and a scene that began as an
exchange of praises and dispraises ends in the purely economic register with the change
of a single consonant: "Men price the thing ungained more than it is" (my emphasis).
III
The realization that praising and dispraising affect the price of something-that is,
that language has the capacity to affect the perceived (and hence real) worth of objects-
creates in the early modem period an anxiety both about value in general, which becomes
unstable, and also about language, which becomes suspect in terms of motivation. The
nature ofvalue is one ofthe contested themes in Troilus and Cressida, and both camps
debate whether value is inherent to a thing itself or dependant on socially-agreed-upon
judgments. Critics of the play have framed this as a debate about whether value is
subjective or objective. The most well-known example of this disagreement occurs
during the debate in the Trojan council about whether Helen should be returned to the
Greeks.
Nestor has just delivered an offer to the Trojans to end the war. He frames this
exchange in terms of the costs incurred by the Greeks during the fighting:
After so many hours, lives, speeches spent,
Thus once again says Nestor from the Greeks:
'Deliver Helen, and all damage else-
As honour, loss of time, travail, expense,
Wounds, friends, and what else dear that is consumed
In hot digestion of this C0TI110rant war-
Shall be struck off.' (2.2.1-7)
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Just as Troilus combines the consumption tropes in the subsequent debate, Nestor
also mixes economic exchange with metaphors of eating, emphasizing the destructive
overtones of "consumption" by employing a well known early modem figure for self-
consumption (the cormorant). Nestor's offer resembles the notice of a lender to a
creditor, suggesting that the interest accrued while the Trojans have possessed Helen will
be forgiven if the original debt be paid. The offer, framed as a commodity exchange, sets
the tone for what Hugh Grady calls a "formally ethical" discourse which is nonetheless
''jarring and disturbing in its instrumentalistic attempt to quantify human lives" (86).
While Helen is the "damage" at stake (if the Trojans give her up, the rest will be
forgotten), Nestor's proposal lumps her together with other "prices" of the war,
suggesting that there is an arithmetical equivalence for "honour," "time," "wounds," and
"friends"; he effectively levels these items with "expense." Everything can be quantified,
and the Greeks could be at least potentially compensated for any of their losses. As
Heather James has suggested, Helen's commodification allows different characters to
interpret her differently, but all such readings are reductive and economic: she is "either a
pearl or a whore of great price" (104). In Marx's terms, Helen is the ultimate fetishized
commodity, "a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort of another"
(41). The reservation occasionally voiced by those who attempt to fix her worth is that
her use-value seems relatively small compared to what people are willing to exchange for
her.
Tne question in Trvilus and Cressida is never whether a person has some
quantifiable worth, which is a given, but how exactly to measure that worth. Thus Hector
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believes that Helen is not worth what the Trojans have expended in keeping her;116 he
argues for giving Helen back to the Greeks by a mystifying series of arithmetic allusions;
Troilus responds by rejecting rationality in general: the very fact of the war indicates that
Helen is worth the exchange whether it is reasonable or not. Hector again attempts to
present the exchange as an equation: "Brother, she is not worth what she doth cost / The
holding" (2.2.50-1). Troilus' response grounds value in the will: "What's aught but as 'tis
valued?" (52). This disagreement places rationality at the center of the debate over worth.
Modem theories ofmarket exchange suggest that all transactions are fundamentally
rational, for parties agree to enter into such contracts based on principles of self interest;
hence Troilus may oppose rationalizing the cost of the war because rationality is already
implied by his economic theory: it is a supposedly inherent feature of market exchange.
According to Grady, Troilus views value as "baseless, independent of any
intrinsic properties of the commodity, completely a function of the evaluating self and the
selfs whims--exchange value without use value, in Marxian terms" (88). Yet the "self'
cannot simply declare the worth of something; worth is entirely dependent on the social
contracts that determine value in a market economy. Helen is valuable not because
Troilus or any other Trojan has (arbitrarily) declared her so. She is valuable because the
war proves that multiple parties place a high value on her. In Marxian terms, the
commodity (Helen) has value only because she has entered into a relation of exchange
with other commodities; her value is thus the product of social relations (76). Both the
U6 Hector thus focuses on Helen's use-value. As Marx puts it, "How, then, is the
magnitude of this value to be measured? Plainly, by the quantity of the value-creating
substance, the labour, contained in the article. The quantity oflabour, however, is
measured by its duration, and labour-time in its turn finds its standard in weeks, days, and
hours."
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marriage market and the war bring individuals into relation with each other in such a
way that they may begin to establish value. This is both the virtue and the danger of
emulation.
Troilus himself has already articulated the consequences of his own belief system
in the first scene of the play, endorsing the collectivist theory he puts forward at the
Trojan council, but recognizing the ends of that logic: "Fools on both sides. Helen must
needs be fair / When with your blood you daily paint her thus" (1.1.86-7). To say that
others will pay for Helen because she has value is to say that she has value because others
will pay for her: the circularity of this dynamic creates an uncertainty about how to
measure value properly, for it suggests the possibility of collective delusion about
measure. Thus looming behind assertions ofthe subjective nature ofvalue is a nostalgia
for a simpler, objective value system in which objects have value according to inherent
properties regardless of market price.
To Hector, Troilus' focus on subjective value is "mad idolatry," a worldview that
makes "the service greater than the god" (56). Hector frames the problem in economic
terms,
Every tithe soul, 'mongst many thousand dimes,
Hath been as dear as Helen; I mean, of ours:
If we have lost so many tenths of ours,
To guard a thing not ours nor worth to us,
Had it our name, the value of one ten,
What merit's in that reason which denies
The yielding of her up? (2.2.18-24)
Troilus responds by noting that there is more at stake than the lives paid to keep Helen;
the honor ofthe Trojans is in the balance. I will have more to say about reputation and
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creditworthiness later, but Troilus--during an argument in which he explicitly rejects
"reason"--does not here reject Hector's calculations; instead he points out a hidden
"cost" to letting Helen go: if the Trojans release her, their ability to make good on
promises comes into question:
Weigh you the worth and honour of a king
So great as our dread father in a scale
Of common ounces? Will you with counters sum
The past-proportion of his infinite,
And buckle in a waist most fathomless
With spans and inches so diminutive
As fears and reasons? Fie, for godly shame!
Both Hector and Troilus are thus making economic arguments, but Troilus places
his faith in the rationality of the market; if both camps are paying in blood for Helen, then
Helen is by definition worth the price. Hector argues, on the other hand, that there is such
a thing as a bad deal:
HECTOR: Brother, she is not worth what she doth cost
The holding.
TROILUS: What's aught but as 'tis valued?
HECTOR: But value dwells not in particular will.
It holds his estimate and dignity
As well wherein 'tis precious of itself
As in the prizer. (2.2.50-55)
Here Hector explicitly states his theory of value measurement. A thing has as much value
"of itself" as it derives from the will of the "prizer." Yet Hector's insistence on this ideal
must be considered in light ofHector's other allegiances to outdated systems of honor
and heroism. He is the play's most nostalgic and reactionary character, hopelessly out of
touch with the political complexities demonstrated by Ulysses or the market
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manipulations practiced by almost all the other characters. Like his other outdated
allegiances, his argument for inherent, objective value utterly fails, and even he agrees to
continue fighting for Helen. In terms of debates about how properly to measure worth,
Hector's commitment to absolute value, like his practice ofhelping up the Greeks he has
knocked down, is naive and self-destructive. As Lars Engle argues, the play evinces "a
rabid allegiance to market forces and an unrelieved economism with almost no residue of
inherited absolutist conviction to work upon" (148). Hector's theory of inherent value is
presented only to be utterly destroyed by the subjectivist theories of value all other
characters embrace.
The argument enacted by Hector and Troilus foregrounds the questions the play
investigates most persistently. As Engle frames them, "How may value in men or women
be assessed? How may it be maintained or fixed? What causes it to fluctuate? In one form
or another these questions are asked and given hypothetical answers over and over in the
course ofthe play" (151). Characters desperately attempt to manipulate their own and
others' values while simultaneously wishing for a simpler, more objective system by
which value might be measured. Because value is relative, it can only be determined by
the logic of comparison. Engle points out how Pandarus employs this logic in an attempt
to establish the value of his niece:
Pandarus attempts to establish Cressida's value by comparing her to publically
accepted exemplars (in Helen's case a standard) of beauty and intelligence. Of
course these comparisons are of little use if Pandarus can cite only his own
opinion; thus he searches for any objective or quasi-objective measures of value
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he can find. Cressida is almost as fair as Helen, for instance. Or [... ] Troilus
"is very young; and yet will he within three pound lift as much as his brother
Hector" (1.2.117) (151).
In the play's world of subjective value, comparison is the only mechanism by which
worth may be measured. As Marx puts it, "Since no commodity can stand in the relation
of equivalent to itself, and thus tum its own bodily shape into the expression of its own
value, every commodity is compelled to choose some other commodity for its equivalent,
and to accept the use-value, that is to say, the bodily shape of that other commodity as the
form of its own value" (65). Yet, as we have already seen, the strategy of comparison
risks slipping into an infinitely regressive and unstable worldview in which all value is
dependant on other values that are themselves equally unstable.117 For Helen-as
discussions throughout the play reveal-may be a "standard" of beauty, but that standard
is utterly unstable and subject to the praise and dispraise of interested parties. Thus
Pandarus, in his attempts to praise Troilus to Cressida, necessarily devalues and
dispraises Hector, and in his attempts to praise Cressida to Troilus, he devalues and
dispraises Helen. The more Pandarus tries to manipulate value the more he emphasizes
the variability of all value. As Engle puts it, "In his attempts to talk up value, Pandarus
only draws attention to the relativity and changefulness of values (especially values
conferred by erotic attraction)" (151).
117 In his critique of the "expanded form ofvalue," in which every commodity is brought
into a relation of exchange with every other commodity, Marx suggests the possibility of
just such an "interminable series of expressions of value": "Since the bodily form of each
single commodity is one particular equivalent form amongst numberless others, we have,
on the whole, nothing but fragmentary equivalent forms, each excluding the others" (74).
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The sense that value has become detached from a clear system of objective
measurement, that the currencies of desire and military distinction have been separated
from the gold standard of fixed worth, is a symptom of the economic culture of early
modern England. Craig Muldrew has analyzed the transition from feudal networks of
obligation, in which networks of exchange consisted of relatively hierarchical agreements
between families that could last generations, to the more complex systems of exchange
common to the early modern period: 118
Personal social relations were seen in terms of trust, but as market competition
and disputes became common, 'society' came to be defined, not just as the
positive expression of social unity through Christian love and ritual as had been
the case in medieval England, but increasingly as the cumulative unity of the
millions of interpersonal obligations which were continually being exchanged and
renegotiated (123).
The rise of the "culture ofcredit" that accompanied the increasingly complex market
structures created a reliance on trust: "To be a creditor in an economic sense still had a
strong social and ethical meaning. Most credit was extended between individual
emotional agents, and it meant that you were willing to trust someone to pay you in the
118 Muldrew dates this increasing complexity from the middle of the sixteenth century:
"After 1530 consumption expanded, and as the amount of buying and selling increased,
marketing structures became more complex. With limited amounts of gold and silver in
circulation, this economic expansion was based on the increasing use of credit, much of
which was informal [... ]; and because most credit relations were interpersonal and
emotive, this led to their becoming problematic" (3).
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future" (3). Unlike modem economic theory, which developed from the classical
economic models of the eighteenth century, approaches to markets in the early-modem
period stressed the interpersonal, cultural aspects ofexchange, for to exchange anything
in early modem England was to make a judgment about the person with whom one was
exchanging, to demonstrate trust in that person. Thus both objects of exchange and those
who offered (and marketed) goods had to be evaluated, judged, and measured. By 1580
the new systems of exchange had created what Muldrew calls an "economic crucible" in
which marketing involved not only economic objects of exchange, but also the social
relationships that made those exchanges possible, especially in terms of the reputation of
members of the exchanging community: "there was a reordering of notions of community
relations towards a highly mobile and circulating language ofjudgement," which
Muldrew calls "the 'currency ofreputation'-about the creditworthiness ofhouseholds
attempting both to cooperate and compete within communities increasingly permeated by
market relations" (2-3).
The Trojan and Greek societies are just such communities, obsessed as they are
with the dynamics of exchange and reputation. While Grady refers to the Greeks as
"objectivist" foils to the "subjectivist" Trojans symbolized by Troilus (92), it seems to me
that the Greeks are as subjectivist as the Trojans. They certainly understand how to
manipulate their relative individual values at the expense of the army's general
effectiveness. In fact, Ulysses recognizes that the factionalism-that is, competition
among the Greeks, as opposed to competition with the Trojans-is the primary threat to
the Greek project, which would ideally result in each of the Greeks raising their
respective values at the expense of the Trojans. This is not an objectivist view of social
174
worth; it is price-fixing. This is why Achilles' self-interest is a threat to the group's
goals. As long as Achilles recognizes that he can raise his own value by withholding his
services from the collective he represents a threat to the Greek project of collectively
inflating their respective values.
While characters repeatedly resort to misogynistic formulations to explain the
war, the conversation in the Greek camp reveals that the war provides a market by which
heroic and military worth may be established. Thus while both camps blame Helen for
the war, both also insist on fighting for reasons completely unrelated to her. Nestor's
argument that "valour's show and valour's worth divide / In storms of fortune" (45-6)
asserts the importance of the war on the grounds that it will reveal "worth," for only in
the difficult circumstances of the war are the properties inherent to valor allowed to enter
into a market exchange, a system of comparisons by which relative values may be sorted
out. Yet the various attempts by characters to manipulate their own values in fact results
only in confusion and anxiety. These anxieties reflect cultural concerns about the
instability ofvalue, or, more precisely, about the unstable systems of economic and
individual measurement that displace the older modes of exchange, which still
commanded rhetorical and emotive power. Hector's insistence that the value of objects
lies "not in particular will," but is "precious of itself' belongs to a vanishing world.
Not surprisingly, arguments about the nature of value are common to
pamphleteers of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, for the play's
obsessions with the subjective nature of value pick up on similar cultural obsessions
elicited by the rise of early capitalist systems of measure. Hector's argument for the
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objective value of commodities, for instance, is articulated by William Scott in An
Essay on Drapery (1635):
A Contract must be made according to the equality of the thing; and that must bee
measured by the price that is given. For as time is the measure of businesse, so is
price of Wares. Ifthe price exceed the worth of the thing, or the thing exceed the
price, the equality ofjustice is taken away; that both agree is the just rule of
trading, against which deceipt is opposite. (18-9)
As Hector says of Helen, "she is not worth what she doth cost / The holding." Of course,
part of the problem is that the price for Helen has not been agreed upon by two rational
parties. The Trojans pay the price for Helen every day they keep her, but the initial
transaction was not a price that underwent the usual practices of bargaining, by which a
fair and just price might be determined. This is why Troilus attempts to frame the rape of
Helen as a market exchange: "And for an old aunt whom the Greeks held captive / He
brought a Grecian queen" (2.2.76-7).
That trading "an old aunt"-Hesione-for Helen is not a fair deal, is clearly
implied by Troilus, and is an argument for keeping her, for the Trojans have benefited by
the trade. Yet, as Scott would say, in such a transaction "the equality ofjustice is taken
away." The Trojan strategy of seizing Helen as recompense for their own losses, as
emphasized by Shakespeare-is perhaps a vestige of the late medieval practice Avner
Greif has called "community responsibility systems," in which a community is held
responsible for the default of anyone of its traders. In situations-impersonal
176
exchanges-in which personal reputation was not a feasible guarantee of credit,
communities could enforce trade violations by holding all members of the defaulter's
community responsible for the debt:
A local communal court held all members of another commune legally liable for
the default of any member in contracts with a member of the local community. If
a defaulter's communal court refused to compensate the injured party, the local
court acquired compensation by confiscating the property of the defaulter's
commune members who were present within its jurisdiction (223).
At the heart of Shakespeare's version of the Trojan War is a conflict of trust, and that
trust violation has a negative effect on the reputation and identity of the members of each
community. The community responsibility system provided an incentive to deal justly
with others in order to preserve the communal reputation for good credit, yet the system
collapsed when heterogeneity within communities disincentivized such collective action.
It is just such conflicts between individuals and their communities that creates emulation
in Troilus and Cressida and makes justice so difficult to achieve. Without a legal
framework for the restitution of defaults, exchange depends on reputation, either
communal or individual, yet a breakdown in reputation leads to the failure ofjustice.
The possibility that economic exchange might not result in justice is at the heart
of economic measurt: anxiety. In the Boke }{amed the Governour Thomas Elyot
appropriates Aristotle's distinction between commutative and distributive (or
"rectificatory") justice. While distributive justice entails what Muldrew calls "the
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distribution of honour, money or some other assets divisible among members of a
community, according to merit" (44), commutative justice involves determining
mathematical equality between the parts of a transaction, and "sometime is voluntary,
sometime involuntary intermedlynge":
Voluntary is bienge and sellynge, love, suertie, lettynge, and takynge, and all
other thynge wherin, is mutuall consent at the beginning [... ]. Justice
commutative hathe no regarde to the persone, but onely considerynge the
inequalitie wherby the one thynge excedeth the other, indevoureth to brynge them
both to an equalitie" (196).
Both forms ofjustice are at stake in Troilus and Cressida: on the one hand, honor and
merit among Trojans and Greeks must be appropriately measured and distributed, and on
the other hand exchanges between parties must be mathematically equivalent in order for
them to be just. 119
In the Greek camp we see the same debate played out in slightly different terms.
Ulysses' famous speech on degree is a corollary to the Trojan debate on value, for
questions of worth cannot be limited to the Trojans. Ultimately everything and everyone
is indicted-or perhaps infected-including the audience. The Prologue argues that the
119 Agnew notes that "questions of commutative (or individual) justice overshadowed
questions of distributive (or social) justice in ethical and casuistic writing from Aquinas
onward, but this was largely because the answers to the distributive questions were
already embedded in the rules of access to markets, the prohibitions against hoarding, the
provisions for public granaries, and, not least of all, the retributive resources of carnival"
(37).
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play itself is subject to the relative values of the audience: "Like or find fault; do as
your pleasures are" (30). As C.C. Barfoot argues, the play "is concerned to press on us
the view that we are all inclined to be traitors once we have something to sell, either by
underselling or overselling goods, or ourselves, or others, or even by merely putting
ourselves, or our goods, or others up for sale at all" (47). This appraisal is (perhaps
subconsciously) reinforced by the use ofthe homophone traitor/trader, which
Shakespeare plays on in Pandarus' epilogue, where both words are used, (Palmer 302 n.
37).
Like Scott and Elyot, and like the Trojans, the Greeks are concerned about the
justness of their exchanges. Ulysses, in his speech on order, describes a world in which
the failure of degree-that is, a system of ordered relations-leads to the failure of
justice. Unlike the universe, which part of the created "order," the Greek camp, Ulysses
argues, is "chaos." In my discussion of this speech in Chapter I, I noted how it enforces
prevalent cultural anxieties about failures of measure, for it insists that failure of order in
anyone instance threatens to create disorder everywhere, figuring unease as disease:
The general's disdained
By him one step below; he, by the next;
That next, by him beneath. So every step,
Exampled by the first pace that is sick
Of his superior, grows to an envious fever
Of pale and bloodless emulation.
And 'tis this fever that keeps Troy on foot
Not her own sinews. (1.3.129-36)
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Disorder spreads like a disease, and infects not only the Greek camp, but the world
itself. Through "emulation" the Greeks, like the Trojans, recreate the world of the market
in their camp, but this system of competitive comparison destabilizes value rather than
fixes it.
The Greeks do not question the worth ofHelen relative to their own losses to the
extent that the Trojans do. They see the war itself as a chance to establish individual-in
the language of this play "particular"-achievement. Once again, the logic of the
marketplace is figured in human terms. As we have seen, the effect of this on female
characters is commodification, which leads to misogynist value assessments from male
characters. But while the effects of market value are gendered differently, males are
likewise the sum oftheir "worth," in this case through emulation, a word Shakespeare
uses in Troilus and Cressida almost as many times as in the rest of his plays combined. 120
"Emulation" is a word with ambivalent connotations in early modern England, potentially
meaning "[t]he endeavour to equal or surpass others in any achievement or quality"
(OED 1), that is, the code by which Hector wishes to test himself against the best of the
Greeks. Yet in its uses in Troilus and Cressida the word always has a negative
connotation, that of OED 2: "ambitious rivalry for power or honours; contention or ill-
will between rivals"; or even OED 3: "grudge against the superiority of others; dislike, or
tendency to disparagement, ofthose who are superior."
Emulation, then, might be considered positive to the extent that it entails
improving one's worth, but negative to the extent that it entails improving the
appearance of one's worth. And, as we have seen and has been articulated by Troilus and
120 Eight out of eighteen instances (Bartlett 431).
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others, the appearance of worth increasingly comes to be seen as actual value. Thus
the Greeks do not oppose the war as wasteful or view their losses as extraordinary. In
lengthy rhetorical orations, Agamemnon and Nestor, symbolic representations of power
and wisdom, both argue that the "[c]hecks and disasters" (1.3.4) the army has
experienced are tests of greatness. Agamemnon claims that "the protractive trials of great
Jove" (19) are designed so that "[d]istinction" might reveal the "rich in virtue" (16, 29).
Nestor expands on the argument, emphasizing the role of fortune: "In the reproof of
chance / lies the true proof of men" (32-3). That is, both argue that the failure to defeat
Troy will increase possibilities for individual distinction; both see the war itself as
productive of emulative possibilities. In a sense, they agree with Thersites' later ironic
comment: "All the argument is a whore and a cuckold. A good quarrel to draw emulous
factions and bleed to death upon" (2.3.65-6).
Ulysses rejects both explanations, arguing instead that the desire for individual
distinction---emulation-is precisely the cause of the Greeks' failures. I do not think it is
enough, on the basis of Ulysses' rejection of individual will, to label the Greeks-as
Grady does-"objectivist." Agamemnon's and Nestor's arguments are ultimately bound
to worldviews that originate in the appetite of the self-the worldview Ulysses ostensibly
rejects. Furthermore, Ulysses describes the entire Greek camp as ultimately bound to this
subjective outlook, and, although he rails against it, he shows himselfto be a crafty
manipulator of the relative values he criticizes. As Cedric Watts notes, Ulysses "invokes
the principle of hierarchy in order to urge the Greeks to respect their leaders. But after
this appeal for respect, Ulysses goes out to rig a lottery in order to deceive the warriors;
and furthermore, his deceptions fail [... ]" (126). The Greeks are as imprisoned by
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subjectivist values as the Trojans: after all, they too must be persuaded by Troilus'
logic since they are still engaged in a war for Helen.
In his speech, Ulysses expounds on early modem commonplaces, the importance
of "rule" and order, comparing the army to a beehive and then to the Ptolemaic solar
system. To abandon the "specialty of rule," Ulysses suggests, is to destroy the entire
world, for the world depends on a system of ordered relationships. Interestingly, Ulysses
does not argue that justice will be destroyed in such an event, but that it will be confused;
like "right and wrong," it will lose its name:
Force should be right--or rather, right and wrong,
Between whose endless jar justice resides,
Should lose their names, and so should justice too.
Then everything includes itself in power,
Power into will, will into appetite,
And appetite, an universal wolf,
So doubly seconded with will and power,
Must make perforce an universal prey,
And last eat up himself. (1.3.116-24)
Self-consumption is a recurring theme. Here the appetite is "an envious fever / Of pale
and bloodless emulation" (1.3.133-4); elsewhere Thersites says "lechery eats itself'
(5.4.30-1); and Agamemnon claims that "[h]e that is proud eats up himself' (2.3.146). In
a play where one's worth is always economic, pride and avarice become the same sin: all
characters in Troilus and Cressida try to inflate their own worth through individual will
or appetite, which in the gastric logic of the play must lead to self-consumption. As
Hillman argues, the play's manifestations of appetite result in the trope of seif-
consumption because "appetite contains--or wills-its own end. For the play seems to
me to conceive of appetite as something very like Nietzsche's 'will to power'-an
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insatiable, appropriative urge [...]" (306). Avarice is figured in Alciat's emblem as a
filthy woman "quaeque suum cor edit": "who eats her own heart" (Alciato 71).
In my discussion of the seventh canto of Dante's Inferno, I argue that the fourth
circle ofhell is an experiment in the logical ends of measure anxiety. In that canto, those
who fail to assess value properly are condemned to an afterlife in which they must carry
stones in a meaningless dance, constantly running into each other. The pilgrim Dante
thinks he must be able to recognize some ofthese sinners, but Virgil explains otherwise:
"the undiscerning life that befouled them makes them dark now to all recognition" (53-4).
Once again, in Troilus and Cressida, failures of recognition are a consequence of failures
to measure properly: straining for individual distinction paradoxically results in repeated
failures to distinguish one individual from another. Catherine Belsey describes appetite in
terms of desire, which is rooted in subjective identity: "The play stages the extent to
which objects of desire, always only a succession of stand-ins, are ultimately
interchangeable for the subject. But obsession here is indiscriminate: the characters lose
all distinction as desire becomes the element in which they have their being" (93). Like
right and wrong, and like justice, the characters "lose their names" (1.3.118). Patricia
Parker notes that Aeneas cannot distinguish Agamemnon from the rest of the Greeks (the
'''general' from the particulars"), and Thersites later comments that "Ajax actually takes
him for the general" (Literary Fat Ladies 88). In Pandarus' catalogue of the Trojans
returning from battle-the entire point ofwhich is to distinguish Troilus from the other
Trojans-Pandarus confuses Troilus with Deiphobus (1.2.209). Hector comicaHy asks
Thersites "Art thou for Hector's match?" (5.5.22). In a world without a figurative gold
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standard by which values may be fixed, Shakespeare suggests, individual distinction
is fool's gold, a fundamentally impossible illusion.
It is this lack of standard that damns both Shakespeare's characters and Dante's
indistinguishable souls. When Ulysses says that the "disease" of the Greeks is that "[t]he
specialty of rule hath been neglected" (1.3.77), the diagnosis depends on the possible
connotations of "rule." One possible definition is social: "A regulation framed or adopted
by a corporate body, public or private, for governing its conduct and that of its members"
(OED 5a). Conversely, it might be read in individual terms: "A principle, regulation, or
maxim governing individual conduct" (OED 1a). Thus this word participates in what
Parker has called the "[p]aronomastic play on the 'general' and the 'particular'" in
Troilus and Cressida (87). In its context, the word preserves both connotations:
communal order (rule) has been poisoned by the failure of individuals to govern their
appetites. I2l Order is the standard that provides value to commodities. This standard is
what Dante's Virgil calls "misura," measure:
Everyone of them [the prodigal and avaricious] was so cross-eyed in
mind in the first life, that no measure governed their spending. (40-2)
Without objective measure, individual worth depends on and is contextualized by the
value of one's peers, that is, it is a market value. As I have suggested, this recognition
has a thoroughly economic effect: individuals devalue the worth of others to improve
their own relative "price." Parker has noted that economic awareness in this play leads to
inflation "in its multiple senses--ofbody, of discourse, of price, and of the space before
121 That is, the failure of temperance. Milton employs "rule" in this context: "if thou well
observe / The rule of not too much, by temperance taught [...J" (Paradise Lost XI 530-1).
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end or fine" (flhakespeare 225). But clearly deflation is at work too. The "universal"
particular drive to increase value has social effects: paradoxically, characters are obsessed
with distinctions of value that depend on a general misura, but such distinctions are
impossible precisely because characters' pursuit of inflating their "particular" values
destroys such "order."
All threats to order in the early modem period eventually suggest failures of
language. As I have suggested, praising and dispraising are especially fraught forms of
discourse to the extent that they are forms ofvalue manipulation. But given Muldrew's
discussion of the rise of credit and the importance of trust beginning in the middle of the
sixteenth century, forms ofpromising are equally complex and susceptible to suspicion.
We might ask Troilus's question-"what's ought but as 'tis valued?"---ofverbal
expressions, including Troilus' and Cressida's vows. Since verbal expressions are
relative, Troilus and Cressida need a standard-a "rule," or misura-by which to
measure their own faithfulness. Troilus selects himself as his standard of truth, or, more
precisely, he claims that his future faithfulness will itself be the standard for future
faithful relationships. He makes his name the collateral of his promise. Yet his name is
more than himself, for it is a literary byword for one who is faithful and yet is betrayed;
like all characters in the play, Troilus evinces a kind of awareness of himself as a literary
artifact.
Thus Cressida cannot revert to her own name as a standard of truth, partly
because her name has already been compromised. instead she uses her name as a
negative pole of faithfulness: in effect, she curses herself:
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If I be false, or swerve a hair from truth,
When time is old and hath forgot itself,
[... ] yet let memory
From false to false among false maids in love
Upbraid my falsehood. (3.2.171-178)
The wit of this scene depends on the audience's awareness of Cressida's vast literary and
cultural history as a standard of betrayal, an equivalence easily available to early modem
audiences. Thus, before the vows have been exchanged-before the play has started-
Cressida has betrayed Troilus. Shakespeare couches the motives for this betrayal in a
kind of market logic: like the male characters, she recognizes that her own value is
dependent on forces of competition, which may raise her "price." Cressida, like Helen, is
both price and prize, and it is her awareness ofher value as prize that causes her to
manipulate the market in order to increase her price.
Cressida is depicted as self-consciously aware of her own value from her first
appearance in the play. In the first Act, Cressida and Alexander are talking when
Pandarus enters. Cressida, after being informed ofPandarus' entry, deliberately praises
Hector, since she is aware that it is the very possibility of her availability that preserves
her "price." Here I quote from the New Variorum, for reasons of spelling and
punctuation:
Enter Pandarus
Cre. Who comes here?
Man. Madam your Vncle Pandarus.
Cre. Hectors a gallant man.
Man. As may be in the world Lady.
Pan. What's that? what's that?
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Cre. Good morrow Vncle Pandarus.
Pan. Good morrow Cozen Cressid: what do you talke of? good morrow
Alexander: how do you Cozen? when were you at Illium? (1.2.40-
9)
While Cressida is already figured as a cheat by her textual history, the pun on
cousin/cozen here also prefigures her as a cheater at the precise moment that she self-
consciously attempts to manipulate her own market value by speaking of another man in
her uncle's presence. She presents herself as a good with a relative price, but she is also
buying, and it is in her interest to devalue the good (Troilus) by comparing him
unfavorably with Hector:
Pandarus:
Cressida:
Pandarus:
Cressida:
Pandarus:
Cressida:
Troilus is the better man ofthe two
a Jupiter! There's no comparison.
What, not between Troilus and Hector? Do you know a man if you
see him?
Ay, if I ever saw him before and knew him.
Well, I say Troilus is Troilus.
Then you say as I say, for I am sure
He is not Hector. (1.2.56-63)
This exchange continues through the procession of Trojans, in which Pandarus attempts
to establish Troilus' relative value, continually pressing Cressida to "mark Troilus above
the rest." He might as easily urge her to "market Troilus above the rest"; like Ulysses,
who attempts to manipulate the emulation market ("Let us like merchants show our
foulest wares I And think perchance they'll sell" [1.3.352-3]), Pandarus and Cressida
attempt to inflate or deflate goods in order to serve their own economic interests. In the
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process of assigning value, the commodity in question must always be compared to
another commodity.I22
In the vow scene, however, Cressida's attempts to preserve self-value lead to a
disastrous paradox. She is caught in a bind: to be valuable she must be both available to
competition and completely unavailable-"true." Cressida's attempt to fix her
faithfulness to her own name is material for stage humor because of the force her name
already has, emphasized again by Pandarus' use ofthe term "cousin":
Go to, a bargain made. Seal it, seal it. I'll be the witness. Here I hold your
hand; here, my cousin's. If ever you prove false to one another, since I
have taken such pain to bring you together, let all pitiful goers-between be
called to the world's end after my name: call them all panders. Let all
constant men be Troiluses, all false women Cressids, and all brokers-
between panders. Say 'Amen.' (3.3.184-90)
Thus Pandarus presents the romantic attachment between Cressida and Troilus as an
economic deal, a "bargain" which must be witnessed and sealed. Yet it is a bargain
destined to end in bad faith, for the grammatical extension of the hypothetical "if ever
you prove false to one another" is ambiguous. That is, the last sentence has independent
syntactic force and negates both Cressida's previous "if" and Pandarus' "if'; it becomes a
122 See Marx: "It is not possible to express the value of linen in linen. 20 yards of
linen=20 yards oflinen is no expression ofvalue. On the contrary, such an equation
merely says that 20 yards of linen are nothing else than 20 yards of linen, a definite
quantity of the use-value oflinen. The value of the linen can therefore be expressed only
relatively-i.e., in some other commodity" (56).
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pronouncement or, with the addition of "Amen," a prayer. This etiological
signification is reinforced by Pandarus' reference to his own name, which did in fact
spawn the word "pander": the word was in use from Bocaccio's and Chaucer's accounts
of the Troilus and Cressida (OED).
Troilus and Cressida both grasp at standards by which to reinforce their words,
but one of the effects of a world without misura is that language itself fails. Even when
context demands high oratory, such as the meeting between the Greeks in 1.3, the mode
is satirical; the inflated words can only sound deflated in the context of the petty
particular cares of the Greeks. More significantly, in this context language turns to the
idiom of filth and corruption, typified by Thersites' railing. In Thersites the somatic
tropes ofthe play are given voice in linguistic expressions of disgust, usually in terms of
venereal disease. Patroclus is a target for Thersites because he is a perfect embodiment of
commodified flesh and is thus paradoxically without value: "Thou idle immaterial skein
of sleave-silk, thou green sarsenet flap for a sore eye, thou tassel of a prodigal's purse,
thou! Ah, how the poor world is pestered with such waterflies!" (5.1.26-8).
When Ajax has been selected as the Greek champion to face Hector, he is at his
most proud, and Thersites describes the effects of self-assessment without measure: the
lack of the capacity to distinguish and the failure oflanguage. Ajax has no capacity to
distinguish between particulars: "He knows not me. I said, "Good morrow, Ajax', and he
replies, "Thanks, Agamemnon'. What think you of this man that takes me for the
General? He's grown a very land-fish, ianguageiess, a monster" (3.3.251-4). The absurd,
languageless Ajax, incapable of making distinctions yet obsessed with achieving
distinction, is thus an exemplar of the world of failed measure. Just as language in the
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fourth circle of hell is incomprehensible, so in Troilus and Cressida it becomes a
parody of itself, and we might connect Thersites' caustic ranting with the
incomprehensible clucking of Plutus. Yet language only fails in the Inferno when it has
no misura, no shared standard on which community members may rely. Virgil is able to
silence and vanquish Plutus with language, indeed with only a few words, but he does so
by referring to an outside source of value:
Not without cause is our descent to the depths: it is willed on high,
where Michael avenged the proud onslaught. (10-13)
Virgil's language, then, is a currency with absolute value: he is as good as his word(s);
characters in Troilus and Cressida, generally, are not. Yet, like Virgil, they continually
attempt to measure themselves and their words by fixing them to other, more stable
values. Thersites is the character most resigned to the failure of this strategy; unlike the
Trojans and Greeks who repeatedly compare themselves and others to other Trojans and
Greeks, in an infinitely regressive and increasingly futile attempt to fix value somewhere,
Thersites removes himself and all others from the market altogether. In Nestor's words,
he is
A slave whose gall coins slanders like a mint,
To match us in comparisons with dirt,
To weaken and discredit our exposure[.] (1.3.193-5)
The economic metaphor here is prescient. Thersites' counterfeit praises introduce into the
market a set of verbal representations that affect all other verbal attempts to raise or fix
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value, and the result is "discredit"-the failure of trust upon which equitable market
exchanges depend.
In his ability see the pointless scuffling of the "heroes" of the Trojan War,
Thersites is thus like Virgil standing above the pointless clashing of the damned, for he
seems to recognize that the characters of this play are stereotypes whose individuality
ultimately cannot be recovered. In such a context, the high rhetoric of the source texts is
meaningless, and Thersites becomes the chorus: like no other Shakespearean play,
Troilus and Cressida is the play of disgust and verbal filth, and like no other play it is a
meditation on the failures of the ordered and measurable world. It is Dante's Virgil who
might best sum up Shakespeare's approach to the "mad idolatry" of the world without
misura, the Trojan War; these lines might even be considered a motto for the play's
attitude toward its heroes in general:
Bad giving and bad keeping has deprived them of the lovely world and
set them to this scuffling: whatever it is, I prettify no words for it (7.58-
60).
And Shakespeare prettifies no words for the mismeasured world ofthe Trojan War.
Ultimately, failures of measure threaten to infect language itself, and thus in
Shakespeare's nightmare of failed misura Homeric characters enter the early modem
market, teetering, as Foucault says, "on the brink of anxiety," turned into measureless
monsters and expressing every measure anxiety of the early modern world.
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